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ABSTRACT 
Engagement in the provision of support for people in need is often motivated by religious 
ideology. Doctrinally, helping others is one of the general characteristics of most faith-traditions; 
major monotheistic religions such as Christianity and Judaism, and non-monotheistic ones such 
as Buddhism and Hinduism convey principles and teachings that exhort their believers to 
perform various kinds of social services. Islam, also, has such a history of dealing with 
humanitarian issues through providing assistance to the underprivileged classes of society; 
ordaining Zakat (lit. almsgiving) as one of the five pillars of Islam or encouraging Waqf (public 
charity) are major examples of this.  
 Currently, social welfare provision in most developed countries is organized 
predominantly by their governments, yet the intellectual influence of religion through biblical 
references in the historical development of this institution is obvious. This religious influence is 
more prominent and prevailing in underdeveloped countries, where the state is not capable of 
providing comprehensive social welfare for its citizens. A very interesting perspective in this 
discourse was introduced when social welfare provision was adopted as an organizational effort, 
concurrent with the political trend of contemporary Islamic revivalism in the twentieth century.  
 This thesis discusses social welfare organization by an Islamic political party in 
Bangladesh, namely, Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami. The dynamics of the social welfare program 
are not necessarily identical among the multitude of contemporary Islamic political movements 
arising in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies. However, the existence of this program, and, 
more importantly, its recent effectiveness in terms of social achievement and gaining popularity, 
are an undeniable reality. The effective measures of social welfare provision undertaken by the 
religion-based political parties are now manifested in some major Muslim countries, such as in 
the cases of AKP (Justice and Welfare Party; Turkish: Adaletve Kalkinma Partisi) in Turkey, 
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement; Arabic: Ḥarakah al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah) in 
Palestine, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Middle East, and Hizbullah (Arabic: lit. Party of 
God) in Lebanon. The scholars who have studied these movements generally acknowledge this 
aspect of their  makeup in their analyses.  
V 
 Although participation in social welfare organization by an Islamic political party has 
been a political phenomenon in Bangladesh since the early 1970s, it has not yet been studied and 
examined sociologically. This research focuses on the social welfare activities of the major 
Islamic political party in Bangladesh and their implementation in Chittagong, Bangladesh, 
through Islamic Social Welfare Council Chittagong. It will demonstrate why an Islamic political 
party ventures into organizing social welfare activities and how it organizes them. It will also 
show that the relationship between political aspects and social aspects of the party are reciprocal, 
and, therefore, success or failure in the party’s political activities affects its social welfare 
activities and vice versa.  
 This study aims to assess the status of the social welfare program in this party’s overall 
agenda, as well as its outcomes and potentials. Using a methodology involving in-depth 
interviews and focus groups, the study presents an ethnographical inquiry into the social welfare 
program of the Jama’at, particularly in the health and educational sectors. It attempts to explore 
those activities using a qualitative approach to understanding the motives and perceptions of both 
the providers and recipients of the service. It has been proven in many Muslim countries that the 
provision of faith-based social welfare greatly assists the public acceptance of religious political 
parties in those societies where state-supported social welfare is ineffective or nearly non-
existent. In this context, the core argument of this thesis is that the Jama’at in Bangladesh, also, 
has attempted to utilize this valuable resource in order to mobilize support, but that this attempt 
has been greatly (and negatively) affected by the prevailing political circumstances. The evident 
success of Islamic political movements in some other Muslim societies, that engage in social 
welfare provision as a significant way of engaging the community and thereby gaining its 
approval of the party, is likely to ensue in Bangladesh also, if the Jama’at is able to manoeuvre 
its social welfare program with a pragmatic approach that suits the local cultures and societies.  
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Note for Non-English Words and Transliteration 
 
This work contains many non-English words, in languages such as Bengali, Arabic and Urdu. I 
write the non-English words, unless commonly used in English, in Italics, then provide an 
explanation in parentheses, for short meanings, or in footnotes, for long explanations. Instead of 
any specific transliteration method, for those non-English words I use the general transliteration 
system as followed by conventional academics and the media.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Social welfare provision is an indispensable and age-old element of human society that places 
emphasis on the well-being of the members of the society. At various stages of human 
history, social welfare has been organized and administered by several types of authority. 
Although there have always been some exceptions, it is generally and naturally carried out by 
capable authorities, be it by the rulers or by the wealthy people. With the development of 
social structures and governance systems in the modern era, organization of social welfare 
provision has become more complex than ever before. Among several other emerging 
paradigms, one of the interesting cases is the organization of social welfare provision by 
Islamic political parties involved in contemporary Islamic revivalism in a number of Muslim 
majority countries.  
This research is an attempt to explore social welfare organization by a major Islamic 
political party, Jama’at-e-Islami (Urdu: lit. Islamic Party) in Bangladesh. It will focus on 
investigating the social welfare program – social welfare programs are now considered a 
major avenue for Islamic political parties worldwide to reach ordinary people – administered 
by this party in the city of Chittagong, the second largest city and the commercial capital of 
Bangladesh. In the process of achieving this objective, the research will also investigate the 
policies, motives and experiences of people relevant to the program. In examining this 
particularly engaging and ongoing social welfare provision, this study is providing an 
ethnographic study of Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami with regard to its social welfare 
organization, particularly in the health and educational sectors. The study will explore these 
activities using a qualitative approach to understand the motives and the perceptions of both 
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the service providers and the service receivers. It will posit that the progress made by this 
religiously based political movement, in spite of its decreasing acceptance among middle-
class and educated Bangladeshi people in a secular state, is indeed attributable to the social 
welfare program it has already undertaken. This organization of social welfare by Islamic 
political parties is a recent phenomenon found in several Muslim countries, such as Turkey, 
Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan and Indonesia. In many of those countries, Islamic 
political parties have been able to mobilize this welfare resource successfully to gain political 
opportunities. The apparent success of political Islamic revivalist movements in Turkey, 
Egypt and Palestine has inspired the Jama’at in Bangladesh, but, as this research will show, 
Jama’at has failed to achieve similar political success. Moreover, the social welfare activities 
of the Jama’at also suffer from major practical drawbacks (see Chapter 8). Nevertheless, 
welfare organization by the Jama’at in Bangladesh has engendered strong support for the 
ideological and political causes of the movement and contributed to the development of a 
modern Islamic polity.  
The historical background of this phenomenon will be discussed in this chapter, 
followed by a description of the significance of the topic, which will also facilitate 
understanding of the explanation of the key areas of the thesis, such as political Islamic 
revivalism, the distinctiveness of the Jama’at as an Islamic political party and social welfare 
provision organized by Islamic political parties in various other Muslim countries. The 
chapter will also outline the objectives, scope and structure of this study, with a specific focus 
on the research questions, to which this thesis will attempt to respond. The relevant literature 
will be reviewed in the next chapter. 
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BACKGROUND  
Religious institutions often engage in providing support for people in need, as well as 
motivating their followers and adherents to participate in charity and welfare activities or 
programs. Doctrinally, helping others is one of the general characteristics of most faith-
traditions; major monotheistic religions, such as Christianity and Judaism, and non-
monotheistic ones, such as Buddhism and Hinduism, convey principles and teachings that 
advise the believers to perform various kinds of social services (Jawad, 2012). Islam also has 
such a history of dealing with humanitarian issues through providing assistance to 
underprivileged members of society. Ordaining zakat (almsgiving; Arabic: lit. purification) as 
one of the five pillars of Islam or encouraging waqf (public charity; Arabic: lit. stopping) are 
major examples of this assistance. From the very beginning of its history, the practice of the 
religion of Islam has been associated with the authority of the governance. In one of his 
famous statements, Umar (ruled 634–644), the second Caliph after the Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH), says about himself that “if a dog dies hungry on the banks of the river Euphrates, 
Umar will be responsible for dereliction of duty” (Mohtsham, 2007, p. 258). This assertion, 
by an early Muslim ruler, metaphorically referring to an animal, indicates the responsibility 
of the Islamic state towards its citizens. The Islamic rulers’ sense of responsibility and 
religious obligation for social welfare have strongly motivated contemporary Islamic political 
parties’ inclusion of a social welfare agenda in party activities. Both religiously and 
historically, welfare is counted as one of the primary duties of socio-religious authority in 
Islam. As the contemporary political Islamic revivalist parties strive to establish Islam in 
governance, they have also adopted this aspect as one of their primary agendas.  
Currently, social welfare provision in most developed countries is organized 
predominantly by their governments, yet the intellectual influence of religion is obvious 
through biblical references in the historical development of this institution (Cnaan & 
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Mcgrew, 2006). Since the time of ancient civilizations, religion has always been a key 
determinant in social welfare organization. In underdeveloped countries where the state is not 
capable of providing comprehensive social welfare to its citizens, non-government private 
organizations have come forward in an attempt to fill the void. Among these, religious 
organizations are significantly represented, as humanitarian assistance is a tenet common to 
almost all religions. However, such religious organizations are customarily apolitical, and 
social or educational in nature. A very interesting and different trajectory was added to this 
situation when social welfare provision was adopted as an organizational effort with the 
political trend of contemporary Islamic revivalism in the twentieth century. 
This transnational political trend of Islamic revivalism was introduced in Bangladesh 
by Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami (lit. Bangladesh Islamic Party). This is the largest Islamic 
political party in Bangladesh, the South Asian country with the fourth largest Muslim 
population. Ideologically, this party strives for ‘the establishment of Islamic governance’ 
(Iqamat-e-Deen) at state level, as advocated by its theologian founder and ideologue, Abul 
Ala Mawdudi, who formed it in British India in 1941. Similarly to its counterparts in other 
Muslim countries, Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami (henceforth, the Jama’at) has several social 
welfare enterprises actively operating throughout the country. 
‘Social Welfare’ is one of the four primary official agendas of the Jama’at in 
Bangladesh, as is declared in its party constitution. The Jama’at organizes several types of 
social welfare activities targeting society’s poor and underprivileged. It provides them with 
direct financial donations as well as medical and educational services. In an underdeveloped 
country where state-provided welfare is significantly inadequate and in some instances even 
absent, this service has been helping the party to reach a vast cross-section of the population. 
One rationale that led to the undertaking of this study was the obvious lack of 
academic analysis of the social aspects of Islamic movements in Bangladesh in general and of 
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Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami in particular. In a study of the role played by religion in 
Bangladeshi society, the Jama’at is significant and undeniably an influential factor. The 
importance that the Jama’at holds in Bangladesh is described by Mumtaz Ahmed (2008, p. 
61):  
Revivalist Islam in today’s Bangladesh is represented by two distinct and opposing streams: 
the politically activist revivalism is represented by the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the quietist, non-
political da’wah-oriented revivalism is represented by the Tablighi Jamaat. … Regarded as 
one of the most effectively organized religio-political movements, the Jamaat-i-Islami has 
staged a remarkable comeback, despite the enormous liability that its leadership carries from 
the 1971 experience when it sided with the Pakistani forces and fought against the 
independence of Bangladesh. It was banned, along with the other Islamic political groups, 
after the liberation of Bangladesh. Soon after it re-emergence on the national political stage in 
the late 1970s, however, the Jama’at became the most powerful Islamist group in Bangladesh. 
Compared with fewer than 2 per cent of the votes polled by all Islamic parties, the Jamaat 
candidates received 12.13 per cent and 8.63 per cent of votes during the 1991 and 1996 
parliamentary elections. 
The significance of societal issues in the Jama’at’s agenda is apparent in Esposito’s 
description of this party, where he states that the Jama’at “strives for the establishment of an 
Islamic state through educational work, social reform, and democratic elections” (Esposito, 
2003, p. 156). The Jama’at in Bangladesh is analysed from different perspectives by various 
scholars: for instance, its religiously based political ideology (Kabir, 2006), its place in recent 
global terrorism discourse (Pattanaik, 2009), its role in importing a transnational 
understanding of Islam to the local context of Bangladesh (Hossain & Siddiquee, 2006; 
Kumar, 2009), and its approach to addressing women’s issues (Shehabuddin, 1999; 
Shehabuddin, 2008). However, I have not been able to trace a single study so far that focuses 
on Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami’s social welfare activities. One of the reasons for this dearth 
of academic focus on this specific area seems to be the political nature of the movement with 
its primary objective of establishing Islamic governance.  
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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study will focus on people’s perception and experience with regard to the Bangladesh 
Jama’at-e-Islami’s social welfare program. Consideration of theological aspects of this 
program is not the central point of discussion in this thesis, but yet these have some 
significant implications. People expect the implementation and manifestation of some 
religious aspects of its ideology when they are involved in the activities run by a group 
claiming religious affiliation. During the initial library research for this study, it was evident 
that the moral aspects of social welfare have been studied widely and for centuries by Muslim 
theologians.1 Certainly this discourse was initiated by the relevant verses in the Qur’an and 
the compilation of the Prophetic Traditions under several relevant chapters.2 From a modern-
day economic perspective, Islamic tradition is sometimes represented as an alternative: a 
welfare-generating economy opposing the interest-based modern economic system (Tripp, 
2006). In discussions concerning the association of economics with social welfare issues, 
zakat (almsgiving), third among the five pillars of Islam, is often regarded as the nucleus of 
the economy of an ideal Islamic state (Weiss, 2002). Jan Ali (2014) explained zakat as a 
spiritual approach towards poverty alleviation and economic development through charity, an 
approach which has not been properly practised in Muslim societies for a long time, or in the 
modern age. While studying the role of religion in modern-day social work, Patel, Numphries 
                                                            
1 A list of relevant books would contain thousands of titles. Here some book titles are mentioned only to 
exemplify the classical Muslim scholarship that discusses the welfare aspect of Islam from different 
perspectives: Purification of Wealth (Islah al-Mal) by Abu Bakr Ibn Abi al-Dunya (d. 894); Book of Wealth 
(Kitab al-Amwal) by Abu Ubaid al-Baghdadi (d. 838); Rights of the Neighbour (Haqq al-Jar) by Shams al-Din 
al-Jahabi (d. 1347); Islamic Guidelines for Human Development (Al-Tawjih al-Insani lil-Numuw al-Insani) by 
Abdur Rahman al-Zaid; Laws of Alms (Fiqh al-Zakat) by Yusuf al-Qaradawi; Culture of Welfare Works 
(Thaqafat al-’amal al-Khairy) by Abd al-Karim Bakkar; Distributing Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic 
Economy, edited by Munawar Iqbal.  
2 Various aspects of welfare, such as almsgiving, charity, helping people in need and especially orphans, social 
cohesion and cooperation, and social insurance are ordained in and inspired by the Qur’an in numerous verses. 
For instance, almsgiving (zakat) is mentioned in: Al Baqarah: 83, 177, 261, 274; Al Imran: 133, 134; Al 
Maaidah: 12; Al Taubah: 60; Al Ahzab: 33 and many more verses. Moreover, thousands of relevant Prophetic 
Traditions (Hadith) are compiled in several chapters in the prominent compilations such as those of Sahih 
Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, which include the Prophetic Traditions on the topics of charity, endowment, public 
interest, leniency in financial trading, loans, supporting family members and kin, good behaviour and so on.  
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and Naik (1998, p. 199) mentioned five principles as intrinsic to Islamic values, that are 
simultaneously shared by Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism. In this discourse emphasis is 
placed on the well-being and equality of humankind, individual freedom as being associated 
with community bindings, and personal responsibilities and relationships based on 
consultation. These values could be effective as identifying variables in evaluating a religion-
based social welfare program.  
For a thorough study of this social phenomenon, it is not enough to explore only the 
roles played by a religion-based voluntary welfare provider, such as the Jama’at, and to 
understand the social welfare system in Bangladesh. It is also important to appreciate the 
significance of the contribution made by this service provider to the overall social functioning 
of the society. Given that the underdevelopment of the Bangladesh economy has resulted in a 
lack of state-supported social welfare provision, the role played by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and religiously based charitable organizations is very important. This 
study, then, will explore why and how in a secular country, religiously based political 
organizations or movements such as the Jama’at have a role to play. 
Inevitably, the fulfillment of basic human rights is associated with the financial 
situation of a country or society. The economically developed countries of the world have 
moved towards being welfare states that secure the basic rights for their citizens. For 
instance, Australia has seen the emergence of welfare policy, replacing previous charity 
structures, after the experience of the 1890s economic depression. This influenced the 
introduction of the old age pension schemes in 1901 (Garton, 1994). Charity organizations 
are working in the developed states playing diverse roles, sometimes in a supplementary 
manner and sometimes as substitutes. In underdeveloped countries, the absence of such state-
organized welfare systems has opened up greater opportunity and operational space for such 
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charity organizations. Similarly in Bangladesh, these NGOs play important role in 
‘promoting and safeguarding’ human rights issues (Zafarullah & Rahman, 2002). 
The Muslims of Bangladesh, who represent the fourth largest Muslim population of 
the world, are not disconnected from the changes and developments that their counterparts in 
other countries have been experiencing. As has, simultaneously, been the case with other 
Muslim societies in different regions, various trends and schools of Islamic thought have 
flourished among Muslims of Bangladesh along with the continuous Westernization of their 
society and the burgeoning of secularism. The study of Muslims in Bangladesh, and their 
approach towards their religion, has more significance now than ever before, within the 
context of current geo-political realities of the South Asian region. This context is relevant 
since the Muslims of Bangladesh are affected by the conflicts occurring in their region, in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, many of which are politically and religiously motivated.  
Also, the present revivalist trend of Islam represents very diverse ways in which a 
large number of Muslims look at the role of their lives in the contemporary world. A political 
interpretation of Islam is one such view and is spreading increasingly in various Muslim 
societies. The marriage of social welfare with this politics-oriented Islamic revivalism is 
certainly an interesting phenomenon that will greatly impact on and cause changes to these 
societies. The political trend of Islamic revivalism calls for establishing Islam in every 
worldly aspect of human life, and applying religious principles of governance at the state 
level is considered as the ultimate objective of this discourse. To achieve this goal, political 
revivalist scholars established Islamic political parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Jama’at-e-Islami, that started participating in a Western-styled political framework. 
Although their theological interpretations of Islamic governance disagree to varying degrees 
with Western concepts of democracy, these parties have been trying to negotiate around these 
disagreements and to gradually secure political space in Muslim societies. Against this 
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background, their provision of social welfare functions as an important tool for gaining 
acceptance in the underdeveloped societies. Moreover, the religious obligation of the Islamic 
authorities to provide charity has also inspired them to organize welfare activities alongside 
the reduced state mechanism for social welfare in those countries. Manifested primarily 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, this engagement in social welfare provision has already 
produced positive outcomes for Islamic political parties in countries like Turkey, Egypt, 
Palestine and Indonesia (Clark, 2004b; White, 2012). In the case of Indonesia, the Islamist 
political party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), was not able to form a government in its 
own right. Kikue Hamayotsu (2011, p. 971) claimed, however, that “the relatively solid 
party-mass relations and broad spatial penetration of PKS are conditioned by its 
organizational ability to deliver welfare services to strategically targeted constituencies”. 
Examining the manifestation of this phenomenon in the Bangladeshi context will certainly 
give significant insights into this area of study.  
Finally, Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami represents one of the most active and influential 
sectors of Islamic socio-political endeavour in the country. Many Islamic scholars, and 
Muslims in general – adapting to different trends of Islamic revivalism, according to their 
understanding of Islam and their interpretation of religious theories – are divided on the 
subject of Islamic politics, with Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami considered in reality as the 
country’s central and mainstream representation of the contemporary political Islamic 
revivalist approach. It is worth mentioning that the Jama’at is also the most criticized Islamic 
party in Bangladeshi society. Various Muslim religious scholars, and their followers in 
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, censure the principles and activities of Jama’at as a result of 
their theoretical differences with the thoughts of Mawdudi, the scholar-founder of this party. 
A critical analysis of the concepts and activities of Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami regarding 
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social issues would assist in building an understanding of the position of this Islamic party in 
Bangladeshi society. 
The Jama’at is currently the largest democratic Islamic political party in Bangladesh, 
with more followers than all the other Islamic political parties of the country combined. It has 
gained a major role in the nation, although it is currently facing serious drawbacks in politics 
with the allegation of its involvement in war crimes during the liberation war in 1971. There 
are numerous other Islamic political parties in Bangladesh, but some of them lack even a 
mature organizational structure, while the Jama’at is known for its well-designed 
organization, such as its leadership and management being conducted though strictly 
observed party policies and structure. It could also be safely assumed that the initial success 
of the Jama’at in Bangladeshi politics inspired groups adhering to other religious schools of 
thought to join in national politics through the formation of several new Islamic political 
parties. Of all the Islamic political parties in the country, the Jama’at has been able to 
organize a strong and working social welfare provision framework. Considering all these 
facts, it would seem obligatory for the study of social welfare activities organized within the 
political trend of contemporary Islamic revivalism in Bangladesh to start with a case study of 
the Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami.  
 
POLITICAL ISLAMIC REVIVALISM 
Islamic revivalism in the contemporary world is considered a response to modernity. Islamic 
movements are organized calling for the reformation of Muslim societies based on Islamic 
values and principles. This wide-ranging concept, of returning to Islam in its pristine form, 
attempts to extend the influence of religion to all aspects of human life. In twentieth-century 
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Muslim countries, development of Islamic political activism has contributed to Islamic 
revivalism and has taken a significant place in this discourse.  
Participation by Islamic parties in the process of democratic politics is a very novel 
course, that has recently been experiencing a rapid expansion throughout the Muslim world. 
Historically, major segments of the Muslim world in Asia, Africa and parts of Europe were 
ruled largely by a combination of two types of government: Islamic theo-democracy3, known 
as Khilafah, and dynastic monarchy (Lapidus, 2002). However, religion was never separated 
from the government. Islam has been always pertinent to those governments to varying 
degrees, through consultation with religious scholars or by their unmediated involvement in 
the administration. The monarchs in the Muslim world generally needed religious attestation 
and affiliation in order to elevate and sustain their authority. The term ‘Khilafa’ originally 
refers to the ruler, to be either selected or elected regardless of his heredity.4 However, most 
of the Muslim monarchs took on the title ‘Caliph’ (Zaman, 2004) (instead of the generic term 
‘Amir’ (Arabic: lit. Ruler)) which also indicates their religious affiliation.  
In the wake of the European industrial revolution and rapid Western advancement in 
science and technology, governments in the Muslim world weakened and many Muslim 
countries consequently experienced European colonization in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. One of the major consequences, in the aftermath of this colonial experience, was 
the division of the Muslim world into more than 50 Muslim states and the establishment of 
diverse types of political systems. Some Arab states are still ruled by the dynastic monarchs, 
but most of the Muslim states are now administered by elected quasi-democratic governments 
                                                            
3 The term ‘theo-democracy’ was coined by Mawdudi to define the Islamic method of governance, known as the 
Caliphate (‘Khilafah’ in Arabic). However, many Islamic scholars argue that the word ‘democracy’ is non-
acceptable in Islamic terminology, as it originated in Western civilization. One of the basic principles of the 
concept of the Caliphate, however, is consultation, according to Islamic textual directives (Afsaruddin, 2011; 
Esposito, 1999).  
4 This practice is according to the mainstream Sunni school of thought. However in the Shi’a school, descending 
from the house of the Prophet is considered as one of the significant traits of the leadership (Darling, 2004).  
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(Nasr, 1999). Although the efficiency and the quality of democracy in many Muslim 
countries are debatable, the situation is similar in many non-Muslim underdeveloped and 
developing countries as well. The socio-political situation of a country is associated with 
several factors, such as economics, education and military power, among others. Most 
Muslim countries are currently struggling for good governance, sustainable development and 
a stronger economy. Social welfare provision is a significant element in this discourse.  
Two major events are marked as milestones in the recent evolution of the ever-
changing political trends in Muslim countries: the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978–1979 
and the Arab Awakening in the twenty-first century. Iran has been ruled by democratically 
elected rulers since the revolution; the Arab Spring is uprooting long-time dictatorships in 
many Middle-Eastern and Arab-African countries. In this context, Islamic political parties 
have been accorded great attention in global and local political discourses. The 9/11 attack on 
the Twin Towers has also played a significant part in the discourse of Islamic politics as it 
has highlighted and introduced into this discourse the obvious division between radical and 
moderate trends of Islamic power politics. 
On the contemporary political canvas of the Muslim world, several Islamic political 
parties represent a global political trend of Islamic revivalism in that they have adopted 
democratic politics as a means to establish Islam in society: the Justice and Welfare Party 
(AKP) in Turkey, the Freedom and Justice Party (the political wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood) in Egypt, the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party 
(PAS) in Malaysia, the United Development Party (PPP) in Indonesia, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in several Middle-Eastern and African countries, and the Jama’at-e-Islami in 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Salih & El-Tom, 2009). One of the traits common to most of 
these parties is their involvement in social welfare issues; for instance, the Jama’at in 
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Bangladesh has been organizing social welfare programs since its inception there in late 
1970s.  
 
IDENTITY OF THE JAMA’AT 
Jama’at-e-Islami is an Islamic movement which was established by the theologian scholar 
and socio-political philosopher, Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903–1979), in 1941, in the undivided 
British India. It was initially founded as a religious movement aiming at socio-religious 
development of the Muslim community in the colonized Indian subcontinent. After the 
establishment of the partition between Muslim-majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India in 
1947, Mawdudi migrated to Pakistan, while the movement also continued to function in 
India, with autonomous and independent leadership but with a strong ideological influence 
from Mawdudi’s writings. Similarly, the Jama’at in Bangladesh has also functioned with 
completely independent policies and leadership since it began work in Bangladesh in 1979, 
eight years after the country gained independence from Pakistan in 1971.  
Emerging as an influential social movement with a strong voice on religious issues in 
Pakistan and India, the movement started to become more involved in political issues in the 
late 1940s. In 1951 it participated for the first time in a provincial election in Pakistan. Since 
then, the Jama’at has functioned as a full-scale political party in Pakistan (Jama’at-e-Islami 
Pakistan), India (Jama’at-e-Islami Hind), Kashmir (Jama’at-e-Islami Kashmir) and 
Bangladesh (Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami). Moreover, expatriates originating from these 
countries, who are influenced by the ideology of the movement, have formed several 
religious-social movements in various countries: for instance, Islamic Society of North 
America (ISNA), Islamic Forum Europe, and UK Islamic Mission. All of these groups 
continue working, with their own independent constructs and activities in their respective 
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countries, towards Islamizing the society, as advocated by the movement’s founder, Mawdudi 
(Haq, 2010; Nasr, 1994; Nasr, 1996; Riaz, 2010). Mawdudi’s objective is summarized in the 
World Almanac of Islamism: “Mawdudi believed the only way Muslims could safeguard 
their political interests was to return to a pure and unadulterated Islam that would not 
accommodate Hindus. He denounced nationalism and secular politics and held that the 
Islamic state was a panacea for all the problems facing Muslims” (Council, 2014, p. 827). 
This revivalist approach has ideological similarities to the approach of Muslim groups in 
other Middle-Eastern countries, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The objective of 
Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is also described in the 
World Almanac of Islamism: “He felt that the weakness of the Muslim world could only be 
cured by a return to the original form of faith, applying its prescriptions derived literally from 
the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition to all aspects of modern life – including the political 
arena” (Council, 2014, p. 1013).  
That being the case, there is no simple way to identify the Jama’at as either a political 
party or a mere religious revivalist movement. Nevertheless, due to its emphasis on political 
action, the Jama’at is predominantly considered as a political party, with a mention of its 
distinctive aspect of ideological identity. For instance, the Jama’at is described in the 
Encyclopedia of Islam (Sija, 2009, p. 388):  
The Jamaat-i-Islami is an Islamic political party in Pakistan founded in 1941 by Abu al-Ala 
Mawdudi (1903–79), the most widely influential Muslim thinker of South Asia in the 20th 
century. It is an ideological movement that has aimed to create an Islamic state in which all 
aspects of social and political life would be governed according to Islamic standards and law.  
In the party constitution, the Jama’at claims to be a transnational movement working to 
establish Islam in society (Jama'at-E-Islami, 2011). This ideal has also recently been termed 
by many as ‘Islamism’ or ‘political Islam’. For instance, Farhat Haq (2010, p. 126) says:  
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I use the term ‘Islamists’ to describe a style of Islamic politics that insists on taking over the 
state in order to create a righteous Islamic society. In Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami is the most 
important example of Islamist politics. Islamists are intensely politicized since they believe 
that regeneration of Muslim societies is not possible without the assumption of political 
power.  
Concerning the identity of the Jama’at, considering all the diverse characteristics of the 
group, the preferred notion is that presented by Mumtaz Ahmad, as he identifies the party 
based on its core objectives and existing characteristics:  
The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat, the two most important Islamic movements of 
South Asian subcontinent in the twentieth century, also represent two fundamentally different 
approaches to Islamic revivalism. While the Jamaat-i-Islami’s main emphasis is on the 
resacralization of political life and the establishment of an Islamic state with the Qur’an and 
Sunna (the way of the Prophet) as its constitution and the Shari’ah as its basic law, the 
Tablighi movement, on the other hand, focuses its activities on the moral and spiritual uplift 
of individual believers, asking them to fulfil their religious obligations irrespective of whether 
there is an Islamic state or not. (1999, p. 458) 
A detailed examination of the Jama’at’s development and current situation as an Islamic 
political party in Bangladesh will be presented in Chapter 6. As a brief prelude to identifying 
the group, it could be stated that the Jama’at is neither merely a political party in Bangladesh, 
nor a social movement. Rather, it is an Islamic revivalist movement that has adopted 
conventional politics as the primary expedient for achieving its own religious and ideological 
objectives. A similar ideology of reviving Islamic governance in the context of modern times 
and places has been driving groups in almost all Muslim countries. This ideological agency 
could therefore be noted as a global movement, whereas the Jama’at is basically a national 
political party working completely independently in its own geographical precinct, while 
maintaining some adherence to the global political religious movement in the larger context. 
Considering this state of affairs, I will continue using the word ‘party’ in this thesis to denote 
the Jama’at, according to general practice.  
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SOCIAL WELFARE OF POLITICAL ISLAMIC REVIVALISM 
The dynamics of their social welfare programs are not necessarily identical among the 
multitude of contemporary Islamic political movements from both Muslim and non-Muslim 
societies. However, the existence, and more importantly, the recent ‘effectiveness’ in terms of 
gaining popularity and social achievement, of these programs are undeniable. The effective 
measures of social welfare provision undertaken by the religion-based political parties are 
now manifested in some major Muslim countries, such as in the cases of AKP (Justice and 
Welfare Party (Turkish: Adaletve Kalkinma Partisi))5 in Turkey, Hamas (Islamic Resistance 
Movement (Arabic: Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmiyyah)) in Palestine, Muslim 
Brotherhood (Arabic: Ikhwan al-Muslimin) in Egypt and the Middle East, and Hizbullah 
(Arabic: lit. Party of God) in Lebanon. The scholars who have studied those movements 
generally acknowledge this undertaking in their analysis. As illustrated by Rabasa and 
Larrabee (2008): “The Islamist political parties, from Refah to Saadet, and above all, the 
AKP, have been especially active in this area. In a very real sense, these charitable and 
social-welfare activities have been the basis for the party’s success at the municipal and 
national levels”.  
From her study of health clinics in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, Janine A. Clark 
believes that much of the success of the Muslim Brotherhood can be attributed to its history 
of serious involvement in social welfare from its early days, as “it established numerous 
private schools, medical services, and charity services – which provided money, food, and 
clothes – for the poor, aged, orphaned and homeless, to name just a few; it also established a 
bureau of charity and social services that was responsible for these initiatives” (Clark, 2004b: 
                                                            
5 Though defining AKP as an Islamic revivalist movement is debatable, most intellectuals and political analysts 
regard it as a political party of moderate Muslims, considering the situation and the nature of Turkish secularism 
as well as the wide spectrum of the concept of transnational Islamic revivalist movements. For details, please 
see (Fuller, 2007: 74-75). 
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15). Levitt’s (2006, p. 242) assertion about the Palestinian Hamas movement depicts a similar 
situation there: “Palestinian moderates argue that it is Hamas’ social welfare activities, not its 
suicide bombings, which translate into grassroots and electoral support for the organization at 
the expense of moderate Palestinian groups”. Hizbullah in Lebanon is not much different 
from its counterparts in other countries, as Rana Jawad writes: “The Hizbullah organisations 
placed most emphasis on religious welfare as in initiative arising from among the people and 
remaining with the people” (Jawad, 2009, p. 115).  
The Jama’at in Bangladesh, also, has a long history of involvement in social welfare 
activities, dating back to the late 1970s. People associated with the Jama’at are widely 
associated with establishing schools and medical centres all over the country. Most of these 
endeavours are on a commercial basis, with their instigators attempting to earn their livings 
as well, but the Jama’at also operates numerous charity schools and charity medical centres 
through various Islamic NGOs for welfare purposes. There are differences between these two 
categories, apart from being commercial or non-commercial operational methods. Although 
schools and medical centres in the commercial category generally bear an Islamic name and 
are commonly known to be run by the people of the Jama’at, they generate revenue for the 
entrepreneurs and therefore regular attempts are made to improve them, in order to compete 
with other private schools and medical centres. On the other hand, schools and medical 
centres in the non-commercial category are run by assigned Jama’at leaders and activists who 
work there as part of their organizational commitment. Being not for profit and charity based, 
these organizations are not generally well-equipped or modernized, as was found during the 
fieldwork for this study. A detailed description of these institutions will be presented in the 
Chapters 6 and 7.  
These charity schools and medical centres represent the welfare activities of the major 
Islamic political parties in Bangladesh. However, no previous academic study has been 
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carried out to examine this socio-political phenomenon with regard to Bangladesh, in spite of 
the country’s having one of the largest Muslim populations in the world.  
 
ARGUMENT OF THE THESIS  
This thesis examines social welfare organization by an Islamic political movement, namely 
the Jama’at in Bangladesh. By studying this phenomenon, it attempts to explore the motives 
of the welfare providers and the experiences of the welfare recipients, in order to 
conclusively ascertain the reasons for and outcomes of this intriguing phenomenon. 
Participation by religion-based groups in the quasi-democratic political systems in 
postcolonial Muslim countries is, itself, a significant phenomenon in the socio-political 
discourse of Muslim societies. In recent decades, those religion-based political movements 
have extended their activities to social welfare provision and constructed a fusion of social 
and political movements.  
Welfare activities in some major Muslim countries have already been studied from a 
social movement perspective. Most studies have regarded them as an avenue for the Islamic 
movements to recruit and mobilize among the poor classes. Egypt’s Islamic charitable sector 
was scrutinized by Sami Zubaida (1992, p. 9), who considers that the ‘receivers’ of its 
welfare programs connect through a “network of patronage and clientship, communal 
membership and loyalty, and possibly political allegiance”. Similarly, Mustapha K. Al-
Sayyid (1993) observes that the Islamic movements, based on a middle-class, professional, 
welfare providing civil society, are successful in gaining popularity among the middle and 
lower middle classes. Examining the case of Turkey, Haldun Gulalp (2001, p. 444) describes 
the provider–receiver relationship inherent in the welfare activities of Turkey’s former 
influential Islamic party, Welfare Party, as a “vertical bloc comprising segments of different 
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socio-economic classes”. On the other hand, Janine A. Clark (2004b, p. 4) differs, saying that 
the relationship between the providers and receivers of Islamic political welfare activities in 
three Arab countries is horizontal, rather than vertical. She argues that “Islamic social 
institutions are run by and for the middle class” and at the same time they neglect the poor 
class as their ostensible beneficiaries. The middle class considers these welfare activities to 
be effective in gaining popularity among the poor through service provision, whereas the 
poor class views them as an element in building a strong interrelationship between members 
of the same class in Muslim societies. With regard to the popularity of political Islam and its 
relationship with social welfare organization, Turkey is considered one of the successful 
cases, where the Islamic parties have been struggling against state secularism but remaining 
in power for a long period. Although Turkey has a better state-supported welfare mechanism 
in place than many other Muslim countries, religion-based social associations have played a 
strong positive role in the emergence of political Islam in recent decades (Gocmen, 2014). In 
this context, in Bangladesh, the under-studied Islamic political parties in general, and their 
social welfare organization in particular, present a unique case for sociological enquiry. The 
Jama’at has been organizing social welfare provision in a Muslim majority secular state as 
one of its major agendas driven by several religious-political motives, and has contributed to 
people’s lives in varying degrees.  
Faith-based social welfare is an age-old social phenomenon which has recently been 
adopted by contemporary Islamic revivalist political parties. It is obvious that social welfare 
provision is considered a religious obligation for an authoritative collective entity such as the 
government, and Islamic political parties have attempted to take up this responsibility to 
whatever extent possible. Simultaneously, the practical advantages associated with obtaining 
political opportunities in the corresponding societies could not be ignored. Islamic political 
parties in various Muslim countries have engaged with social welfare provision and have 
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achieved differing outcomes. In Bangladesh, the Jama’at became involved in social welfare 
relatively early, in the 1970s. Considering the timeframe, the existing social welfare 
activities, and the current status of the party in Bangladeshi socio-political spheres, it has not 
been able to attain the positive outcomes achieved by its counterparts in some other countries 
(see Chapter 8). However, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the party has already 
established a combination of a sustainable working structure and material infrastructures, 
particularly in the areas of education and healthcare. Moreover, its social welfare agenda has 
inspired numerous private endeavours in those areas and boosted Islamists’ participation on 
both a commercial and a charity basis. The cases of other Muslim countries also indicate a 
potential positive resource mobilization if the party is able to overcome some major 
hindrances, such as the adverse political environment of the country and a lack of progressive 
policy making and skilful management of the social welfare activities.  
In this context, the core argument of this research is that the social welfare activities 
of Islamic political parties represent a significant avenue for resource mobilization for those 
parties. In Bangladesh, the Jama’at has attempted to utilize this method like other Islamic 
political parties around the world. However, unlike its counterparts in other countries, the 
apparent lack of success of the Jama’at in Bangladeshi politics is reflected in its organization 
and administration of social welfare activities. In cases like those of Egypt and Turkey, 
previous academic research has generally indicated a successful and fruitful social welfare 
provision organized by their Islamic political parties. Politically, the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt and the Justice and Welfare Party in Turkey have been able to achieve significant 
success in recent years. In Bangladesh, the Jama’at has been gradually declining in the 
political arena, and its social welfare activities were found, during the fieldwork, to be 
generally traditional and neglected. Therefore, I would argue that social aspects of Islamic 
political parties are strongly associated with their political prospects. In the case of the 
21 
Jama’at in Bangladesh, political disadvantage has affected its social welfare activities, and 
vice versa.  
 
AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The central aim of this research is to explore how a religious and political movement acts as a 
social movement, by using social welfare as one of its key activities, in a secular state. It will 
also attempt to find out how effectively this movement plays the role of social welfare 
provider, and what outcomes this phenomenon has produced. The following tasks will 
support the process of reaching this objective:  
 Examining and investigating the motives and purposes of the Jama’at, primarily an 
Islamic political movement, for administering such social welfare provision  
 Exploring the phenomenon of social welfare provision administered by a religion-
based political movement in secular Bangladesh; describing the policies that regulate 
the organizational social welfare provision of the Jama’at and corresponding activities  
 Understanding the experience of the welfare recipients, and the contribution to their 
lives made by this welfare provision  
 Exploring (through a combination of insights thus gained) a critical case study of the 
social welfare agenda of a religion-based political movement, which has become an 
important aspect of contemporary Islamic political revivalism  
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
In this context, the primary question of this research is: why the Jama’at, a religiously 
inspired political party, mobilizes social welfare activities in Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority 
22 
secular state?  To address this inquiry, an ethnographic account of the social welfare 
provision specific to the organized, regulated and sustainable practices by the Jama’at would 
be crucial to our understanding of this recent phenomenon. These welfare activities, in an 
economically underdeveloped country, were expected by the party to be an avenue for 
gaining popularity among the vast poor class, especially among the Muslim population. 
However, the election results and the general weak support of the people for this political 
party demonstrate a different situation. In order to understand this paradox, questions are 
posed to both the providers and the recipients of the welfare programs to find out what they 
think about them. Their reasoning and explanations will then be analysed. This will entail an 
explanation of the subjective meanings of their answers, revealing the motives, perceptions 
and experiences of providers and recipients. For this purpose, the study will pursue the 
following questions:  
1. What constitutes the social welfare activities of Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami?  
2. Who are the beneficiaries of this social welfare program and what is the nature of the 
benefit?  
3. Why and how does a religiously inspired political party, the Jama’at, play a role in 
providing social welfare in a secular Muslim-majority Bangladeshi state?  
4. To what extent were the objectives of the providers and the expectations of the recipients 
met?  
5. How can social movement theories explain and engage these social welfare activities 
administered by a political party?  
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LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
A number of issues pertinent to this research required identification prior to the 
commencement of the data collection. In order to achieve a fair and feasible orientation when 
answering the aim of this study, a careful approach to dealing with these issues was 
necessary. The researcher identified four issues of significance: (i) a lack of related and 
relevant literature, (ii) the radically and abruptly changing political situation of Bangladesh, 
(iii) the personal background of the researcher, and (iv) the probable hesitation of the 
participants in disseminating information that is essential for this research.  
(i) Although there is very little literature on the wider topic of Islamic revivalism, 
political Islam has recently gained attention in academia. However, the social welfare activity 
of Islamic political parties is clearly a new area of study. Because of the lack of literature 
there is a lack of theoretical approaches applied in these areas as well. There is an apparent 
absence of theories of Islamic revivalism in the academic area (Ali, 2012).  
(ii) It is important to keep in mind the continuous political instability in Bangladesh 
when defining the methodology of this study. The case study for this work, Bangladesh 
Jama’at-e-Islami, is currently the most criticized and discussed political party of the country. 
However, it is also the mainstream and most influential group of the Islamic revivalist trend 
there. The central leaders of this party were arrested by the government of Bangladesh in 
2001, accused of war crimes committed during the liberation war of 1971. Several 
government officials have already called for the banning of the party, whereas some other 
human rights observers and legal experts have questioned the procedures of the allegations of 
the war crimes. These political conflicts presented some difficulties during the process of data 
collection for this research. Included in the history of this party is the fact that it was banned 
for years after Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan in 1971. It could be safely 
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assumed that a political ban probably would not be enough to make Bangladesh Jama’at-e-
Islami disappear completely, as the ideology the party embraces has already become a global 
phenomenon.  
(iii) Considering the concept of the utility of social welfare provision for the religion-
based political parties, the broader research area includes different perspectives on the 
relationship between social welfare and Islam in Bangladesh. There are six or seven Islamic 
political parties in the country which are actively involved in national politics, and the 
Jama’at is the largest among them. Some of the other Islamic parties adhering to the idea of 
Islamic revivalism prefer to concentrate on a spiritual program, by being completely 
apolitical. The traditional religious schools and scholars spreading in the vast rural areas of 
Bangladesh have also a strong bond with the Bangladeshi Muslim society. Unfortunately, the 
scope of this research would not allow for covering all of them.  
(iv) Personal background of researcher as a Bangladeshi, having friends and family 
members involved in politics, may result in the objectivity of this study being questioned. 
However, this debate, with regard to being an insider, outsider or an inbetweener, is not new 
in social science. Particularly, ethnographic and qualitative enquiries are closely associated 
with personal and professional identities where the researchers’ backgrounds have influence 
in varying degrees (Ochieng, 2010). Therefore, ethical responsibility for academic practices 
of objective research methodologies and for attaining justifiable findings has always been 
carefully considered during the conducting of this research. It must be noted that this is not an 
action research that challenges the conventional concept of neutrality and objectivity of social 
study (Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p. 23). On the other hand, the researcher was not 
considered as a complete outsider at all times during the fieldwork by both parties included in 
this study: providers and receivers of the welfare programs. Moreover, the background of the 
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researcher, sharing the language, dialect and other social customs, leads to a strong cultural 
competence which has benefited this research (Marby, 2008). 
(v) The researcher had some negative experiences, as some people were hesitant to 
participate due to the local political circumstances in Bangladesh, along with the global sense 
of insecurity resulting from the fear of terrorism. Because some people were reluctant to 
reveal personal opinions and thoughts regarding Islam in Bangladesh and its politics, the data 
collection process was challenging, but interesting.  
 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
The Introduction of this thesis has outlined the background, significance, scope and 
arguments of this study. Basic conceptual aspects of the study – for example, modern Islamic 
revivalism, Islamic political parties, the Jama’at-e-Islami (the subject of the case study of this 
research) and the social welfare activities of Islamic political parties – have also been 
introduced in this chapter. Having explained these rudimentary elements, it is now possible to 
weave in conceptual and theoretical fundamentals of the research.  
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 constitute the literature review segment of this thesis. Chapters 2 
and 3 explore the position of Islam as a religion and the Jama’at as a religious-based political 
party in Bangladesh respectively. Chapter 2 presents an analytical description of the advent of 
Islam in this region and the history of its development in Bangladeshi society. Several topics 
are discussed which lay the foundation for understanding the subject matter of this thesis, 
such as the place of religion in Bangladeshi society and politics, several reformist religious 
movements in the past that have had a strong impact on the situation of religion in 
contemporary Bangladesh and the role of the Jama’at in this religious social atmosphere as an 
Islamic political party.  
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Chapter 3 concentrates on the Jama’at, addressing issues such as the birth and 
emergence of the Jama’at as a religious-political revivalist movement, along with reviewing 
its current positioning in the country. In connection with this, a short biography is presented 
of Abul Ala Mawdudi, the founder of the Jama’at and one of the most influential Islamic 
scholars in modern times. His background and his reasons for establishing this party in 
British India is an essential knowledge about the party. How the party went through various 
transformations after the end of British colonial rule and how it has moved into its current 
position in independent Bangladesh are also described in this chapter.  
Against the backdrop of previous two chapters, chapter 4 provides a critical review of 
literature concerning the research area that incorporates issues having basic relevancy with 
this topic, such as Islamic revivalism, social welfare, the welfare state and the correlation 
between welfare and contemporary Islamic political activism. A comprehensive review of the 
literature on these subjects will explicate theoretical aspects of the topic. This will also pave 
the way for explaining the theoretical perspectives of this thesis in the following chapter.  
Chapter 5 discusses the development of social movement theories and their 
applicability in the current research area. Social movement theories, as such, are a modern 
topic in social science. Among them, two particular social movement theories suit the aim of 
this research. Resource Mobilization Theory and Political Process Theory are explained in 
this chapter along with their relevancy to the case of the Jama’at’s social welfare organization 
in Bangladesh.  
Chapter 6 considers a number of methodological concerns that are intrinsic to 
investigating the social welfare activities of the Jama’at in Bangladesh. The literature and the 
theoretical aspects, as discussed in the previous chapters, are influential in defining the 
methodological framework of this study. In order to study a people-oriented dynamic social 
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movement and to find out the results of diverse human interaction in the field, this study 
requires qualitative inquiry, aiming to obtain elaborate data in their natural settings. This 
research method, along with the data collection process, the characteristics of the participants, 
the field data analysis phase and ethical issues are described in this chapter.  
Chapters 7 and 8 deal with empirical data derived from the fieldwork by investigating 
the welfare activities of the party. Chapter 7 presents an ethnographic study of the social 
welfare activities in the field. It outlines the welfare program organized by the Jama’at in 
Bangladesh. Chapter 8 attempts to understand the motives and achievements of the providers, 
as well as the recipients’ perspectives on this social welfare provision, by scrutinizing their 
experiences and opinions. A set of findings is offered in this chapter. 
Chapter 9, the Conclusion, presents further findings, accompanied by the answers to 
the questions posed by the thesis. This is followed by a discussion of the scope for future 
research and, finally, a concluding summary of this study.  
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CHAPTER 2: ISLAM IN BANGLADESH 
An analysis of the social welfare activities of the Jama’at in Bangladesh intrinsically requires 
a historical analysis of Islam’s place and development as a religion in this region. The 
Jama’at currently acts as a major Islamic revivalist movement in the country, with a 
significant role in the formation of the religious identity and worldview of a large portion of 
its Muslim population. Having introduced the research through a literature review and a 
description of its methodology, it is pertinent here to elaborate on this theme as a conceptual 
foundation of the research topic. A historical illustration of the development of Islam in this 
region will also clarify the current situation of religion in Bangladeshi society, which is 
organically necessary for answering the primary research objective: to understand the 
existing religio-social phenomenon in the context of a constitutionally secular Muslim 
majority state.  
Bangladesh, geographically a small country in Southeast Asia, containing the fourth 
largest Muslim population of the world, has an interesting history of socio-religious 
development. This region became the eastern province of Pakistan at the end of British 
colonial rule, when the Indian subcontinent was divided into two countries, Pakistan and 
India, according to the doctrine of the ‘Two Nation Theory’, that focused on the religious 
identities of their citizens (Ahmed, 2004, p. 5). Pakistan was created as a Muslim majority 
country and India as a Hindu majority country in 1947. Bangladesh, though located on the 
other side of India, became East Pakistan at that time, due to the majority Muslim population 
in this region. However, continuous perceived economic and political discrimination led to a 
political uprising in this eastern part of the country against the central government of 
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Pakistan, and Bangladesh finally achieved independence from Pakistan in 1971 (Santos, 
2007, p. 24).  
As an underdeveloped country, Bangladesh suffers from several crises. Poverty and 
illiteracy are the most prevalent and long-standing problems it faces. Political instability and 
weak democracy in the governance have led to a decline in law and order. There are three 
major sectors of the country’s economy: agriculture, migrant worker remittances and garment 
export (Lewis, 2011, p. 135). 
 
CURRENT AFFAIRS OF ISLAM IN BANGLADESH 
Islam in Bangladesh has been studied from several perspectives. In one of these studies 
Mumtaz Ahmad (2008) has produced an objective and precise analysis regarding the place of 
Islam in Bangladeshi politics. In his article Islam, State and Society in Bangladesh, he has 
attempted to outline the situation of Islam in Bangladesh since its independence from 
Pakistan. Based on political evidence and historical analysis, he argues that Islamic 
expression has been diversified in Bangladesh, as it has been in other Muslim societies. He 
classifies those expressions of diversification into seven predominant categories: Orthodox, 
Sufi, Revivalist, Liberal, Islamic Patriotism, Post-modern and the Ahl-Hadith Movement6 
that led to Islamic militancy. Though he has mentioned some sociological factors that 
contributed to the manifestation of some of these categories of Islamic expressions in 
Bangladesh, his analysis is based on analysing historical events which have resulted in those 
expressions. In the course of his discussion, Mumtaz Ahmad has considered Bangladesh 
                                                            
6 ‘Ahl-e-Hadith’ (Arabic: lit. followers of the Prophetic Tradition) is a term that is locally used to indicate the 
group that considers following any religio-judicial school of thought (madhab) to be unacceptable in Islam. 
Rather, the adherents of this movement claim to follow the Prophetic Traditions directly. This movement 
emphasizes literal interpretations of the religious texts. It also loosely referred to as the ‘Salafi’ in Bangladesh 
and mostly adopts its theological interpretations from the Saudi religious scholars.  
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Jama’at-e-Islami as the advocate of the revivalist school of thinking and “as one of the most 
effectively organized religio-political movements” (Ahmad, 2008, p. 61). 
In Bangladesh, about 89.5 per cent of the total population is Muslim, with Hindus, the 
largest religious minority, making up about 10 per cent of the total population. There are 
small numbers of Christians, Buddhists and adherents of other religions. The people of 
Bangladesh are generally described as religious and conscious of their religious identity. 
Bangladesh is also no different from other Asian Muslim societies that are facing some 
social, cultural, political and economic dilemmas due to the conflict between modernity and 
tradition. The inevitable advent of modern science and Western knowledge has brought about 
many changes in all aspects of life. A local version of Western democracy and the open 
market economy is in practice through the sector of the population that is educated and in 
control of the country. At the same time, many are now trying to find solutions to local 
problems in local contexts and traditions. Some even try to reject modernity to a greater or 
lesser extent. In all these internal social conflicts and developments, religion is always a 
significant catalyst.  
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Table 1: Selected socio-economic indicators of Bangladesh7 
 
Indicators8 Bangladesh 
Area (km2) 147,570 
People  
Population (in millions) 148.6 
Population growth (annual %) 1.1 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 68 (2009) 
Illiteracy rate, total adult population (% of ages 15 and 
above) 
44 (2009) 
Illiteracy rate, adult male (% of ages 15 and above) 39 (2009) 
Illiteracy rate, adult female (% of ages 15 and above) 49 (2009) 
Ethnic groups (2004)  
Bengali (% of total population) 98 
Other (including tribal groups and non-Bengali Muslims) 
(% of total population) 
2 
Religious groups (2004)  
Muslim (% of total population) 89.5 
Hindu (% of total population) 9.6 
Other (Buddhist, Christian, Baha’i and so on) (% of total 
population) 
0.9 
Economy  
GNI per capita 700 USD 
GDP (in millions, current USD) 100,357 
GDP Growth (annual %) 6.1 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 6.5 
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of 
population) 
31.5% 
Poverty headcount ratio at 2 USD a day (PPP9) (% of 
population) 
76.5 
 
                                                            
7 All figures relate to the year 2010 unless stated otherwise.  
8 This table is drawn based on the data primarily acquired from World Bank website. Data on ethnicity and 
religion are taken from the CIA World Factbook (("Data on Bangladesh in South Asia (By Country)," ; "The 
World Factbook: CIA,"). 
9 ‘Purchasing Power Parity’ in economics refers to how much money is needed to buy the same goods and 
services in two different countries.  
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The religious understanding among Bangladeshi Muslims is a complex issue to discuss. Islam 
came to this region primarily through Sufi preachers and Arab traders. Due to the historical 
influence of Sufi thought, the Muslims here are generally inclined to the peaceful aspects of 
their religion. Instead of refuting or conflicting with local customs and cultural practices, the 
Muslims apparently try to integrate between them and religious norms. The traditional 
religious education system and the Imams of the local mosques play important roles in the 
religious life of ordinary people. However, politically, Bangladesh is a secular country, as the 
present government has readopted secularism as one of the state principles. Secularism was 
also one of the state principles of newborn Bangladesh in 1971, but was removed from the 
national constitution only few years later, in an apparent bid by the then military ruler to gain 
the popular support of the Bangladeshi Muslims. This demonstrates that the ordinary people 
of Bangladesh mostly support secular and nationalist political parties, but any attempt to 
uphold religion appeases them, even it is merely symbolic. Joseph Devine and Sarah C. 
White (2013b) demonstrates that Islam is deeply rooted in Bangladeshi social mindset which, 
apart from being merely an observed religion, strongly associates itself with social living and 
development.   
Islamic collective activism is divided among several political and apolitical groups in 
Bangladesh. In the beginning, differences in interpretation of religious thought and practices 
represented the primary cause of the emergence of several Islamic groups in Bangladesh. 
These differences have resulted in strong political rivalry among the groups. The 
characteristics of these numerous groups are highly diverse. Among them, Bangladesh 
Jama’at-e-Islami is a major political party that has played a significant role in the national 
politics of the country for the last three decades. Many consider the Jama’at as an Islamist 
party adapting to the democratic strategy, while others regard it as “the main political arm of 
Islamism” in Bangladesh (Harder, 2010, p. 357). 
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THE ADVENT OF ISLAM IN BENGAL  
A detailed examination of the advent of Islam in Bengal and its development through its 
various historical phases is essential when embarking upon a study of the contemporary 
issues of Islam concerning this region. The present-day country known as Bangladesh, the 
55,598 square-mile area in the north-west part of the Indian subcontinent of South Asia, does 
not resemble the historic region of Bengal. Historians use the name ‘Bengal’ to indicate the 
area of the greater Ganges-Brahmaputra valley that comprises contemporary Bangladesh and 
West Bengal state as well as the state of Assam in present day India. With the end of British 
colonial rule over the subcontinent in 1947, West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Assam became 
part of the Republic of India. On the other hand, East Bengal, with its Muslim majority, was 
made a part of Pakistan and remained as East Pakistan until it became an independent 
country, Bangladesh, in 1971 (Ali, 1985a; Britanica, 1998, p. 100; O'donnell, 1984).10 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly when Islam arrived in the Bengal region. Abbas Ali 
Khan (1914–1999) preferred the opinion of some historians that the Arabs had a trading 
relationship, through the sea route, with the Indian subcontinent even in the pre-Islamic era. 
Muhammad Abdul Mannan (Mannan, 2004, p. 77) mentioned that Khaliq Ahmad Nizami 
wrote: “India’s relationship with the Arab world goes back to the hoary past. Long before the 
rise of Islam, there was brisk commercial contact between India and Arabia, and the Arab 
traders carried Indian goods to the European markets by way of Egypt and Syria. Elphinstone 
has rightly observed that from the days of Joseph to the days of Marco Polo and Vasco da 
Gama the Arabs were the captains of Indian commerce. There were large numbers of Arab 
colonies on the Western coast of India and many Indian settlements in the Arab countries”. 
The Arabs had commercial sea communication with Abyssinia (Ethiopia) on the African 
continent and travelled to China in Asia for trading. An ancient locality, Malabar, located at 
                                                            
10 Muhammad Mohar Ali depicted in detail the geographical features and developments of this region from 
historical perspective. For details, please see Ali (1985a). 
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Kerala in South India is assumed by many historians to be one of the stopovers for Arab 
trading vessels heading towards China and other south-eastern Asian regions (Khan, 2007, p. 
14). According to Muhammad Mohar Ali (Ali, 1985a, p. 43), Arab Muslim traders had come 
in contact with Bengal not much after 700 AD, if not earlier. 
Commercial and religious contact by Arab Muslims with Bengal preceded the Muslim 
Turkish conquest of this region by a long period. The Arab heritage and history of trading 
through maritime communication played a great role in preaching and establishing Islam in 
this part of the world. The first Muslim conquest in the subcontinent was in Sindh, in 700 
A.D./81H, when the army led by Muḥammad bin Qāsim carried out a retributive expedition 
against the local king, whose army had illegally captured and robbed an Arab mercantile 
vessel in an earlier period (Khan, 2007). According to Muhammad Mohar Ali, “the 
acquisition of this territory had momentous consequences for Islam as well as for the Arabs. 
It opened the gates for the gradual expansion of Islam and the subsequent establishment of 
Muslim political power in the subcontinent” (Ali, 1985a, p. 29). 
Abbas Ali Khan mentions that the Arab traders reached Chittagong and Sylhet 
provinces of the Bengal region during pre-Islamic times. Later, Islam arrived mainly through 
the already established communications. He asserts that the early Muslims who arrived in this 
region from outside were mainly from two categories. First, there were saints and pious 
people who came with the Arab traders and preached Islam, with some of them even settling 
permanently. The behaviour and morality of the Arab traders also attracted local people to 
Islam. This kind of religious communication was built up in the region in the early days of 
Islam. Second, Muslims of another type came to this region in later times: the warriors and 
soldiers. They established political control by the Muslims in the subcontinent (Khan, 2007, 
pp. 13-17). 
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The establishment of Muslim rule in Bengal took place about three centuries after the 
Muslim Arab conquest of Sindh. Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Muḥammad bin Bakhtiyār Khaljī (d.1206 
A.D./602H.), a Muslim commander with his own army, led a military expedition against the 
Hindu ruler of Bengal, Lakhman Sena. His victory in 1203 ended the prevailing rule of the 
Hindu Sena Dynasty in this region.11 
Though Islam arrived in Bengal in the early centuries A.D., the number of Muslims 
was not very significant. When they arrived and established political control over the region 
in the thirteenth century, Muslim conquerors encountered cults of gods, goddesses and spirits, 
shaped by an overwhelming concern for survival among the majority of the native people. 
Instead of emphasizing transforming the society and Islamizing the native people, they 
focused on infrastructural development, with the objective of consolidating their political 
power in a territory which was almost entirely non-Muslim but secluded from the other 
neighbouring Hindu regions by geographical situation and historical reasons. They 
constructed several masjids (mosques) and madrasahs (religious schools), supported Muslim 
scholars, saints known as Sufis, preachers and religious endowment activities, and 
encouraged immigration from other Muslim regions (Ahmed, 2001). 
Muslims were migrating to the agriculturally and economically enriched and affluent 
Bengal region from different places, like the West Indian regions, Afghanistan, Persia, 
Arabia, Turkey and Africa. Eaton (2001) suggests that the Bengal region became one of the 
most dynamic economic zones in all Eurasia during the Mughal Empire, especially by the 
end of the seventeenth century. Abbas Ali Khan (2007, p. 21) added, “the numbers of 
Muslims in Bengal were increasing rapidly. Most of them arrived from different places as 
soldiers, traders, preachers, refugees, and so on.” 
                                                            
11 For a detailed account of the background and events of this victory, see Ali (1985a, pp. 49–60). 
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However, even before the Muslims gained political power in Bengal, some of the 
local people converted to Islam, mainly because of the high moral attributes, attractive 
personality and humane behaviour of Muslim saints and personalities. At that time, the Hindu 
Brahminic caste system was predominant in this region. Therefore, the low caste people, 
victims of discrimination in every aspect of social life, were increasingly attracted by Islamic 
teachings regarding human equality and the distribution of rights. Local Buddhist and Jain 
people, whose situation was not better than the low castes but worse, in that they faced 
oppression by the Hindu upper-class rulers of the Sena dynasty, also found a shelter in the 
developing Muslim community (Mannan, 2004). 
However, Mohar Ali (1985b, p. 752) suggests that the rigours of the caste system 
were not the main reason for the Hindus’ conversion to Islam in Bengal. He considers this 
theory of the low-class Hindu origin of Bengal Muslims to be propounded based on mere 
“probability” and “supposition” that “was not substantiated by any specific example from 
history”. According to Ali, though what is said about the spirit of equality in Islam is 
undoubtedly true, this is not the case advocated by several British ethnographers and 
historians who claim that almost all of the Muslims in Bengal originated from low Hindu 
castes. This notion is termed by Richard Eaton the “Religion of Social Liberation Thesis” 
(Eaton, 1993, p. 117). Rather, according to Ali, “instances of immigration of Muslims from 
other countries into Bengal and of their having settled there are, at any rate, more numerous 
and direct than those of conversion from the local population” (Ali, 1985b, p. 760). On the 
other hand, “propagation of Islam was undoubtedly an important aspect of the activities of 
the settler-preachers. … There is however very little direct evidence of any organized Islamic 
missionary efforts. Nevertheless, individual efforts of the Shaykhs (Islamic Scholars and 
Saints), and their teachings and examples must have contributed to the expansion of Islam 
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among the local population” (Ali, 1985b, p. 781).12 He mentions several pieces of evidence 
for conversion to Islam by the higher classes of Hindu society, as well as the Hindus from 
lower classes. Ali (1985b, pp. 787-788) concludes:  
The ratio of immigrant Muslims to local converts is difficult to determine. The available 
evidence indicates however that the number of the former was considerably higher than that 
of the latter. … An idea of how immigrations have changed the demographic features of 
Bengal may be obtained from the fact that on the eve of the British withdrawal in 1947 
Muslims in the eastern districts of Bengal which now constitute Bangladesh numbered about 
60 per cent of the population, but according to the latest census they now constitute more than 
85 per cent of the population. This variation in their percentage has been due not to an 
increase in their birth-rate, nor even to conversion to Islam during the last quarter of a 
century, but to the migration of some Hindus from the former East Pakistan and the 
immigration into it of a considerable number of Muslims from West to East Bengal which 
took place during the Maratha incursions in the mid-eighteenth century.  
It is also noteworthy that some historians and social scientists saw a continuation of the 
previous class system, in a new and hidden form, among the Muslims. The immigrant 
Muslims were called Ashraf (Arabic: lit. honourable) and considered themselves 
representatives of an authentic Islamic culture. Thus, the newly arrived social and cultural 
influences of Islamized Arabs failed to become a general trend among local people, and 
remained as practised by some people and praised by the others. This compromise between 
incoming concepts and prevailing traditions was somewhat accepted, and preferred to the 
previous Hindu caste system of social life, where the oppression and inhumane differentiation 
were obviously cruel. Nevertheless, this peculiar classification of social life had a highly 
                                                            
12 Muhammad Abdul Mannan produced a detailed study of the contributions of various Muslims preachers, 
most of whom were Ṣūfīs, prior to the establishment of Muslim rule in Bengal and also during Muslim rule. He 
considered Bāẏejīd Bostāmi, Sultān Māhmud Balkhī, Shāh Muhāmmad Sultān Rumī, Bābā Ādam Shahīd, Shāh 
Niāmat Ullāh, Shāh Mākhdūm, Nūr Kutub and Shāh Jālāl as the significant Muslim preachers in the early and 
mediaeval history of Bengal. Though most of these were peaceful preachers, some also organized military 
activities against the oppressive Hindu rulers. But most of the Muslim preachers worked individually, without 
government affiliation or relationships and focused on social services. For details, please see Mannan (2004, pp. 
92–103). 
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significant effect on the socio-cultural situation of the Muslims of Bangladesh. Rafiuddin 
Ahmed (2001, p. 13) asserts:  
The social and cultural influences coming from outside Bengal remained restricted primarily 
to these classes, including the Ulama (religious scholars), leaving local Muslims in the same 
situation where they had been prior to their assimilation into Muslim society. The latter 
continued to live in their ancestral villages, were indistinguishable in occupation from 
neighbouring non-Muslims, and often participated in social traditions and festivities that were 
established in this region before the advent of Islam. Even in the nineteenth century, and, in 
many instances, until recently, their lifestyle and world-views did not fundamentally change, 
nor did the attitude of the ashraf towards them. 
The local culture of Bengal, historically deep-rooted in Hindu concepts, is still in practice in 
many parts of rural Bangladesh, irrespective of the Muslim or Hindu religious identity of the 
people, who show great similarities in dress, manners, names and occupations and even in 
some of the rituals and festivals. This diversity in socio-religious life resulted in East 
Pakistani Muslims being considered as ‘less Muslim’ by many West Pakistanis in pre-
independence Bangladesh. This was evident in contemporary discourse on the role of religion 
in state governance. In her book about the identity of Bangladeshi Muslims in pre-
independence period, Ferhana Hashem, a research fellow at the University of Kent, wrote 
(2010, p. 62):  
The West Pakistani elite and the Bengal Muslim elite both articulated contrasting views on 
the role of Islam in Pakistan. Crucially, the Bengal Muslim elite alluded to a broader inclusive 
religious policy that extended across communal lines and was the main source of conflict 
between the two competing elite groups. The West Pakistani elite alluded to a communal 
religious identity that drew exclusively from the tenets of Islam; however, underlying the 
pretext of such Islamic ideals, this group sought to continue the economic, social and political 
marginalisation of the Bengali Muslims. Thus, they used Islam to continue their exploitive 
rule over the Bengal Muslim elite and masses.  
Regarding language, Urdu, the common language of West Pakistan, was considered as an 
Islamic language due to its being written in Perso-Arabic script and spoken by most of the 
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Muslim elites in the subcontinent. On the other hand, Sanskrit-prone Bengali, the common 
language of East Pakistan, was generally viewed ‘as totally foreign to Muslim culture’ by 
many non-Bengali speaking Muslims of the Indian subcontinent (Uddin, 2006, p. 4). This 
lingual-religious divide has a long history in this region. During 200 years of British colonial 
rule, Muslim population practiced Persian and Urdu in their education to the extent that many 
of them refused to learn English considering it a non-Islamic language. On the other hand, 
Hindu population of India generally practiced Sanskrit, Pali, Hindi and later English in their 
educational institutions. Amena Mohsin, a professor of International Relations at the 
University of Dhaka, wrote (2009, p. 35):  
British colonial policy of divide-and-rule stopped the growth of this process (religiously 
pluralistic development). Their economic and education policies as pursued in Bengal were 
aimed at creating a Hindu aristocracy as a counterweight to one traditionally represented by 
Muslims. For instance, the Zamindari system (1793) sharpened the dichotomy between the 
Hindu landlords and Muslim peasants. The use of Persian for official purpose (Persian was 
spoken by the Muslim aristocracy, and was the language of the Muslim court) was replaced 
first by Bengali and later by English. This opened up job opportunities for Bengali Hindus, 
since Muslims refused to educate themselves in English. The result was the emergence of a 
white-collar, English-educated Hindu urban class, and the steady decline of Muslim 
aristocracy.  
Although the Muslims of Bengal spoke Bengali, their religious education was predominantly 
administered through Persian and Urdu. This affiliation between language and religion was 
also reported by Turkish Islamist Intellectual and Journalist Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu. In 
exploring major languages spoken by the Muslims in the East, he wrote about Bengali 
(Ihsanoglu, 2003, p. 115):  
No doubt, the fact that Bengal was subject to Muslim rule for six centuries contributed to the 
spread of Islam throughout the country, and the Bengali language, in addition to Persian and 
Arabic, played an important role in consolidating Islamic culture there. Some linguists 
describe Bengali as an Indian language (descended from Sanskrit) of the Indo-European 
family. However, others think that the basic structure of Bengali is Dravidian, rather than 
40 
Sanskrit, even though the language may later have come under Sanskrit influence, particularly 
owing to the efforts of Hindu writers. Writing in Bengali came somewhat later, given that the 
official languages of the Islamic state and those of education were Persian alongside Arabic. 
For this reason we find no literary works by Muslims in Bengali before the sixteenth 
century… Islamic subjects in Bengali literature subsequently became more popular and 
Arabic, Persian and Urdu words, expressions and phrases entered the language. 
Before we thoroughly discuss the position of Islam and Muslims in the creation of Pakistan in 
1947 and Bangladesh in 1971 in the coming sections, it is critical to shed more light on the 
early period of Islam in this region particularly because the perception regarding the 
‘Muslim-ness’ of Bangladeshi Muslims, as held by many West Pakistanis, was actually 
associated with the syncretistic nature of the origins of Islam in Bangladesh. 
  
MUSLIM RULE IN BENGAL  
Abbas Ali Khan (2007) mentions the names of 100 Muslims rulers of this region during the 
period of Muslim rule in the Bengal. This period started with the conquest of ‘Lākhṇābatī’ by 
IkhtiyārKhaljī in 1203 and ended with the defeat of Sirājuddaulā in 1757 at the Battle of 
Plassey. This defeat was in a battle against the British forces of the East India Company and 
the traitors from his own army. There were three categories of Muslim rulers during this 
period. Some conquered the incumbent power through their own strength and were 
recognized by the Muslim rulers in Delhi, who were considered as the central rulers of the 
Indian subcontinent due to their power and the territory they held. Some were totally 
sovereign rulers but connected with Delhi by good diplomatic relations.13 However, some 
                                                            
13 Muhammad Mohar Ali wrote: “Another myth created by the nationalist (Hindu) writers centres round the 
conflicts between the Lākhṇābatī rulers and the Delhi Sultans. These have too often been depicted as Bengal’s 
struggle for ‘independence’. These conflicts were born out of personal ambitions and had nothing to do with 
regional or territorial nationalism which was unknown at that time. Besides being an attempt to read modern 
developments into past events, the myth is also fraught with inconsistency and double standards. To say that the 
expansion of Muslim political sway in Bengal was slow because of sustained Hindu resistance, and at the same 
time to suggest that the Lākhṇābatī rulers were fighting Bengal’s struggle against Delhi’s hegemony is clearly 
antithetical” (Mohar Ali, 1988, vol. 1, p.74). 
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rulers were appointed by Delhi and ruled this region as governors. The following table 
provides an outline of the Muslim dynasties which had political control over this region at 
different times.  
Table 2: List of Muslim ruling dynasties and orders in the Bengal14 
 
Timeline Dynasty/ruler Type of ruler 
1203–1227 Khalji dynasty and 
lieutenants of Ikhtiyār al-
DīnKhaljī 
Turks having good diplomatic relations with 
Delhi 
1227–1341 Balbani rulers under the 
rule of Delhi 
Mongols from Central Asia  
1342–1413 Ilias Shahi dynasty Sovereign rulers originating in Sijistan, Persia 
1414–1441 Ganesh Hindu local landlord, sovereign 
1442–1487 Recovered by Ilias Shahi 
dynasty 
Sovereign  
1487–1493 Habshi rulers Abyssinian (Ethiopian) origin, Africa 
1493–1538 Husein Shahi dynasty Arab origin, sovereign 
1538–1564 Shur dynasty Bihar origin 
1565–1576 Qarrani dynasty Pathan origin, Afghanistan 
1576–1757 Mughal dynasty Governors of Delhi 
1757–1857 British East India 
Company rule 
Puppet local ruler, acquisition of Diwani (the 
office of revenue collection and civil 
administration) and Nizamat (military affairs, 
security and criminal administration) by the 
British East India Company15 
1857–1947 British crown rule Colonial rule  
1947–1971 Province under central 
rule  
Greater Bengal region was divided along 
religious lines. West Bengal remained with 
Hindu India, and the eastern part became East 
                                                            
14 Based on Mohar Ali, History of the Muslims of Bengal, vols. 1 and 3 (1988); Ali Khan, Bāṃglār 
Musalmānder Itihās (History of the Muslims of Bengal) (2007). 
15 Muhammad Mohar Ali described this system of governance by the British East India Company as “power 
without responsibility” for “ensuing pillage”. Please see Ali (1985c, p.10). 
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Pakistan. 
1971 Independence from 
Pakistan as a new 
country, Bangladesh  
Independent nation state  
 
During the 550 years of Muslim rule in the Bengal region, the establishment of Sharī‘ah 
(Islamic jurisprudence) in civil order neither materialized nor was given priority by the 
majority of the Muslim rulers, as internal conflicts for power and conspiracies by various 
interest groups provoked political unrest among the rulers from different dynasties, with these 
political activities hardly affecting the lives of common people. The secular practice of 
conceptual separation of religion and state was in operation (Eaton, 2001), and in general the 
peasantry, with its agriculture-based economy, continued without being bothered by the 
political situation. The religious life was developed mainly by the Muslim preachers, saints 
and Ṣūfīs, who spread Islam through social services. In the course of this historical trend, a 
lack of the practice of Islamic culture, along with maintenance of the old local customs and 
traditions derived from Hindu religion played a key role in the cultural and educational 
decline of the Muslim community in later decades. Moreover, the British colonial 
administration was mainly supported by the Hindus, who perceived it as an opportunity for 
revenge against centuries-long rule by the Muslims. During the two centuries of British 
colonial rule that followed, the Muslim society experienced severe and collective decline in 
all aspects of life, especially in education, economic activities and government services.16 
This was the historical period when Muslims worldwide faced colonization and intellectual 
backwardness. This prevailing situation, from both local and global perspectives, certainly 
affected the religious development of the Muslims of Bengal.  
                                                            
16 For a detailed examination of the prevailing situation of discrimination towards the Muslims in Bengal with 
evidence from government records, please see P. Hardy (Hardy, 1972, pp. 198-221). 
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According to Abbas Ali Khan (2007), though the Muslims ruled Bengal for nearly six 
centuries, the Muslim people lacked an awareness of religious identity. This situation arose 
mainly because of their inclination towards the practice of Hindu culture, exemplified in 
traditional folk activities, literature, festivals, fairy tales, lifestyles and so on. Khan claims 
that one of the major reasons for this religious decline is the ‘half-conversion’ of the locals 
from their pagan idol-worshiping religion to Islam, without their having a basic 
understanding of or orientation to Islamic teachings and principles. Many of them resorted to 
Islamic identity in order to avoid the social discrimination of the Hindu caste system or/and 
to achieve the privileges that went with being from the ruling religious identity, but a proper 
Islamic education was absent in many communities. Thus, the imitation of various Hindu 
rituals, like enkindling fire in festivals, using musical instruments in mass processions to 
celebrate Muḥarram,17 worshiping at graves,18 and non-Islamic ways of showing respect for 
the saints became widespread and performed by Muslims oblivious to their inherent 
contradiction with Islam.19 During its history, this region has also seen various efforts by 
Muslim reformists dedicated to spreading Islamic teachings among the masses.  
A brief analysis of those reformist movements is indispensable here, as the Jama’at, 
the subject matter of this research, is itself currently pioneering a new type of religious 
reformation in this region. The Jama’at has introduced a socio-political explanation of Islam 
to this society. This age-long continuation of the call for religious reformation certainly 
                                                            
17
 Muḥarram is the first month of the Islamic lunar calendar. It is one of the four sacred months of the year in 
which fighting is prohibited. This month is an occasion of mourning in remembrance of the Battle of Kārbālā, 
which took place in this month, in which Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī, the grandson of Muḥammad (PBUH), was killed by 
the forces of the second Umayad Caliph, Yāzid. 
18 According to mainstream Islamic principles, a dead person has no power to do anything good or bad for 
anyone living in this world, unless God allows them a power of recommendation on the Day of Judgement. 
However, many people following local practices and popular culture in Muslim societies believe otherwise, 
considering a pious person able to make a strong recommendation to God, even after death. Therefore, people 
continue to visit the graves with special prayers, and sometimes their practices extend to bowing down or 
prostrating themselves towards the grave, which is considered a serious sin in Islam.  
19 For details, please see Khan (1996, pp. 59–70). 
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facilitated the acceptance of this revivalist thought in its early period. The historically 
significant and most recent reformist movements are presented in the following section.  
 
REFORMIST MOVEMENTS 
On many occasions in the historical development of the society of Bengal Muslims, 
compromises between Islamic directions and the prevailing social customs and prejudices 
have been reached. Therefore, though the number of Muslim inhabitants was always 
increasing with the popularity of Sufi trends and peace-loving preachers, the concept of 
Islamic society and state was ignored during most of the history of this region. As a result of 
this trend, old Hindu culture continued to be the dominant culture and led to a local version of 
Islamic practice, considered by orthodox religious scholars as deviationist innovation 
(Bid’ah), among the Muslims of this region.  
However, Muslims in Bengal experienced several reformist movements, from 
religious and social perspectives, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 
concepts and discourses of different Muslim reformist movements in Arabia as well as in 
Greater India influenced many consciously practising Muslims of Bengal: for instance, the 
Salafiyyah movement of Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb20; the movements of Shaykh 
Aḥmad Sarhindī al-Fārūqī al-Naqshabandī (1564–1624), known as Mujaddid Alf-e-Thānī; 
Shah WalīAllāh Muḥaddith al-Dehlawī (1702–1760) and his son Shah ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz (1745–
1823); that of Sayyid Aḥmad Berelawī (1786–1831) of Raebereli in northern India; and that 
of Shah Ismāʻīl Shahīd (1779–1831).21 The Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya and the Faraizi 
                                                            
20 Muhammad Mohar Ali mentioned the reform movement of Titu Mir in south-eastern Bengal and the Fara’idi 
movement in central and eastern Bengal as related to the wider spirit of the movement initiated by Muhammad 
bin Abd al-Wahhab in Arabia. Please see M. Ali (1985, Vol. 3, p. XI). 
21 In his book, Muhammad Abdur Rahim, a famous Muslim historian of the Indian subcontinent and Professor 
in the Department of History in Dhaka University, studied the reformist movements of the Muslims of Bengal, 
the influence of contemporary great reformist movements on them and the participation of the Muslims of 
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movements are reportedly the most prominent local Bengali movements influenced by the 
above mentioned Indian movements (Ahmed, 1981, p. 39). Moreover, there were movements 
among Muslims which simultaneously represented the people’s resistance against colonial 
oppression and the struggle to maintain their Muslim identity in the face of oppression by 
Hindu Zamindars (Feudal Lords), collaborators with the British colonial rulers (like the Faqir 
insurgency) and the movement of Titu Mir (Ali, 1985c). Nevertheless, there was no sustained 
and influential state governed by Islamic ideology in the greater Indian subcontinent until the 
nineteenth century, despite the fact that many Muslim rulers and dynasties had ruled for 
different periods of its history.  
A great breakthrough in the history of Muslims of the subcontinent took place in the 
middle of the twentieth century. A concept of autonomous rule based on religious identity 
was growing. Poet philosopher Muhammad Iqbal envisaged first an independent country for 
Muslims of this region and proposed a Muslim state in his speech in the 1930 All-India 
conference of the Muslim League in Allahabad.22 Ten years later, in 1940, a resolution was 
proposed by Fazlul Huq, then Prime Minister of the Bengal province and President of the 
Bengal Muslim League, and subsequently accepted at the conference of the All-India Muslim 
League in Lahore. This resolution is known as the ‘Lahore Declaration’. It called for Muslim 
autonomy in different parts of British India based on the religion of the majority of the 
population. Later, this resolution developed into a popular demand from the Muslim people 
to establish the country of Pakistan, and Muslims from all over the Indian subcontinent joined 
this movement (Rahim, 2006). 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Bengal in the historical Jihad movement against British colonial rule. For more information in this topic, please 
see Rahim (2006, pp. 74–86). 
22 Muhammad Iqbal said in his historical speech: “A separate Federation of Muslim Provinces, reformed on 
these lines I have suggested, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from 
the domination of non-Muslims” (G. Allama, Pakistan Movement historic documents, published for the 
Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, p128–133, as quoted in Mannan, 2007, p. 252). 
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Abdur Rahim, who later founded the Jama’at in this region, joined this movement and 
worked continuously in mobilizing public opinion and increasing awareness of the movement 
among the common people through effective communication. Almost at the same time, 
Mawdudi initiated his activities, with a call for a return to the purer form of Islam in people’s 
personal and collective lives. At that time, Mawdudi’s activities were limited to writing and 
intellectual discussions only. The young Abdur Rahim came to know about this new trend of 
thought when he was a researcher at Calcutta Madrasah and shared its ideology. 
With freedom from British colonial rule and the establishment of the new state, 
Pakistan, the endeavours and thoughts of Abdur Rahim were given free rein. The Bengal 
region, an area with a Muslim majority, became known as East Pakistan (excluding West 
Bengal with its Hindu majority which became part of the other state, India). Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah was given authority as the Governor General of Pakistan, the new state for Muslims, 
who had been waiting for it for two centuries. Abdur Rahim devoted himself to serving his 
ideology both intellectually and practically in this new-born state. In subsequent years, he 
authored a number of books on different aspects of Islamic ideology. At the same time, he 
pioneered the translation of Arabic and Urdu Islamic books into modern Bengali language, 
and thus introduced world-renowned Islamic literature to the Muslims of this region. To be 
precise and evaluative of his authorship at this period, it is obvious that his focus was mainly 
on writing about political and social affairs of Islam. Later he included the study of Islamic 
economics, religious affairs and some other issues (Majidi, 2003).  
 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE JAMA’AT AND INDEPENDENCE OF BANGLADESH 
In order to grasp the emergence of the Jama’at in Bangladesh, one needs to understand the 
historical context in which this movement started its activities in this region in the late 1960s 
in pre-independent Bangladesh. Present-day Bangladesh became East Pakistan during the 
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partition of the Indian subcontinent because of its Muslim majority. But from the very 
beginning of this state, Bengalis had to struggle for a balanced and equal representation in 
politics and government jobs. At the end of British colonial rule, this region was lagging 
behind other parts of the subcontinent in education and economic prosperity. Repeated 
military rule by West Pakistanis and continuous economic disparities fuelled the grievances 
of the Bangladeshi people. Discrimination against them in the civil and military services was 
apparent (Asad, 1990; O'donnell, 1984; Sobhan, 1993). Akhtaruddin Ahmad (1982, p. 30), a 
minister in the last cabinet of East Pakistan and a pro-Pakistani politician during the 
liberation war, had to agree that:   
[t]he material progress (of all Pakistan) was so much visible that the transformation of these 
spheres went beyond recognition in spite of its limited resources and lack of skilled 
manpower. … But certain things were lacking in this development. 1) The development in the 
agricultural sector lagged behind, especially in the east, with a permanent food deficit due to 
drought, flood and cyclone. It was a country with an 80 per cent agricultural population and 
85 per cent living in villages. 2) The gap between the rich and poor could not be narrowed 
appreciably because of the capitalist structure of industrial progress, with a vast majority of 
agricultural and industrial workers remaining neglected though almost all the industries were 
based on agricultural products like jute, cotton, tobacco, tea, sugarcane, etc. Last but not least 
was the unequal development of East Pakistan, which contains the majority population and 
earned the maximum foreign exchange and national revenue in juxtaposition to West 
Pakistan.  
As a result of this situation, the Awami League, a pro-secular political party of Pakistan, 
primarily based in East Pakistan, became popular among the Bangladeshi people. Even 
though the majority of the Bengalis were religion loving people, the political agendas of the 
secular Awami League achieved a high popularity among them, since the Awami League was 
perceived as a force defending their basic rights against discrimination and oppression.23 
                                                            
23 For a detailed examination of the historical background of how the Awami League gained huge popularity in 
East Pakistan, please see Asad (1990, pp. 1–81). 
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Almost all Islamic political parties had failed to feel the pulse of the nation and 
continued supporting the West Pakistani rulers, with the hope of maintaining the integrity of 
the state which was established in the name of Islam. Abul Asad (1990, p. 239), an 
intellectual leader of Jama’at-e-Islami and the present editor of the Islamic newspaper, The 
Shangram, conceded:  
It was the biggest failure for the Islamic activists to not to realize the reality of the liberation 
war, which started on March 26, 1971, all of a sudden. They misinterpreted the active roles of 
socialist and secular people during the movement and considered it as their own fight without 
any popular support. But it was a fatally wrong assumption. Brutal attacks and killing 
operations of the Pakistani army against unarmed civilians on the night of March 25, 
converted this movement into a revolution of Bangladeshi people, who were fighting to 
protest the inhumane military cruelty without any prior plan.  
Another significant and practical reason behind such a political stand was the assumed secret 
relationship of the Awami League with the Indian government agencies, which were believed 
to be active in weakening the rival state of Pakistan through instability and disintegration 
(Asad, 1990; Azam, 2004). Concerning this situation, Akhtaruddin Ahmad (1982, p. 50) 
asserted:  
The country no doubt made tremendous progress in economic development, though not so 
much in the agricultural sector. But East Pakistan, being not given her right share in economic 
development, remained a constant breeding ground for discontent. Out great neighbour India 
never remained inactive throughout these years with its greater resources and pull in the 
international sphere. … His (Sheikh Mujib’s) involvement in the Agartala conspiracy case 
made things more confused and desperate. India’s design to aid the secession of East Pakistan 
through the armed uprising of Bengali forces became crystal clear in this case. But the way 
the case was conducted created a reverse reaction in the mind of East Pakistanis. 
Consequently, the general election of Pakistan, on 7 December 1970, produced a national 
triumph for the Awami League. It was the first election in the history of Pakistan, 
administered under military rule and in which people directly voted to elect the National 
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Assembly members. The Awami League not only won 160 of the 162 seats in the provincial 
assembly of East Pakistan, but achieved an absolute majority by winning 160 of the 300 seats 
in the National Assembly. O’Donnell (1984, p. 86) says that “an analysis of the election 
figures from East Pakistan shows that the 17.4 million registered voters who went to the polls 
cast 73 per cent of their votes for the Awami League. The only other political party to obtain 
more than 5 per cent of the vote was Jama’at-e-Islami”. 
Instead of transferring power to the newly elected political party, the military ruler, 
General Yahya Khan, continued with political dialogues. Jama’at-e-Islami condemned this 
injustice and demanded the immediate transfer of government power to the elected parties.24 
Separatist and revolutionary ideas were spreading among the masses again in this deadlocked 
political situation, but the military ruler continued reinforcing military power in the province. 
Finally, on the night of 25 March 1971, a crackdown operation by the Pakistani army against 
civilians took place in Dhaka, the provincial capital of East Pakistan. Michel Laurent, an 
associate press photographer who escaped military censorship and roamed in places of 
conflict even after other foreign journalists had been expelled, reports that the count of lives 
lost through this genocide had reached 15,000 people by 28 March 1971 (O'donnell, 1984). 
This was the beginning of a civil war which consequently became the liberation war, lasting 
for nine months until the separation, when East Pakistan emerged as independent Bangladesh 
on 16 December 1971.  
The Awami League leaders escaped to neighbouring India along with millions of 
civilian refugees, whereas the leaders of the Islamic political parties remained inside the 
country and tried to pacify the unrest. The Jama’at leaders claimed that it was a life-
                                                            
24 A statement by East Pakistan Jama’at-e-Islami leader, Gholam Azam, was published in the newspapers on 4 
March 1971. He stated that the “irresponsible decision to postpone the National Assembly without consulting 
the party of absolute majority has created a dangerous situation threatening the security of the country. The 
popular unrest indicates that the people would not tolerate such a type of conspiracy anymore. The martial law 
authority does not have right to remain in power after a clear and vivid public opinion is expressed through the 
last general election” (as cited by Asad,1990, p. 42). 
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threatening situation for them to move to Hindu India due to their religious identity. They 
also had to bear the responsibility of various war crimes, for example, the killing of civilians, 
rapes, inhumane and brutal tortures perpetrated by the Pakistani army and some of their 
native collaborators (Asad, 1990; Azam, 2004; Hossain & Siddiquee, 2006). 
To understand the issues regarding this historical conflict, which still has a great 
impact on the position of Islamic movements in Bangladesh, a short analysis of the socio-
cultural situation is required. It is a historical fact that Islam entered this region early in its 
history and that Muslims ruled over it for centuries. Muslims became the majority population 
in the eastern part of Bengal, which is not the case in West Bengal. In describing this growth 
of Muslim population and Muslim rule over this region, Abbas Ali Khan (2007, pp. 59-70) 
claims that under Muslim rule the Bengal region always had a history of peaceful co-
existence between Hindus and Muslims. According to Khan, although a large number of 
people who converted to Islam were attracted by the social rights given by this new religion 
to every member of society – irrespective of their previous castes or family identities, in the 
context of the prevailing Brahminic caste system – the social life of the local Muslims 
remained nevertheless amalgamated with the prevailing cultures and social habits derived 
from Hindu and Buddhist traditions. 
Historically, the West Pakistani Muslims considered themselves as better Muslims 
than those of East Pakistan. Many illiterate soldiers of the Pakistani army believed that they 
were serving Islam by killing the Bengalis and that raping Bengali women was halal (lawful) 
as they were part of ganimah (booty). They killed Hindu civilians in many parts of 
Bangladesh and even in Dhaka. Gholam Azam, then President of the Jama’at-e-Islami East 
Pakistan and one of the chief collaborating Bengali politicians, described some incidents of 
this nature. He mentioned that Pakistani soldiers used to say: “All Hindus should be banished 
in order to purify Pakistan” (Azam, 2004, p. 153). Rafiuddin Ahmed (2001, p. 3) noted the 
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fact that “the experiences of the Muslims of Bangladesh suggest that socio-territorial identity 
plays a critical role in defining and redefining the parameters of a community”. One of the 
major reasons behind this situation in Bengal is the historical separation of two aspects of 
life: individual and collective. History has witnessed that most of the Muslim rulers, as well 
as the people, followed Islamic principles in their personal lives and social occasions, but did 
not attempt to reflect those principles in collective issues like the judiciary, state affairs, or 
the economics system (Khan, 2007, pp. 70-78).  
The impact of this historical experience, leading Bangladeshi Muslims to practice a 
culture-influenced version of their religion, is still evident in the socio-political discourse of 
the country. Current Bangladeshi political parties are predominantly divided into two 
nationalist-identity alignments. Secular-nationalists identify the people of Bangladesh with 
the term ‘Bengalis’ which includes people of the Bengali-speaking Hindu-majority West 
Bengal state in neighbouring India. This group incorporates the secular Awami League and 
all communist and socialist political parties. On the other hand, religious-nationalists employ 
the denomination ‘Bangladeshi’ which passively excludes people of West Bengal and thus 
bears an inclination towards Islamic identity of the people of Muslim-majority Bangladesh. 
This group consists of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and all other Islamic political parties 
including the Jama’at. However, the term ‘Bangladeshi’ was not much used in pre-liberation 
period as the country was named as Bangladesh after the independence. This identity struggle 
between ‘Bengali’ and ‘Bangladeshi’, as correctly investigated by Sufia M. Uddin, was a 
significant factor in the process of liberation of Bangladesh as the term ‘Bengali’ represented 
an opposition to West Pakistani culture-influenced version of Islam. She (2006, pp. 117-118) 
noted:  
... nineteenth century reformers’ and Muslim elites’ attempted to create a unified 
subcontinental Muslim culture and community but inadvertently also reinforced a uniquely 
Bengali vision of Muslim community. This vision alienated the Bengali Muslims from their 
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coreligionists who identified more closely with the broader subcontinental Muslim culture 
symbolized in the knowledge and use of Urdu. The alienation became evident only after 
Pakistan gained independence from the British. This was not merely a Bengali community 
distinct from Muslim identity but was rather a Bengali-informed Muslim community ... 
regional distinctiveness and conception of community, the product of nineteenth-century 
literary production in the Bengali language, would not be supplanted in the twentieth century 
by some form of West Pakistani culture that West Pakistanis viewed as more authentically 
Islam. Bengali Muslims would not surrender the regional distinctiveness that had been so 
prolifically articulated in the previous century. Bengali Muslim efforts to keep Bengali culture 
alive would feed the move to independence from Pakistan. Secularism instead of Islam in 
addition to Bengali culture would be the basis of nationalism in Bangladesh.  
The historical background of this Bengali-influenced Islam was reported by Sanjay 
Bhardwaj, a South-Asian Studies scholar, in his research on the contesting identities in 
Bangladesh as (2011, pp. 6-7):  
... the result was that culture and society in Bengal evolved with a set of syncretic values that 
emphasised religious inclusion. This was the result of a longstanding tolerance among the 
people of this deltaic region in relation to a wide range of influences that included Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Islam, Sufism and Tantrik cultures, each of which had been accommodated within 
indigenous tribal cultures. Within this syncretic Bengali society, one could still identify 
longstanding forms of worship from pre-modern Bengal. Brahmanical and Islamic identities 
seeped into the layers of society and created a distinct culture in Bengal such that there was a 
co-existence between old and new religious practices. This meeting of Islamic and indigenous 
cultures went on to create the world’s second largest Muslim ethnic community.  
This topic was summarized by Denis Wright as he wrote (1987, p. 15):  
Bengali Islam has its own cultural distinctiveness. In comparison with other parts of India, 
Islam came late to this region, and by the time it did, it was largely through processes of 
filtration and infiltration that it happened. Because Bengalis were usually converts from 
Hinduism, their Islam has been more liberal and tolerant of unorthodoxy than that of north-
western India. A direct reinforcement of that liberalism took place because Islam came to 
Bengal largely through the activities of the Suifs, who taught an esoteric way of approaching 
the faith.  
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Interestingly in the independent Bangladesh, bearing Secularism as one of the fundamentals 
of the newly-born state, orthodox religious segments of the society and general liberal 
Muslims alike were threatened by the triumph of secularism and the increasing cultural 
influence of neighbouring Hindu-majority India. This led to the formation of the 
‘Bangladeshi nationalism’ trend in country’s politics. According to Akhand Akhter Hossain 
(2015), an academic specializing in political economy, this nationalist political trend based on 
the ‘Bangladeshi’ identity demonstrates a re-emergence of Muslim nationalism, which was 
originally ‘the basis for the establishment of Pakistan’. To him, this is the continuation of 
deep historical differences between two religious communities, Hindu and Muslim, and “it is 
competing against Bengali ethnicity, language, culture and secularism within an emerging 
two-party political system” (Hossain, 2015, p. 368). However, other scholars such as Denis 
Wright (1987), M.G. Kabir (1987) and Aminur Rahim (2007) viewed ‘Bangladeshi 
Nationalism’ as the process of a search for a new ‘religio-linguistic’ identity. In this 
proposition, secularism never had a stronghold in the Bangladeshi society and polity, rather 
people supported the secular Awami league in order to oppose Pakistani military regime 
which promoted Islamic fraternity in order to carry out its economic exploitation over the 
Bengali Muslims. Denis Wright (1987, p. 21) argued:  
In spite the fact that Bangladesh became a secular state along the lines of the Indian model 
immediately the Awami League took office, Bangladeshis were often reminded of their 
Islamic heritage. According to one Bengali source, while only half-heartedly underlining their 
Islamic identity during the Pakistan phase, the impetus for Bangladeshis to do so disappeared 
when Bangladesh became a reality. Islamic identity became the centre of resistance against 
Indian predominance in Bangladeshi politics. Whether or not Muslim Bengalis had not been 
serious in stressing a Muslim identity as part of Pakistan is a moot point, and somewhat more 
complicated than is implied by the quotation. It was not merely a reflection of anti-Indian 
sentiment which produced this phenomenon, although this was its most obvious 
manifestation. Secularism was simply not an issue during the Pakistan (although democracy 
certainly was).   
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The latter opinion seems to be closer to the reality, as the increasing influence of Islamic 
political parties in Bangladesh validates its argument. These religiously based political parties 
broadly identify themselves as Islamist and non-nationalist movements, however, they 
maintain strong political alliance with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the primary 
campaigner of ‘Bangladeshi’ nationalism, and which was characterised by Sufia Uddin as a 
religious nationalist party. She elaborated (2006, p. 123):  
Yet Bangladesh today is experiencing an emerging nationalism based on religious identity as 
expressed by the BNP as well as another nationalism based on secular Bengali identity, which 
was the foundation of the independence movement. Complicating matters further is a third 
movement, fundamentalist in nature, that promotes a global Islamic culture. Fundamentalists 
strive to move Bangladesh toward a state governed by Islamic values.  
While clarifying these ‘fundamentalists’, she put the Jama’at-e-Islami an example of 
fundamentalism in Bangladesh (Uddin, 2006, p. 136). Although similar point of view about 
the Jama’at is held and expressed by the researchers such as Ali Riaz (2010) and Taj Hashmi 
(2011), there are utterly opposing opinions expressed by other contemporaries such as John 
Esposito (2008), Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (2005), Mumtaz Ahmed (1999) and Maidul Islam 
(2015). The latter segment emphasized on the long history of the Jama’at’s democratic 
political struggle and stronghold in the society. Bangladeshi Muslim society, where Islam 
came predominantly through Sufi Muslim preachers and which inherently rejects extremist 
Islamic thoughts until today, would not provide a religious party with such a strong position 
as the Jama’at holds in the national politics if it would adopt and practice religiously 
extremist ideas. The history of the Jama’at’s democratic political struggle in Bangladesh is 
another major witness of its being non-fundamentalist as well.  
The events of the liberation war and independence in 1971 had a tremendous effect in 
the development of Islamic politics in the country. During the nine-month military 
occupation, pro-Islamic leaders remained in Bangladesh and formed various civil and 
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paramilitary organizations to support the Pakistani army. On the other hand, the leaders of the 
Awami League and other secular and communist parties took shelter in neighbouring West 
Bengal in India and organized guerrilla warfare from there. Finally, India fought a direct war 
with Pakistan in December 1971, when Pakistan attacked some parts of India. The continuing 
internal civil war was transformed into a war between two states. After a short period of full 
conventional warfare, the Pakistani army surrendered to the Indian army in Dhaka on 16 
December 1971. 
With the liberation of Bangladesh, absolute control by the pro-secular Awami League 
began and religion was outlawed from the political arena. The Muslim League, the Nejam-e-
Islam Party, the Jama’at-e-Islami and all other Islamic religious parties went underground 
and continued only among their dedicated activists and in a very feeble way. In fact, Sheikh 
Mujib converted Bangladesh into a one-party state, ruled by his authoritarian governance, and 
this continued until he was killed in a military coup on 15 August 1975 (O'donnell, 1984, pp. 
174-176). 
The key person of the liberation movement, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, returned to 
Bangladesh, freed from the Pakistani gaol, and became President of Bangladesh. Secularism 
was adopted as the key principle of the new government and the constitution. All Islamic 
parties were out of the political arena due to their previous stance during the liberation war. 
As a consequence, many innocent people involved with Islamic political parties were killed 
by the guerrillas, and even lynched by the masses who had experienced extreme levels of 
torture during the war from the Pakistani army and their local collaborators (Asad, 1990, p. 
259). 
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POLITICAL ISLAM IN CONTEMPORARY BANGLADESH 
The 1971 Liberation war of Bangladesh marked a crucial milestone in the development and 
role of Islam in Bangladeshi society. West Pakistani rulers emphasized the unity of the 
newly-born Muslim state in this conflict while their counterparts, East Pakistani leaders, 
focused instead on social, political and economic discrimination. Secularism emerged there 
as the means to struggle against this exploitation of Islam by the West Pakistani political and 
military leaders. However, the large majority of the Bangladeshi Muslims never withdrew 
their deep faith in their idiosyncratic religion which had been assimilated with local traditions 
and culture. Therefore, the return of religion in the political arena occurred soon after 
independence in the mid-seventies and it has been growing stronger since then. This was also 
contemporaneous with the rise of political Islam in many other Muslim countries in the 
context of the cold war era.  
Continuing from there, the present landscape of political Islam in the Bangladesh 
consists of a plethora of Islamic political parties and organizations adhering to various 
interpretations of Islam as well as to different religious leaders. Mubashar Hasan, a former 
journalist and currently a PhD candidate at the Griffith University, wrote regarding the 
historic development of political Islam in Bangladesh (2011, p. 155):  
Development of political Islam took place in Bangladesh mainly in four phases: the Turkish 
war and the founding of the Khilafat movement during the First World War; the Oil crisis in 
the 1970s and the boost of Islamic institutions and practices in Bangladesh’s political 
discourse, mainly supported by the Middle Eastern countries; the Soviet–Afghanistan war and 
its linkage with Bangladeshi radicals in the 1990s; and by the globalization of war between 
Al-Qayeda and West and its implication on Bangladesh through the rise of extreme groups. 
Only four years after the independence, in August 1975, the supreme Bangladeshi leader of 
the liberation war, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was assassinated by a group of Army officers 
after becoming the dictator President of Bangladesh and banning all political parties except 
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his newly formed one. (Islam, 2015; Lewis, 2011). This regime change ousting the secular 
politics from the power was the most significant event leading to the re-emergence of Islamic 
politics in this region. The military coup eventually led to General Ziaur Rahman, a 
Liberation War hero and the Army Chief, becoming the President of the country until he was 
also assassinated 5 years later in 1981 by another group of army officers. The period of 
Zia’s25 rule witnessed the establishment of a multi-party democratic political system and the 
strengthening relation with Islamic countries in the Middle-East. The new state government 
also initiated formal practice of religious rituals and symbols in socio-political events, 
removed Secularism from the country’s constitution and lifted the longstanding ban on 
Islamic political parties for the first time in Bangladesh. The next Military President General 
Ershad proclaimed Islam as the state religion in 198826. (Devine & White, 2013a; Griffiths & 
Hasan, 2015; Hossain, 2012; Islam, 2015; Riaz, 2011; Uddin, 2006). Several Islamic parties 
such as the Muslim League, the Jama’at-e-Islami, Nezam-e-Islam, Islamic Democratic Party 
and so on started their activities in the independent Bangladesh. The Jama’at is the most 
influential Islamic party in the country today, whose history and development will be 
examined in detail in the following chapter. Prior to that, this section now focuses on a brief 
literature review of political Islam in Bangladesh.  
There are large numbers of Bangladeshi Muslim population who affiliate themselves 
with the Tabligh Jama’at, a transnational and apolitical religious movement. Focusing on 
individual piety and avowedly distancing themselves from religion-based politics, the 
Tabligh is generally not considered as an Islamic political party but an Islamic piety 
movement. According to Jan Ali, a social scientist specialized in Islamic revivalism, this 
                                                            
25 ‘Zia’ is the conventional short form of the name ‘Ziaur’ in Bangladesh when it is mentioned as the single-
word first name.  
26 In 1977, General Zia amended the Constitution and replaced one of the four state principles “Secularism” 
with “Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all actions”. Finally in 1988, General 
Ershad declared Islam as the State Religion of Bangladesh. Recently in 2010, the Supreme Court has reinstated 
Secularism as one of the four state principles in the Constitution. While this research is being submitted in 
March 2016, the court is hearing a petition to revoke Islam’s state-religion status.   
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apolitical nature is aligned with the transnational missionary nature of this movement. He 
wrote (Ali, 2010, p. 121):  
Tabligh Jama’at’s sense of identity is faith-based and it does not pay any attention to political 
and historical realities of the modern nation-states in which it pursues its missionary 
activities. If this is the case then what conclusions can be drawn regarding the importance and 
relevance of modern concepts of rule of law, citizenship, and constitutional liberalism in a 
modern democratic state? Generally speaking Tablighis barely pay attention to these and do 
not concern themselves with state differences based on different political ideologies. 
The Tabligh is essentially a non-political religious movement, however, there are some 
exceptions among the adherents of this movement in the deeply politically divided 
Bangladeshi society. Similar to the neighbouring countries and all over the world, the Tabligh 
collectively distances itself from any political parties or ideologies in Bangladesh, but a large 
number of Tabligh associates there are typically known for their personal political support for 
the secular Awami League. According to Sufia Uddin (2006, pp. 161-162):  
Tabligh Jama‘at is avowedly apolitical and thus differs markedly from another transnational 
movement, the Jama‘at-i-Islami. In fact, members of the Jama‘at-i-Islami are frustrated that 
the Tabligh is no ally in politics, as it is and always has been unwilling to participate in 
political debates. In fact, Tablighis typically support the Awami League.  
This support for the Awami League cannot be considered as a collective stance of the 
Tabligh, as many of them also vote for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in the national 
elections. In general, there is no evidence to show that the Tabligh, as a group, inspire its 
adherents to support any specific political party, rather it unequivocally avoids political 
issues. Moreover, leaders of the both secular-nationalist and religious-nationalist political 
parties usually visit the great annual conference of the Tabligh, named as the Ijtema. Taj 
Hashmi (2011) opined that some Tabligh organizers could arguably be personally 
sympathetic to ‘transnational Islamic terrorists’, but there is no solid evidence found in reality 
that may support this view.  
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Some other minor Islamic groups exist in the country as well who do not participate 
in the elections. Hizbut Tahrir is such a small group with transnational network, currently 
banned by the government and secretly popular among some young students. It considers 
participation in any democratic process as forbidden in Islam. There are some extremist 
groups such as Jama’atul Muzahidin, Ansarullah Bangla Team, Harqatul Jihad etc., working 
secretly in Bangladesh with very minor support and continuous opposition towards 
democracy. Ali Riaz mentioned that they are ‘too many to be mentioned individually’ and 
‘many of them are minuscule and many others keep changing names to avoid any 
crackdown’, but ‘some have built widespread networks’ within different countries in this 
region (Riaz, 2011, p. 16).  
According to the Election Commission database, Bangladesh has currently 13 Islamic 
political parties among a total of 41 political parties registered with the Commission 
(Commission, 2012a). These are: Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami (registration withheld in 2009 
according to a High-Court verdict), Zaker Party, Bangladesh Toriqot Federation, Bangladeshi 
Khelafot Andolon, Bangladesh Muslim League, Jomiot-e-Ulama-e-Bangladesh, Islamic Front 
Bangladesh, Islami Oikkojot, Bangladesh Khelafot Mojlish, Islami Andolon Bangladesh, 
Bangladesh Islami Front, Khelafot Mojlish, and Bangladesh Muslim League (BML Group). 
Many of these parties are dissenting fractions of few old Islamic parties. It is a commonplace 
among those Islamic parties to form new parties following their differing leaders. Most of 
them are based on the traditions provided by religious educational institutions, such as the 
Madrasah system. Students and former students usually follow their teachers, who can  
simultaneously be both political and spiritual leaders of those parties (Riaz, 2008). There are 
a few local Islamic parties, like the Zaker Party and the Toriqot Federation, also formed by 
the followers of certain Sufi orders, and their influence is primarily limited to their local 
districts mainly. Some of them do not have enough public support to participate in the 
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national elections. Ali Riaz & Kh. Ali Ar Raji (2011) mentioned that, the numbers of Islamic 
parties contesting in national elections were only 2 in 1979 and 1986. The number increased 
to 17 in 1991 and 18 in 1996, afterwards it decreased to 11 in the 2001 National Election.   
However, these smaller Islamic parties often form political coalitions as an electoral strategy. 
The significance of Islamic parties in Bangladeshi politics and their struggle is evident in Ali 
Riaz’s (2011, pp. 15-16) following statement:  
In Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Jamaat-i-Islam (BJI, which until recently called itself the JIB 
– the Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh) not only weathered the political storm after the 
independence of the country, which they violently opposed, but also emerged as the 
kingmaker in the 1990s. There are a number of other smaller Islamist parties who represent 
the broad spectrum of religio-political parties. A coalition of these parties is known as the 
Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ, Islamic United Front). Both the JI and the IOJ were partners of the 
ruling coalition led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a right of centre party, 
between 2001 and 2006.  
An analysis of the 9th National Parliamentary Election 2008 shows that, the Jama’at-e-Islami 
got 4.70% of the total turnout vote in the country, whereas all other Islamic political party 
jointly received 1.67% (Commission, 2012b). In the previous National Election of 2001, the 
Jama’at received 4.28% of the total votes, and all other Islamic political parties combined 
only received 0.8% (Commission, 2002). This shows that the Jama’at received slightly less in 
2008 whereas the other Islamic political parties more than double their results from the 
previous election. For most of these Islamic parties, the Jama’at in Bangladesh showed the 
way to participate in democratic politics. However, all opposition political parties, including 
the religious-based parties, boycotted the latest National Election in 2014 as the Awami 
League government abolished the Caretaker Government system27 which had been 
                                                            
27 Caretaker government in Bangladesh is a tentative form of government, comprised of ten selected advisers 
who would be agreed by all major political parties and headed by the Chief Adviser who would be the last 
retired Chief Justice of the country. This government would be in effect for a maximum duration of three 
months at the end of a normal government’s five-year regular tenure, and the primary goal is to administer the 
national election neutrally. Caretaker government system was first proposed by the then Jama’at President 
Ghulam Azam in 1990 after the fall of Military Dictator General Ershad. Such government supervised the 
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temporarily in place during all national elections since the 1991 after the mass-revolution 
against the last military dictatorship in Bangladesh.  The apparently fewer proportion of votes 
received by all Islamic political parties, including the Jama’at, is explained by Ferdous Jahan 
and Asif M. Shahan (2014, p. 426) as: 
In Bangladesh, Islamic political parties’ policy influence is very high and electoral 
success is very low. A deeply entrenched civil religion in the form of nationalistic 
identity bars religion from playing a significant role in influencing the voting 
behaviour of the citizens.  
This multitude of Islamic parties in Bangladesh has various agendas, interpretation of 
religion, ideological disagreements, and various types of leaderships. Different scholars have 
attempted to classify them into broader categories. Taj Hashmi’s (2011, p. 32) categorization 
in this regard may be oversimplified when he divided them into four major categories. These 
are: 1. fatalist/escapist, 2. militant fundamentalists, 3. opportunist/pragmatist, and 4. 
liberal/modernist. According to him, the Jama’at falls in the militant reformist category, 
although there has been no evidence of the Jama’at being related with militancy so far. 
Regarding the Jama’at in particular and Islamic terrorist groups in general, Akhand Akhtar 
Hossain (2012, pp. 182-183) explained in a recent study:  
Clearly, Islamic resurgence in Bangladesh has not taken a militant path under an organized 
political party or movement. Neither the BNP nor the Jamaat-i-Islami has direct linkage with 
Islamic militancy. Indeed, objective conditions in the country are not conductive to extremist 
Islamic movements. Some of the youth joined some overseas Islamic resistance movements in 
the 1970s and 1980s and later formed militant groups within Bangladesh. But violent activity 
in the country has been sporadic at best, and evidence of links with international terrorists or 
militant organizations is slight and lacks credibility. The facts aside, the domestic mass media 
have engaged in ‘sensational reporting’ of the activities of Islamic militants, especially since 
9/11.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
elections and transitions in Bangladesh in 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2008. However, the last Caretaker Government 
was military-backed and it held the offices for 2 years in 2007 and 2008. The Awami League abolished the 
caretaker government system in 2011.  
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With regard to the classification of Islamic groups, Maidul Islam (2015, p. 6) presented an 
even more simplified spectrum as he asserted:  
Islamist organization form a broad political spectrum, and one can categorize them into three 
distinct groups in terms of operational strategies and attendant tactical questions related to the 
modes of capturing political power: (a) Parliamentary Islamists (b) Militant Islamists and (c) 
Extremist Islamists. The Parliamentary Islamist generally use and chose parliamentary 
democratic methods such as participation in elections and mass mobilizations, like the 
Jamaat-e-Islami in South Asia, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Refah Party in Turkey, etc. 
Militant Islamists use both parliamentary methods and armed violence like Hamas in 
Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Extremist Islamists, however, use only violent and 
terrorist methods like the Al-Qaeda network, Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also been called as Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, or in short, 
Islamic State (IS) and groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba which are based in Pakistan and 
operate in Kashmir.   
In this categorization, he correctly separated the Jama’at, the largest political Islamist trend in 
the Subcontinent, from extremist groups, but he could not appreciate the syncretistic nature of 
Islamic politics in Bangladesh by including smaller Islamic political parties other than the 
Jama’at. This diversity of Islamic parties in Bangladesh is better illustrated by Ali Riaz and 
Kh. Ali Ar Raji in their presentation of ‘Taxonomy of Islamist Political Parties in 
Bangladesh’ (Riaz & Razi, 2011, p. 48). They described the Jama’at as a 
pragmatist/opportunist Islamic party with wide-raging support base. Islamic parties following 
traditional religious scholars were characterized by them as idealist and orthodox, while the 
followers of Sufi orders were mentioned as shrine based political parties. Finally, Islamic 
parties or groups that never participated in elections are divided into two categories; urban 
elite-centric and jihadists. However, unlike Taj Hashmi, they didn’t include Tabligh Jama’at 
in this categorization of Islamic political parties in Bangladesh which is a more proper 
approach considering the apolitical nature of the Tabligh in Bangladesh and elsewhere.   
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CONCLUSION  
Islam came to the Bengal region in its early days, during the first century of this religion. 
Since then, the role of religion in this society has gone through an enormous development and 
transformation. As in almost all other Muslim societies around the world, religion influenced 
the local culture of Bengal, combining with local tradition in the maturing religious practice. 
Although this region was mostly ruled by Muslim rulers after the advent of Islam, orthodox 
Islamic principles were not strictly imposed in the social life of the people. Another reason 
behind this flexibility was the contribution of Sufi religious figures to the spreading of Islam 
in this region. The Sufis mostly preferred to use peaceful means of conversion, instead of 
hostile conflict and they allowed the people freedom to keep their traditional culture while 
attempting to teach them absolute monotheism.  
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this region experienced numerous 
religious reformist movements, mostly in response to foreign colonization. Increasing 
communication with the outside world also facilitated the transfer of ideas from the Middle-
East and other Muslim societies. In contemporary times, the religo-social ideas of 
Bangladeshi Muslims are as diverse as in any other Muslim societies. Globalization and 
modern communication methods have a significant role in the development of the multi-
faceted expressions of religious practice in Bangladesh. One of these expressions, or schools 
of thought, has led to political participation by the Islamic revivalist school. This school, as 
exemplified by the Jama’at-e-Islami, comprises people from every walk of life, as well as 
from different Islamic schools, such as Sufi, Salafi and modernist, among others, all actively 
working inside the Jama’at framework.  
Before studying the social welfare programs of the Jama’at, it is necessary to 
recognize the characteristics of this movement. Although the common people have great 
affection for Islam and their own religious identity, serious debates and controversies about 
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Islamic political movements exist in Bangladeshi society. Several factors, such as the role of 
Islamic political parties during the country’s liberation war, the growth of secularism and 
nationalism along with modern education and the occasional conflict of religious reformist 
approaches with local traditions have contributed to this present situation. The issue of 
liberation was a highly significant factor in Bangladeshi politics, yet four decades after 
independence was achieved, the Jama’at faces political annihilation. However, due to the 
government’s autocratic subjugation of this political party, the Jama’at is now more of a 
social movement in the country. The following chapter will present the history and 
development of the Jama’at in Bangladesh, along with its current position in Bangladeshi 
Muslim society.  
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CHAPTER 3: BANGLADESH JAMA’AT-E-ISLAMI: 
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
 Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami now plays a significant role in the national political arena, and, 
politics apart, this group is also indispensable to the study of the presence of Islam in 
Bangladeshi society and the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism worldwide. In common with 
other Muslim countries, Bangladesh has several Islamic groups and parties participating in 
national politics, of which the Jama’at is the largest one. In the post cold war period, and 
especially during the current epoch of the ‘global war on terror’ following the 9/11 attacks, 
‘political Islam’ has increasingly become a major point of interest in socio-political 
discourses in many countries, including Bangladesh.  
Jama’at-e-Islami was established in 1941 in undivided British India, as the brainchild 
of the theologian scholar Abul Ala Mawdudi. The Indian subcontinent was divided into 
independent India and Pakistan in 1947, and the Jama’at continued its activities in both 
countries. Several years after the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, the 
Jama’at also started its activities in the new-born country of Bangladesh. Currently the 
Jama’at operates in at least eight geographic locations: as political parties in Pakistan, India, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India’s occupied Kashmir province and Pakistan’s Azad Kashmir, 
and as Muslim community and social organizations in Great Britain28 and North America29 
(Nasr, 1994: xiv). Although the Jama’at organizations in different countries enjoy a warm 
                                                            
28 The Muslim migrants to Britain, adherents to the ideology of the Jama’at in a broad sense and primarily 
originating from the subcontinent, established a large Islamic organization named Islamic Forum of Europe 
(IFE). There is another London-based Islamic organization, named Da’watul Islam (lit. Preaching of Islam), 
which was established and is run predominantly by British citizens of Bangladeshi origin.  
29 Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) 
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relationship amongst themselves, they work separately, as their policies, programs and 
authorities are different in accordance to their local contexts. They all share the common aim, 
however, of religiously educating people with a focus on a political reading of Islam, mostly 
based on literature by Mawdudi. In general, the activities of the Jama’at in one country are 
not influenced by any means by the Jama’at or similar organizations from other countries. 
Although they have some informal inter-communication and an identical way of thinking, 
this does not affect their independent agendas, decision making and political activities. 
This chapter seeks first to explore the history of the Jama’at and its development in 
Bangladesh. A description will then be presented of the Jama’at’s organizational structures 
and programs. This is intended to pave the way for the following chapters which will study 
the social welfare activities of this party.  
 
THE FORMATIVE CONTEXT OF THE JAMA’AT  
During British rule, Muslims in the subcontinent generally considered themselves as 
repressed. British rule began there when the forces of the East India Company captured the 
region from the Muslim rulers, in the Battle of Plassey in 1757. A century later, in the 
aftermath of the Great Indian Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and the defeat of the last Mughal 
emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar (1775–1862), the Muslims in this region became more 
detached from the British rulers, and subsequently fell behind their Hindu counterparts in the 
socio-political and educational spheres. 
This situation led to Sir Syed Ahmed Khan’s (1817–1889) forming a reformist 
educational movement called the Aligarh Movement and establishing a Muslim university in 
the city of Aligarh. This movement later produced the All-India Muslim League, in 1906, a 
political party aiming to promote modern education for Muslims and advance their agendas. 
67 
This party became the major political party representing the Muslims of this region in 
subsequent years and, finally, in 1947, the ruling party of the newly created Muslim majority 
state of Pakistan.  
In the early 1920s, Muslims in British-controlled India formed a movement named the 
Khilafat Movement, primarily to support the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey during the 
aftermath of World War I. The movement failed, as the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished. 
However, it revived the spirit of independence among the Muslims of this region that had 
been long suppressed after the failed Sepoy Mutiny. During this time, a socio-political Hindu 
nationalist movement named Shuddhi (Sanskrit: lit. purification) became popular among the 
Hindus. One of the prominent leaders of this movement, Swami Shraddhanand (1856–1926), 
was killed by a Muslim assassin, and riots between Hindu and Muslims became rampant 
throughout India. 
Altogether, during this period, politically conscious Muslims of India were generally 
divisible into three categories: 1) supporters of the Indian National Congress, demanding 
Hindu-Muslim unity and keeping India united based on nationalism, 2) supporters of the 
Muslim League, demanding separate states for the Muslims and the Hindus based on the 
‘Two Nation Theory’30 and 3) small groups of supporters of the British colonial rulers.  
While establishing a new Islamic political party at this crucial time, Mawdudi had to 
explain explicitly why his stand was different from that of both the Indian National Congress 
and the Muslim League. He wrote strongly against the possibility of a Hindu-Muslim joint 
state, highlighting the severe discrimination faced by the Muslims in previous years and 
                                                            
30 The Two Nation Theory demonstrates that the Muslims and Hindus are two different communities, so 
different in religious, cultural, social, economical and political aspects of their lives that they should be 
considered as two different nations and would require two different countries. Differences beyween these two 
communities were first given emphasis by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, a Muslim educational reformist, in order to 
make the Muslims aware of their educational and culture backwardness. Later, Muhammad Iqbal, a Muslim 
poet philosopher, propagated the idea of two autonomous homelands for two different nations and finally 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, politically translated this concept and introduced it to 
the people through his party, the Muslim League.  
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refuting the doctrine of nationalism as held by the Congress. At the same time, he denounced 
the Muslim League for their support of secularism and nationalism, for he considered both of 
these ideologies anti-Islamic. His refusal to accept a future nationalist state was so strong that 
he even wrote: “If there is any greater enemy of Islam after Kufr (disbelief) and Shirk 
(associating anyone with God), that would be this devil of race and motherland” (Khan, 1996, 
p. 52). 
 
THE BIRTH OF THE JAMA’AT: MAWDUDI’S RESPONSE TO MODERNITY 
Any study of Muslims on the Indian subcontinent and the emergence of political Islam in the 
modern era, and particularly the Jama’at, would not be complete without a clear 
understanding of the role played by Mawdudi, the founder of the Jama’at-e-Islami. The 
movement was established in 1941 in Lahore, a city in the Punjab province of the then 
undivided India under British colonial rule. Within the last seven decades, the party has gone 
through several stages of development and change in its policies and strategies as it has 
spread to different countries. Before studying its current position in Bangladesh, it is 
important to have a critical understanding of the early development of the party.  
During the first half of the twentieth century, the political spheres of the Muslim 
world were pretty much void. While the British, French, Italian and other European colonial 
rulers were withdrawing from various Muslim majority regions, the Muslim population in 
those countries faced the unprecedented predicament of determining their political 
framework. Historically accustomed to dynastic rule and later on to colonial subjugation, 
their preferences for political models varied. In some Arab and Asian Muslim countries, 
socialist political and economic models gained popularity. However, Western democratic 
political models were followed in most other Muslim countries. During this time of historical 
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changes, a few Muslim scholars around the globe came forward with their ideas regarding an 
Islamic politico-economic model based on their interpretations of Islamic principles and 
practices. Mawdudi, a prolific Indian writer, was one of these. 
In the March 1941 edition of the magazine, Tarjuman al-Qur’an, Mawdudi wrote an 
outline of a new Islamic party, explaining why such a group was needed. This article initiated 
correspondence with like-minded people from all over the Indian subcontinent, and he invited 
them, about 75 people, to his magazine’s office to attend a conference (Khan, 1996, p. 75). 
Mawdudi’s primary focus was on changing and Islamizing the educated elite of 
society. He considered them to be the major catalyst of societal change and was concerned 
about the increasing influence of Western ideas and culture in their lives. His strategy was to 
motivate the educated and developed portion of society to embrace Islam as a complete way 
of life, with the long-term aim of eventually Islamizing the whole society. At the same time, 
he had a strong faith in the ‘Islamness’ of the masses, as he considered them to be a great 
supporting factor in actualizing his vision of establishing Islam in society. In one of his 
interviews, published in 1967, he was asked whether democracy would be a good option for 
his party, given the fact that the masses were likely to support non-Islamic parties which 
might better address their material needs. His reply was:  
Their hearts throb with the love of Islam and they cannot be lured away by the slogans of 
bread and clothing. Even in Arab countries the popularity of un-Islamic movements is mere 
propaganda. I have observed the situation obtaining there and have also had the opportunity to 
study closely the Arab masses. They love Islam from the core of their heart. But whether in 
Syria, Egypt, Iraq or some other Arab country, the masses have never been allowed the right 
to choose their representatives.(Selected Speeches & Writings of Maulana Maududi, 1982 as 
cited by Shehabuddin, 2008: 580)  
The hypothesis was that Islam, being the main issue and base ideology of the Jama’at, could 
attract the votes of the masses, and finally the ensuing ‘Islamic State’ would solve all existing 
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problems. However, it seems that the experience of the following years changed Mawdudi’s 
proposition in terms of political reality. Nasr referred to the statement Mawdudi made in 
1971, where “in a rare show of self-criticism, he declared that the Jama’at boasted a literacy 
rate of 85 per cent in a country where the same percentage were illiterate; it had spent too 
much energy and resources on attracting the educated, while it was the poor and uneducated 
who determined elections. The Jama’at should re-examine its policies and its orientation and 
strategy” (Nasr, 1994, p. 90).  
Abbas Ali Khan (1914–1999), former president of the Jama’at in Bangladesh and a 
history teacher by profession, described 1946 and 1947 as the years of expansion and 
development for the Jama’at. Starting with fewer than 100 people in 1941, the Jama’at 
organized a two day central conference in April 1946 in Elahabad City, in which more than 
2,000 delegates participated. Literature by Mawdudi was being translated into many 
languages, such as Arabic, English, Turkish, Tamil, Malayalam, Bengali, Sindhi, Hindi, 
Gujrati, Persian and Poshtu. Organizational structures of the party were developed and people 
from different walks of life, such as religious scholars, academics, businessmen and civil 
servants had joined the party (Khan, 1996, pp. 122-145). 
After the division of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, Mawdudi, along with some of 
his colleagues, migrated to the newly established Muslim state, Pakistan, while many others 
decided to remain in India. As Mawdudi declared during the division process, the party was 
divided into two independent parties in the two different countries, with their own agendas 
and activities: Jama’at Islami Pakistan and Jama’at Islami Hind (India). The number of 
Rukon (highest cadre in the party organization) was 625 before the division. Of these, 385 
established the party in Pakistan, and the remaining 240 continued with the party in India 
(Khan, 2007, p. 198). 
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ABUL ALA MAWDUDI: A PIONEER OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM 
Mawdudi was born on 25 September 1903 in Awrangabad, a city in the Indian state of 
Hyderabad (located in the present-day Indian province of Andhra Pradesh). He came from a 
religious family known for their piety and educational excellence, referred to by Roy Jackson 
(2011) as a ‘noble lineage’. His father, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, a lawyer by profession, 
followed Sufi practices and it was because of his influence that Mawdudi chose to receive a 
traditional Islamic education. Being a talented and bright student, he acquired a good 
command of Islamic knowledge and different languages, such as Urdu and Arabic, from an 
early age. In 1918, when he was 15 years old, he started writing about Islamic and political 
issues in various newspapers and magazines. At the age of 17, he became the editor of a 
weekly magazine, Taj, published in Jabalpur City. The following year, he went to Delhi to 
work as the editor of The Muslim. In 1924, he edited the magazine, Al-Jam’iyyat, the official 
publication of the organization, Jam’iat-e-Ulama-e-Hind, the national umbrella organization 
of the Indian Muslims at that time. He continued with this magazine until 1928, when he 
resigned and devoted himself to writing as an independent.  
These intellectual works of Mawdudi’s introduced him to the leading Muslim 
intellectuals and politicians of the Indian subcontinent of that time, and he became involved 
in the Tahrik-i-Hijrah movement, a group opposing British rule in India and inspiring 
Muslims to migrate to a Muslim majority country (Jackson, 2006, pp. 190-196). 
In 1931, he became the editor of a well circulated Islamic monthly magazine, 
Tarjuman al-Qur’an (Urdu: lit. Meaning of the Qur’an), that was published from Haiderabad 
City. Later, in 1938, he established an Islamic institute and complex, called Dar al-Islam 
(Arabic: lit. House of Islam), in Pathankot City. The magazine continued to be published 
from the new base. During these years, the Indian subcontinent was preparing for 
independence from British rule, and various ideologies and political doctrines were 
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flourishing there. Mawdudi started writing intensively, explaining some contemporary 
aspects of Islam, such as Muslim cultural identity, Islamic revivalist movements, the 
importance of education, and so on. He also advocated the concept of Ummah as unity based 
on religious identities, and refuted all other forms of nationalism.  
The life of Mawdudi can be divided into two main phases. In the early part of his life, 
until the late 1940s, he was a prominent scholar, calling for holistic politico-economic 
changes in society. Even with the establishment of the political party, Jama’at-e-Islami, he 
was relatively better known for his focus on the social and educational reformation of Muslim 
society. It was not until the division of India and Pakistan in 1947, when he migrated to the 
newly established Muslim country, that he started advancing his causes through his political 
activities and became renowned as a politician struggling to establish Islamic principles of 
governance and an Islamic constitution. Although he continued writing profusely during this 
second phase of his life, his intellectual activities were further enriched with socio-political 
activism. During these years, he had to face imprisonment on several occasions, the banning 
of his party and even a death sentence pronounced by a military court, which was withdrawn 
later due to international pressure on the Pakistani government.  
As an ideologue and religious scholar, Mawdudi wrote more than 100 books and 
treatises on different aspects of Islam. Many consider his most important intellectual work to 
be the exegesis of the whole Qur’an, called Tafhim al-Qur’an (lit. understanding of the 
Qur’an). Through this explanation of the central text of Islam, he attempted to interpret the 
religion as a complete way of life and a system of collective human living on this earth. His 
other significant intellectual contributions include Khutbat (Collection of Lectures), Tafhimat 
(Elucidations), Tajdid wa Ihya-e-Din (A History of Islamic Revivalist Movements), Al-Jihad 
Fil-Islam (War and Peace in Islam), Risalat-e-Diniyat (Towards Understanding Islam), Sud 
(Usury), Purdah (The Veil), Rasa’il wa Masa’il (Questions and Answers), Tanqihat 
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(Explications), Islam ka Nizam-e-Hayat (The Islamic Way of Life), Islam ka Nazariyyah-e-
Siyasi (Islamic Political Theory), Human Rights in Islam, The Islamic Movement: Dynamics 
of Values, Power and Charge and Witness Unto Mankind: Purpose and Duty of the Muslim 
Ummah (Nation).  
However, Mawdudi’s writings did not meet with universal acceptance. Some critics 
of his intellectual contribution to Islamic knowledge claimed that his emphasis was too much 
on socio-political change, to the detriment of moral and spiritual development. Defending his 
stance, Humeira Iqtedar (2011) argued that Mawdudi opposed the traditional tendencies of 
the Ulama (Islamic Scholars), offering a more enlightened interpretation of religious texts. 
According to Iqtedar (Iqtedar, 2011), Mawdudi adopted and reproduced ‘Western political 
concepts, structures, and operations’ that were novel, in order to present Islam as a rational 
and universal religious system. However, looking at the topics covered by Mawdudi, it is 
clear that he wrote on several religious and spiritual aspects of Islam. His books covering the 
Islamic belief system and the philosophy of worshiping in Islam are still, to this day, included 
in the syllabus of the Jama’at as introductory reading materials on Islam. In this regard, it can 
be assumed that while Mawdudi was a vigorous critic of Western values and ideologies, at 
the same time he adopted a Western methodology of organization and rational explanation. 
This resulted in both widespread acceptance of his work by educated Muslims and agitation 
amongst many traditionalists. 
Mawdudi’s religious interpretations and concepts clearly influenced many great 
Muslim scholars globally, such as Syed Qutb and Muhammad al-Ghazali from Egypt, Abul 
Hasan Ali Nadwi, Manzur Elahi, Amim Ehsan Eslahi, Israr Ahmed, Khurshid Ahmed from 
Pakistan and India and Gholam Azam from Bangladesh. He died in 1979 in a hospital in New 
York at the age of 75 and was buried in front of his house in Lahore (Khan, 2008, pp. 356-
359).  
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Regarding Mawdudi’s brainchild, the Jama’at, the party has gone through several 
developments with different characteristics in different places. For instance, Jama’at-e-Islami 
in Pakistan and Bangladesh continued to oppose secularism strongly, seeing it as an anti-
Islamic ideology, whereas the Jama’at in neighbouring India urged the government to apply 
secularism in order to protect the minority Muslims (Ahmad, 2009b). 
 
ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AS THE IDEOLOGY OF THE JAMA’AT  
Islamic Revivalism is a complex term that includes several meanings. Primarily, it entails the 
removal from Islam of the foreign accretions of all historical periods. It is natural that the 
practices of the religion would become mixed up with other social and religious influences, 
and Islam exhorts its followers to strive always to remove such accretions and return to the 
origins of Islam as derived from the Qur’an and the Prophetic Traditions, the two major 
sources of Islam, and emulate the religious culture practised in its pristine period.  
The interpretation of the nature of the origins of Islam varies from one movement to 
another. However, the perception of its being challenged by modernity and Western 
civilization is a common feature of these movements. Therefore, many scholars agree that 
several movements adhering to the concept of Islamic revivalism in modern times are 
connected through a common appreciation of “the ideology of a defensive reaction to 
modernity” (Ali, 2012, pp. 23, 45). For instance, the Jama’at regards secularism and cultural 
Westernization as the greatest challenges faced by an Islamic movement today. The doctrine 
of Egyptian scholar Syed Qutb, who considers Western civilization as jahiliyyah (lit. 
ignorance) is highly esteemed by the Jama’at. At the same time, the Jama’at has also been 
negotiating with various modern methods to smooth their organizational activities (Ahmad, 
2009b, pp. 49-50). The rationale presented here by the Jama’at is that participation in 
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electoral politics and the modern management of its organizational structure are not part of its 
central ideology.  
This characteristic way of dealing with modernity is also apparent in the activities of 
the Tablighi Jama’at, the world’s largest transnational Islamic revivalist movement. It has 
adopted modern technologies but with an emphasis on avoiding the negative consequences of 
modernity (Ali, 2010, p. 127). There are differences among movements concerning the issues 
that they focus on and the approaches that they adopt for their activities. The degree of 
emphasis on personal piety, spiritual development and self-reformation as well as on social 
issues, political agendas and education also varies from one to another. 
The Tablighi movement inherently attempts to avoid political issues in its activities, 
whereas the Jama’at is primarily known as a political party for its emphasis on and 
involvement in political issues. The political method that the Jama’at adopts to attain its 
ideological objectives is currently termed ‘political Islam’. According to Akbarzadeh (2012), 
political Islam is a phenomenon that is manifested in taking a stand against other prevailing 
political ideologies, such as nationalism or secularism. For Islamists, reinterpretation of 
Islamic history and re-evaluation of religious texts act as the core forces in their demand for 
social changes to establish their ideology. Akbarzadeh correctly recognized that Islamism 
confronts two primary rivals, on two different levels: national governments at the local level 
and the West on a global scale. However, his explanation of ‘the paradox of political Islam’ 
seems to contradict the reality of the political situation. For him, a major feature of the 
Islamists is that “their understanding of Islam is presented as the only authentic version, 
dismissing alternative views as inauthentic and illegitimate” (Akbarzadeh, 2012, p. 3). This 
verdict suffers if one appreciates the pluralistic nature of Islamism and its diverse 
interpretations, ranging from reformist to extremist. It is common knowledge in Islamic 
studies that the religion has been subject to interpretation of its primary texts, that is, the 
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Qur’an and the Prophetic Traditions, after the revelation ended with the death of the last 
prophet. Therefore, almost all Muslim scholars see the possibility of an error of human 
reasoning. Current scholars explaining and upholding Islamic political ideologies are no 
different, except for a very few extremists, who are certainly not representative authorities of 
the wide ranging contemporary Islamic political scene. 
Against the backdrop of this intricate conceptual composite of Islamic revivalism, it is 
a challenging task to define the Jama’at. Emphasis on a particular aspect, such as politics, 
might result in disregarding religious or social aspects of this movement. Broadly speaking, 
the Jama’at represents the ideology of legalist reformist Islamism in Bangladesh. In defining 
the trends of Islamic movements in the modern era, scholars and intellectuals differ hugely on 
what they believe to be the correct typologies. Classic classifications consider these 
movements as primarily divided into three categories: traditionalists/fundamentalists who 
focus on theological principles; modernists/reformists who attempt to modernize Muslim 
societies without compromising their religious aspects; and secularists/liberalists who are 
more inclined to rational explanation rather than textual or religious explanations of Islam, as 
propounded by scholars like H. Gibb, W. Smith, A. Hourany, L. Binder, H. Mintjes and R. 
Humphrey (Auda, 2009). However, these typologies have become more complex during the 
recent decades. This very problem was recently emphasized by Tariq Ramadan in his website 
(2013) as: 
The problem of terminology, confusion is rampant; no one knows exactly who or what 
‘Islamism’ means. The term, which has now become powerfully pejorative, can be applied to 
movements ranging from al-Qaeda (worldwide, and most recently in northern Mali) to the 
legalists of Ennadha and the Muslim Brotherhood by way of the Justice and Development 
parties in Turkey and Morocco (with certain reservations), and up to and including the Iranian 
regime. It is hard to believe that the confusion is being maintained, and the terminology being 
utilized purely by chance. Meanwhile the petro-monarchies of the Gulf, those wealthy allies 
of the West, whose authorities affirm that democracy is un-Islamic, regimes that apply the 
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Shari’a in its most legalistic and repressive form and that forbid women from social and 
political participation, are never described as ‘Islamists’ even though their policies and 
practices form the essence of political Islam. 
Using a different approach, John Esposito recognized four categories of Islamic movements, 
based on their attitudes towards Islamic socio-political change: secularist, conservative, neo-
traditionalist and Islamic reformist. He considered Jama’at-e-Islami as a neo-traditionalist 
Islamic movement.  
Although they value the classical Islamic synthesis, they are not wedded to it as are the 
conservatives. Movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i-Islami reflect a neo-
traditionalist approach. While they accept much of classical law, they believe that law 
historically incorporated many un-Islamic practices. Therefore, Muslims must return to their 
revealed sources to revitalize the Islamic community. (In this sense, they may be called 
fundamentalists). Claiming continuity with eighteenth- and nineteenth- century Islamic 
revivalists like Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Shah Wali Allah, neo-traditionalists 
maintain that the only authority to be followed is that of the Quran and Sunnah; they claim the 
right to interpret (ijtihad) the Quran and Sunnah to respond to the needs of modernity. 
(Esposito, 1998, p. 315) 
 
POLITICAL METHODOLOGY OF THE JAM’AT  
Pakistan was created as a state for the Muslims, but its founding fathers were mostly secular 
in their political ideologies. They preferred the Western approach of democracy in polity and 
a legal system independent from theological influence, with a minor role given to religious 
identity. Mawdudi was blatantly opposed to this from the very beginning and advocated a 
central role for Islamic governance, including having the state and the constitution shaped by 
religious principles. These ideas also resulted in much controversy, with some claiming that 
Mawdudi and his followers were opposed to the creation of Pakistan as a separate state for 
Muslims.  
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In a speech given in Aligarh Muslim University in 1940, Mawdudi claimed that an 
Islamic state should be an “ideological state”, completely free “from all traces of nationalism 
and its influences” and “built exclusively on principles”. He also argued that such a state 
“conducted on a definite set of principles and ruled by a group of persons composed of 
widely differing nationalities who have accepted those principles as the basis of their entire 
life” could have been possible following the French Revolution, or indeed the establishment 
of Communism, but both of those human endeavours finally “disappeared in the darkness of 
nationalism”. He also argued that a proper Islamic revolution can only take place through 
constant efforts to bring about societal changes, whereas a nationalist state for the Muslims 
would lead them away from this revolution (Mawdudi, 1977, pp. 17-18).  
The timing of Mawdudi’s strong assertion regarding a nationalist state is interesting, 
as it was expressed only six months after the acceptance of the Pakistan Resolution in Lahore 
by the Muslim League. However, despite his public misgivings, he migrated to the newly 
created state immediately after it was founded in 1947, claiming that he was actively 
supporting the creation of the Islamic state of Pakistan. In Pakistan, he continued struggling 
to introduce Islamic principles into its constitution and legal system (Yasmeen, 2012a).  
However, a critical reading of Mawdudi’s activities and intellectual contributions 
confirms that his thoughts and concepts developed throughout the years and changed to fit the 
changing circumstances. Instead of holding to a rigid interpretation of religious perspectives, 
he adapted progressive and rational explanations to advance his cause. Roy Jackson (2006, p. 
191) has correctly summed up Mawdudi’s role in the creation of Pakistan and his objectives 
in writing on several aspects of Islam:  
The primary focus determined from all his works is a genuine concern for the future of Islam 
coupled with the call for an Islamic state and how this might be constituted. Further, he 
believed that Islam could achieve this through its own ideology which he considered to be 
self-sufficient and distinct from Western values. In many respects, his views echo those of the 
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Salafiyyah. Undoubtedly, Mawdudi’s writings and activities contributed greatly to the 
founding of Pakistan in 1947. Today, Mawdudi continues to be read, studied and respected by 
Muslims across the world and is constantly referenced in relation to modern themes of 
Islamic resurgence.  
To summarize and to put the political methodology of the Jama’at into a current perspective, 
it must be said that Islamic activism within the electoral democracy is now one of the major 
trends of contemporary Islamic revivalism, that ultimately seeks to re-establish the Caliphate 
(Islamic State) governed by Islamic principles. Jama’at-e-Islami (Urdu: lit. Islamic Party), 
one of the oldest and largest transnational Islamic movements, introduced a modern political 
revivalist reading of Islam to the South Asian region. The party was initiated officially in 
August 1941 by theologian scholar Syyed Abul Ala Mawdudi31 in undivided India under 
British colonial rule.32 Mawdudi was always outspoken about the prime objective of Islamic 
politics being ‘establishment of the religion’ (Iqamat-e-Deen), and this objective still remains 
the same for the party. However while keeping their objective intact, Islamic political parties, 
including the Jama’at, have adopted several methodologies and changes in their strategies 
worldwide. Interestingly, these parties have currently been going through severe turmoil and 
upheaval around the world. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt formed a political party called 
the Freedom and Justice Party, which won the national election in 2012, and its leader, 
Mohammed Morsi, became the first democratically elected President of Egypt. However, he 
was ousted by the Egyptian army on 3 July 2013. Similarly in Bangladesh, the Jama’at 
leaders are facing a war crimes trial, some have received the death penalty, others have been 
imprisoned and the party was barred by the court on 1 August 2013 from participating in the 
upcoming national election. A panel of High Court judges viewed that one of the Jama’at’s 
                                                            
 31 For a brief description of the life and thought of Mawdudi, and his contribution to Islamic revivalism through 
establishing the Jama’at, please refer to (Nasr, 2005, pp. 98-121) 
32 “Revivalist Islam in today’s Bangladesh is represented by two distinct and opposing streams: the politically 
activist revivalism is represented by the Jamaat-i-Islam, and the quietist, non-political da’awa-oriented 
revivalism is represented by the Tablighi Jamaat” (Ahmad, 2008, p. 61). 
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fundamental principles, as outlined in the party’s constitution – to believe in God as the 
source of all sovereignty and power – contradicts the fundamentals of the country’s 
constitution, as, according to the constitution, the people are the source of all sovereignty and 
power. Consequently, the judges panel decreed the registration of the Jama’at under the 
election commission null and void, and thereby made the Jama’at ineligible to participate in 
any election in the country.  
The Jama’at in Bangladesh is generally identified as a political party with an Islamic 
agenda, that seeks to establish Islamic principles at the state level through regular politics. 
However, the beginning of the party was different in nature. At the time of its inception in the 
1940s, the aim of the Jama’at was primarily centred on establishing an Islamic community. In 
its early years, the Jama’at intentionally refrained from political activities, such as 
participating in elections. This was due to the earlier theological reasoning by Mawdudi, the 
founder of the party, and his fellow religious scholars, who regarded participation in Western 
style politics as prohibited by Islam. But in 1951, Mawdudi came to the conclusion that 
political participation would be an acceptable way to further establish Islam in the people’s 
personal lives (Iqamat-e-Deen) and to reassert the governance of God in their collective lives 
(Huqumat-e-Ilahiyyah) – his two primary agendas (Nasr, 1996, p. 43). This notion 
occasioned major disagreement among several Jama’at leaders, and Amin Ahsan Islahi (a 
notable religious scholar and commentator of the Qur’an), Muhammad Asimul Haddad (the 
director of the Arabic translation bureau) and Israr Ahmad (a notable political and religious 
figure) resigned from the party. This was the second instance of some Ulama (religious 
scholars) leaving the party; the first was the departure of Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi and Manzur 
Nomani in 1942. Nasr described this trend as a struggle with the Ulama and stated that “as 
the Jama’at became more a political party than a religious movement, Mawdudi’s style began 
to change from scholar to politician” (Nasr, 1996, pp. 43, 115).  
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However, the objectives and the activities of the Jama’at extend far beyond the 
political sphere. It adheres to the doctrine of transnational Islamic political revivalism which 
is clearly realized in its official objective: “to achieve the satisfaction of God and success in 
the hereafter through establishing Islam for the sake of peace and human welfare in 
Bangladesh and in the world” (Jama'at-E-Islami, 2008, p. 11). Theoretically, the Jama’at 
observes politics as a means to secure social justice and welfare based on Islamic principles.33 
In conjunction with this claim, it has attempted to establish a practical model of Islamic social 
welfare policy. Currently, the people adhering to the ideology of the Jama’at administer the 
most successful private interest-free Islamic Bank in Bangladesh, a widespread network of 
hospitals and pharmaceutical services, and educational institutions, both general and 
religious, all over the country. Considering the banking and other financial institutions 
primarily as profit-oriented services, these social activities of the Jama’at could be roughly 
divided into two major categories: profit-oriented socio-economic services and non-profit 
social welfare. In the current research, my aim is to study the latter, which is significantly 
instrumental in the resource mobilization process of the Jama’at as a social movement.  
The non-profit activities target the people living in poor conditions. As a religion-
based political group, it is expected that the Jama’at should serve the material needs of poor 
and needy people. Moreover, helping the poor and bringing about constructive changes in 
society is an indication of piety, which was demonstrated in the early history of Islam. It is 
expected that this practice be adhered to by different Islamic movements in different ages and 
places. However, the pragmatic motivation of attracting the masses towards the party 
ideology or of collecting more followers has a significant place in this discourse. To sum up, 
                                                            
33 This is perceivable from the four major activities of the Jama’at as they are officially stated in the party 
constitution: 1) revival of Islamic values and national unity, 2) creating responsible citizens and eligible 
leadership for building a justice-based society and state, 3) ultimate dependence on the Almighty Allah to secure 
democracy, economic and social justice, basic human rights, balanced distribution of the wealth and 
development of living quality, and 4) universal Muslim brotherhood and friendship with all other nations 
(Jama'at-E-Islami, 2008, pp. 11-12). 
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the structure of the Jama’at represents a complex socio-political framework that attempts to 
uphold religious principles while compromising with current socio-political phenomena.  
From the historical development of the Jama’at, it is apparent that the party has 
adopted a top-down approach, in line with the thinking of its founder theologian Mawdudi, 
whose priority was to Islamize the educated sector of the society. His concern was that being 
an able Muslim requires an adequate amount of knowledge (Jackson, 2011, p. 65). This 
educational elitist approach has resulted in a gap between the party and the vast majority of 
Bangladeshis, who are far from being educated and who are living below the poverty line. To 
close this gap, there is an noticeable attempt inside the party to reach the marginalized 
population through social welfare provision. Moreover, there has been a recent trend in the 
activities of the Jama’at towards adapting a bottom-up approach based on strengthened social 
foundations (Razzak, 2012).  
 
JAMA’AT-E-ISLAMI IN EAST PAKISTAN: EARLY DEVELOPMENT  
To understand the situation of the Jama’at in present-day Bangladesh, a brief look at its 
development in this region is necessary. As a political party, Jama’at has had to operate 
throughout different types of socio-political change taking place in the greater Indian 
subcontinent. Mawdudi established this party, initially, with a vision of changing the male 
elite of his society through educating them about Islam. The cadre-based organizational 
structure and a highly categorized academic syllabus were manifestations of this vision. Later 
activities of the party included women and working class people (Shehabuddin, 2008, p. 
579). The Jama’at, having been established as a religious movement in the British ruled 
Indian subcontinent, was later converted into a religion-based political party in Pakistan after 
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partition in 1947 and continued to operate in Bangladesh after its (Bangladesh’s) 
independence in 1971.  
The Jama’at was introduced into present-day Bangladesh by a Bengali religious 
scholar named Muhammad Abdur Rahim. Rahim lived in Calcutta as a student and later as a 
researcher for about eight years, from 1938 till 1946, except for an interval of a few months 
in 1943, when he stayed in his own village in Pirojpur. Calcutta was the centre of political, 
economic and cultural activities for the whole of Bengal at that time. Rahim’s surroundings 
in Calcutta helped in developing political awareness in his thoughts. Moreover, he was a 
conscious observer of the process of independence of the subcontinent from British colonial 
rule and the subsequent formation of the two states based on religious identity. Though he 
was a supporter of Pakistan, he did not actively participate in the Muslim League, as he did 
not like the agenda of nationalism and the Muslim League leaders, who were secular in their 
thoughts and lifestyles (Majidi, 2003, pp. 39-45). In this respect, he had a similar approach 
towards Islamic worldviews as that advocated by Mawdudi. According to his biography, 
Muhammad Abdur Rahim felt the inner urge to provide effective services for his community 
and to serve the greater objectives of participating in Islamic revivalism after reading some 
books authored by Mawdudi. He began to learn more about the political party, Jama’at-e-
Islami and started a written correspondence with Mawdudi through the post and finally 
participated in the greater Indian conference of the party, which was held in Allahabad in 
March 1946. He met his mentor, Mawdudi, for the first time during this conference. Upon 
returning home, he established the first unit of Jama’at-e-Islami in the Bengal region in his 
own locality (Majidi, 2003, p. 48). 
In November 1950, Abdur Rahim went to Karachi to join the central conference of 
Jama’at-e-Islami and stayed in the Central Office in the company of Mawdudi for three 
months. He frequently travelled to different provinces of West Pakistan with Mawdudi and 
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had the opportunity to learn about the society and the Islamic movement. He exchanged 
views with Mawdudi and received his guidelines for organizational works in East Pakistan. 
Furthermore, this was an opportunity for Abdur Rahim to observe and train himself in the 
official activities of an established Islamic political party. Jama’at-e-Islami was yet to achieve 
the status of a full-fledged provincial organization according to its constitution, so Rafi 
Ahmad Indori, a West Pakistani Jama’at leader, was appointed to oversee the party’s 
activities in East Pakistan and worked as Secretary General of Bengal region under the 
authority of the central body from West Pakistan. After Abdur Rahim’s return from Karachi 
in January 1951, Rafi Ahmad returned to West Pakistan and Abdur Rahim began working as 
the provincial Secretary General. In February 1953, Jama’at-e-Islami in East Pakistan 
achieved the status of an autonomous provincial organization, separate from its central body, 
and Chowdhury Muhammad Ali was sent from West Pakistan as Amir (President) of Jama’at-
e-Islami of Bengal region. Abdur Rahim was appointed as Secretary General at that time 
(Majidi, 2003, pp. 62-64). Later, in 1956, he became the first elected Amir, and Ghulam 
Azam became Secretary of East Pakistan Jama’at-e-Islami in the party’s new form as a fully 
autonomous provincial organization (Islam, 2005, pp. 31, 75). According to Enayetur Rahim 
(2001, p. 237), “to accelerate its activities in East Pakistan, Maulvi Abdur Rahim of Barisal, 
the only notable presence of a Bengali in the Jamat hierarchy, was appointed Amir of East 
Pakistan in 1951”. However, the biography of Muhammad Abdur Rahim confirms that he 
was appointed Amir in 1956 (Majidi, 2003, p. 75). However, Muhammad Abdur Rahim was 
the only Bengali member of the Jama’at from this region at that time, as the previous leader, 
Rafi Ahmad Indori, was from West Pakistan, and probably it was this fact that led Enayetur 
Rahim to consider him as the Jama’at leader in this region as early as 1951. 
A new wave of organizational activities of the Jama’at-e-Islami in East Pakistan 
began with this new committee, and Mawdudi visited East Pakistan for the first time in 1956. 
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He, along with the provincial leaders, travelled to the major cities of East Pakistan and 
delivered speeches to various public assemblages. These programs began the larger scale 
public activities of Jama’at-e-Islami among the masses of this region. Abdur Rahim 
continued working as President of East Pakistan Jama’at-e-Islami for about twelve years, 
from 1956 to 1968, a period which was considered as the formative era of Jama’at in this 
province.  
Though the Jama’at is concerned with social development and service for the 
common people, its main focus has proved to be on national politics and the social elite, with 
priority given to the agenda of ‘establishing an Islamic state’. However, this approach led to 
the Jama’at leaders’ failure to understand the popular perceptions of the people and their 
basic needs during the Bengali uprising in the late 1960s. Jama’at’s primary concern for the 
formal status of Islam resulted in their reluctant official support for Pakistani economic and 
political discrimination against the people of East Pakistan. This discrimination subsequently 
led to the bloody armed conflict which secured East Pakistan’s independence. In Bangladeshi 
politics and society, the Jama’at is still facing the backlash of that political decision to 
support the unity of Pakistan during the 1971 liberation war and is consequently being 
accused of ignoring social concerns and popular demands. Vali Nasr described this stance as 
a failure to “successfully ride the tide of discontent” and notes that the party “narrowly 
looked at Pakistani politics solely as a struggle for Islam and democracy and were oblivious 
to the significance of the socioeconomic changes” that Pakistan was experiencing at that time 
(Nasr, 1994, p. 157). The biggest issue that the Jama’at is facing now in Bangladesh is the 
allegation against it of war crimes and of collaboration with the Pakistani army in the 
liberation war of 1971. A detailed account of the party’s background is given in the previous 
chapter.  
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JAMA’AT-E-ISLAMI IN BANGLADESH: LATER DEVELOPMENT  
After Bangladesh achieved independence in 1971, all religiously based political parties were 
banned in the new-born secular state. This scenario changed dramatically after the 
assassination of the founder and President of the country, Sheikh Mujib, in 1975, by a group 
of army officers. The Fifth Amendment in the national constitution of 1979, which replaced 
secularism with the principle of ‘Faith in Allah’, subsequently paved the way for the 
‘rehabilitation’ in national politics of the Jama’at, along with all other Islamists (Kabir, 
2006). There are now six Islamic political parties participating in the national electoral 
democracy and several others which are officially banned due to their perceived or alleged 
extremist and terrorist orientation and activities. The Jama’at thus pioneered the entry of 
Islam into Bangladeshi politics and initiated the direct involvement of religion there.  
Following the death of Sheikh Mujib, military and nationalist rulers attempted to use 
religion as a tool to gain popular support. Today, religion has secured such a strong place in 
politics that the current government of the Awami League, the party of Sheikh Mujib, now 
led by his daughter, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, is apparently unable to effect a total ban 
on religion-based political activities. This government left the issue of religion-based politics 
unresolved when, in 2010, it revoked the Fifth Amendment of the national constitution and 
reinstated secularism, removing the principle of ‘Faith in Allah’.  
Based on the observation of previous socio-political events in Bangladesh, it can be 
safely assumed that the social involvement of people adhering to the ideology of the Jama’at 
would not be eliminated from Bangladeshi society even if the government were to take any 
extreme measures against this party, such as banning it. This capacity of sustainability is 
partially due to the social services the party has been providing to members of Bangladeshi 
society at the grass-roots level. The sense of religious identity in the Bangladeshi Muslim 
mindset also plays quite a significant role in this regard. However, with secularism now 
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reinstated in the constitution of Bangladesh, a court verdict has declared the Jama’at 
prohibited from participating in the upcoming election. At the same time, five among seven 
central leaders of the Jama’at have been given death sentences by a tribunal set up by the 
current government, due to their collaboration with the Pakistani army in 1971.  
There are two major allegations that the Jama’at usually faces in Bangladesh. The 
party is criticized by many for having an association with Muslim extremist organizations 
and/or collaborating with the Pakistani army in perpetrating war crimes during the liberation 
war in 1971 (D'costa & Hosasin, 2010, p. 346). Some even claim that it is an extreme group 
working towards the ultimate goal of establishing a theocratic Islamic state in Bangladesh 
(Kumar, 2009, p. 541). The Jama’at has often faced allegations of association with extremist 
Islamic organizations, as some of the extremist leaders and activists were associated with the 
Jama’at earlier in their lives. However, the Jama’at has been able to secure its democratic 
position, so far, by adhering steadily to the national political culture and avoiding the use of 
force for the purpose of religious coersion. There is a common assertion made by the 
members of the Jama’at that the extremists left the party and joined or formed other parties 
only because the Jama’at doesn’t accommodate and conform to their ideas. Through different 
activities and publications, the Jama’at has attempted to secure this moderate stance and 
refute religious terrorism and hostility. Regarding their position against the independence of 
Bangladesh in 1971, the Jama’at leaders argue that it was a political decision to support the 
unity of Pakistan and they claim no participation or involvement in the military operations, 
atrocities or war.  
Another situational aspect which helps in understanding the significant role of 
Jama’at-e-Islami in national politics is associated with the utilization of religion as an 
effective tool of power politics in this country. Though the country initially established 
secularism as one of its core principles, the rulers and political leaders have been always 
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aware of the place of Islam in the mindset and everyday lives of Bangladeshi people. Even 
Sheikh Mujib, the founder leader of Bangladesh, who established this country on the basis of 
secularism, decided to make Bangladesh a member of the OIC (Organization of Islamic 
Conference) 34 at its summit in 1973, three years after Bangladesh’s independence from the 
Islamic state of Pakistan (Kamal, 1990: 73). All of the subsequent leaders of Bangladesh, 
irrespective of their ideologies and political doctrines, have used Islam as a useful tool for 
political legitimization (Hakim, 1998, pp. 113-115). 
There are similarities between the Jama’at in Bangladesh and its counterparts in other 
Muslim countries with regard to the concerns they address and challenges they meet as 
Islamic political movements. In addition, the socio-political challenges for the Jama’at in 
Bangladesh include the consequences of its support for the unity of Pakistan (given in the 
belief that the unity of that perceived Islamic state was vital for the Muslim identity) during 
the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. The Jama’at in Bangladesh has been surrounded by 
increasing controversy in recent years. Allegations have been made against some of its 
leaders relating to their association with and participation in the war crimes primarily 
committed by the Pakistani army during the 1971 liberation war. A ‘War Crimes Tribunal’ 
was established in 2011, after four decades of independence. Throughout this period the 
Jama’at had participated in all national and local government elections. Though the election 
results represent a debatable scale by which to measure public acceptance, where a myriad of 
variables such as democratic conditions, local agendas and interests and the law and order 
situation have impacted on them, they generally provide an accepted appraisal of the status of 
the political groups involved. This is also important when the Jama’at, whose ideology and 
objectives are religious, has adapted to the electoral democracy in order to establish its 
                                                            
34 The Organization of Islamic Conference recently changed its name to Organization of Islamic Cooperation, in 
June 2011. It is an international organization of Muslim countries, and the largest international organization 
outside of the United Nations.  
89 
ideology. The Jama’at even enjoyed the position of a stakeholder during the formation of the 
governments in 1991, 1996 and 2001, when both of the major political parties failed to 
achieve absolute victory in the national elections. Table 3 shows the position of the Jama’at, 
which is normally considered to be the fourth largest political party of Bangladesh35, in four 
general elections contested for the 300 constituency national parliament.  
Table 3: Results for the Jama’at in national elections of Bangladesh36 
Election Date 
Total votes 
cast  
Votes for 
the 
Jama’at 
Seats 
won 
Percentage 
of total 
votes 
Third national 
parliamentary 
election37 
7 May 1986 28,903,889 1,314,057 10 4.60 
Fifth national 
parliamentary 
election38 
27 February 1991 34,477,803 4,117,737 18 12.2 
Seventh 
national 
parliamentary 
election39 
12 June 1996 42,880,576 3,653,013 3 8.61 
Eighth 
national 
parliamentary 
election40 
1 October 2001 55,736,625 2,385,361 17 4.28 
                                                            
35 The three parties which are larger than the Jama’at are, in decreasing order of size: 1) Bangladesh Awami 
League (Urdu: lit. Bangladesh People’s League), a centre-left secular party; 2) Bangladesh Nationalist Party, a 
centre-right nationalist party; and 3) Bangladesh Jatiya Party (Bengali: lit. Bangladesh National Party), the party 
of a former military dictator, which preceded the Jama’at in Bangladesh with regard to its position in the 
national political arena.  
36 The Jama’at boycotted the fourth election in 1988 and the sixth election in 1996.  
37 Data of the third and fifth elections are gathered from Wikipedia (Wikipedia, 2012). 
38 The fifth general election, in 1991, was the first of its kind to take place under a non-political ‘caretaker 
government’ after the public revolution against the military dictatorship. It is considered by many as the first fair 
national election in the country’s history.  
39 Data from the Statistical Report of the Bangladesh Election Commission on the seventh general election 
(Commission, 1996, p. 9). 
40 Data from the Statistical Report of the Bangladesh Election Commission on the eighth parliamentary election 
(Commission, 2002, pp. 6-8). 
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Ninth National 
Parliamentary 
Election41 
29 December 
2008 
69,372,897 3,289,967 2 4.70 
 
Currently, in Bangladesh, the Jama’at is facing some political challenges. Considering its rise 
in the 1980s and 1990s, it was generally expected that the party would continue gaining 
acceptance in a society where most of the members are Muslim and well aware of their 
religious identity. Some political observers, intellectuals and party activists argue that 
compromising certain religious principles for the sake of political gain has created a ‘power-
hungry’ image of the Jama’at in people’s minds, and resulted in ‘a narrow support base’ for 
this movement (Hossain & Siddiquee, 2006). Examples of the success of several Islamic 
political revivalist movements in various Muslim countries have also been introduced into 
this discourse.  
Barrister Abdur Razzak, a central executive committee member of the Jama’at, 
recently wrote an article, Islamic Movements in Different Countries and the Arab Spring, 
which was published in a national newspaper. In it, he described the modern strategies 
adopted by Islamic movements in several countries and especially in Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey 
and India. Justifying those strategies with different verses from the Qur’an and the life of the 
Prophet Muhammad, Abdur Razzak clearly called on the Jama’at’s leaders and followers to 
abandon rigidity in policy making and to be more pragmatic when dealing with public issues. 
When describing the recent progress of various Islamic movements, he has rationalized the 
victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s latest national election as being the result of 
“their being very close to the general people through their social welfare activities” (Razzak, 
2012).  
                                                            
41 Due to the unavailability of a digital statistical report of the Bangladesh Election Commission on the ninth 
parliamentary election, data have been collected from a UNDP report (Eicher, Alam, & Eckstein, 2010, pp. 80-
81) 
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ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAM OF THE JAMA’AT 
The Jama’at adheres to a cadre-based organizational system, whereby a person progresses 
from a primary level up towards the leadership.42 This progress is achieved through 
involvement in organizational activities, in addition to personal development using 
knowledge-based activities. As part of these procedures, the party has an official syllabus 
published and prescribed for its adherents. A preliminary study of this syllabus shows a 
separate segment with a list of recommended sections from the Qur’an, selected Prophetic 
Traditions and particular books on different social topics, such as social relations, social 
services and changes in society, from an Islamic perspective. 
According to the party’s constitution (revised in April 2011), it is imperative for 
anyone willing to join the party to believe in the basic tenets of the Islamic belief system. The 
Jama’at’s constitution can be divided into two sections. The first section briefly introduces 
the religious discourse of the Jama’at that acts as the theological foundation of the party. The 
rest of the constitution discusses several organizational issues, such as the conditions, 
responsibilities and working procedures of the leadership of different levels of the party. 
According to this constitution, the primary objective of the party is to attain the satisfaction of 
Allah through the establishment of the Islamic way of life. In order to achieve this objective, 
the Jama’at lists four permanent programs of work to be undertaken: 1) preaching Islam, 2) 
educating people, 3) providing social welfare, and 4) establishing Islam in the state through 
constitutional and systematic means (Jama'at-E-Islami, 2011, pp. 8-13).  
Organizationally, the Jama’at is a cadre-based organization, where an activist is 
required to participate in regular activities and complete the studies prescribed in the party 
                                                            
42 Seyyed Nasr explained that, since the commencement of party activities, the Jama’at has closely followed the 
teachings and structure as laid down by Mawdudi. The party structure consists of members and sympathizers on 
five different levels, making up a cadre system of activists. There have been minor modifications and alterations 
in the structure at different times and places, but this system remains the core of the Jama’at’s activities (Nasr, 
2005, p. 112). 
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syllabus. According to the constitution, anyone, regardless of gender or religion, who agrees 
to the objectives and agendas of the party is eligible to become an associate member (Jama'at-
E-Islami, 2011, p. 14). It is common practice that an associate member must participate 
vigorously in party activities and accomplish the party syllabus through study circle programs 
before taking the oath of membership of the party. The party syllabus is divided into three 
sections: 1) membership syllabus for the less educated, 2) membership syllabus for the 
educated, and 3) syllabus for higher study (Jama'at-E-Islami, 2010). 
The organizational structure of the Jama’at is basically laid out in three books: the 
Constitution, the Syllabus and the Working Manual. The Constitution contains fundamental 
principles and the Syllabus contains the list of study materials. Apart from these, the Working 
Manual of the Jama’at illustrates four primary programs of the Jama’at, as well as the 
activities through which those programs are implemented (Jama'at-E-Islami, 2006). The basic 
organizational structure of the Jama’at is built upon these three books, and interestingly, the 
Jama’at could be singled out as the only political party in Bangladesh that regularly 
implements democratic procedures in its leadership elections. The other three major political 
parties of Bangladesh, namely the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the Awami League and the 
Bangladesh National Party (established by the military ruler, General Ershad, during his 
autocratic rule) have their own constitutions and working manuals. But it is common 
knowledge that the central leadership of these parties comes from among the family members 
of the party founders. On the other hand, the Jama’at has always been strict in establishing its 
leadership through the chain of party members. This movement never selects or elects its 
leaders from among the family members of existing or previous leaders, which is an extra-
ordinary feature in Bangladeshi political culture.  
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SOCIAL PROGRAM OF THE JAMA’AT  
The foundational base for any political or ideological group is the society and every group 
must deal with social issues, especially when they strive to put an ideology or doctrine into 
practice in that society. While doing this, political or ideological parties become engaged in 
social change and social opinion formation processes to varying degrees. Most of the Islamic 
movements worldwide are no different in this aspect of the socio-political process. Even the 
radical groups have had their own methods of social manifestation. No opinion or idea 
regarding human society can survive if it is not cherished by some of the people, even though 
it might be a very small segment of the society. Youssef has studied the socio-political 
manifestation of an Egyptian Islamic resurgence group, Al-Jihad, considering it as an Islamic 
social movement (Youssef, 1984). Berna (2008, p. 4) goes further, arguing that “Islamic 
fundamentalist movements are inherently social movements”.  
Increasing penetration by contemporary Islamic groups into the national politics of 
several Muslim countries is now another focal point of discussion among the socio-political 
analysts. This political engagement of Islam, which is often called ‘political Islam’, was 
pioneered in the Indian subcontinent by Jama’at-e-Islami. One of the variables that are 
working behind the increasing popularity of Islamic political activities in these several 
countries is the discontent people feel concerning their socio-political experiences with 
Western secular governance (Yilmaz, 2002, p. 3). This scenario is common also in 
Bangladeshi Muslim society.  
The significance of social issues in the ideology of the Jama’at can be understood 
from the objectives and permanent agenda of the party, as defined in its constitution. The 
second objective of the party – reviving Islamic values and building national unity being the 
first one – is stated as the establishment of a justice-based society without any kind of 
discrimination, through creating responsible citizens and eligible leaders. The third objective 
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in the constitution speaks of upholding the ideals of democracy, economic and social justice, 
basic human rights, a balanced distribution of the wealth in the society and freeing 
Bangladesh from discrimination, corruption and terrorism43. Additionally, one of the 
permanent agendas is “social reformation, moral reconstruction, cultural change and service 
to humanity based on Islamic values” (Jama'at-E-Islami, 2008, p. 13). Moreover, a perusal of 
the party’s syllabus, containing the prescribed reading list for adherents, shows a significant 
number of books relevant to social life and society.  
During recent decades, the party has become actively involved in a myriad of socio-
religious matters, in order to advance its political agenda and to keep it contemporary. One of 
these much debated issues is the status of women and their participation in social and 
political activities. The common secular trend of criticizing women’s status in Islam has lent 
support to the Jama’at’s opponents in intellectually undermining its stance regarding 
women’s issues.44 An analysis of the social welfare program of the Jama’at, which is the aim 
of this study, would lead to the greater project of understanding the the party’s point of view 
regarding Bangladeshi society and its different elements. This discourse concerning social 
spheres intrinsically includes women’s issues.  
                                                            
43 The understanding of democracy by Mawdudi, the founder of the Jama’at, is different from the conventional 
Western concept. According to him, absolute sovereignty belongs only to the God who is one and eternal. He 
prefers the coined term, ‘theo-democracy’, as the ideal designation for an Islamic state. This is not identical to 
the European concept of theocracy. Mawdudi explains that “the theocracy built up by Islam is not ruled by any 
particular religious class but by the whole community of Muslims including the rank and file. The entire Muslim 
population runs the state in accordance with the Book of God and the practice of His Prophet. … that is to say a 
divine democratic government, because under it the Muslims have been given a limited popular sovereignty 
under the sovereignty of God. The executive under this system of government is constituted by the general will 
of the Muslims who have also the right to depose it” (Maududi, 1967, pp. 139-140). According to Esposito, 
“this position does not mean that Mawdudi and other modern Muslims reject the idea of a democratic political 
system. They only insist that it be framed within the worldview of Tawhid” (lit. oneness of God) (Esposito & 
Voll, 1996, p. 23). The Jama’at propounds that all other principles of human society, such as the issues of 
economic and social justice, human rights and others, should be shaped according to the framework of Islam in 
a similar fashion.  
44 Elora Shehabuddin alluded to this practice in Bangladesh while mentioning the claims of secularist non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that “Islam has been harmful to women and the only route to progress is to 
discard the shackles of religion and tradition” (Punch, 2006, p. 69). 
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The aspect of religio-political appreciation of gender in Bangladeshi society is 
partially relevant to this study. A few academic and other analyses have been done 
concentrating on different aspects of the Jama’at’s position regarding women’s issues. This 
thesis will also look into this topic in the following empirical chapters by studying gender 
issues that arise during social welfare activities.  
Elora Shehabuddin (2008, p. 577) claims that the current Jama’at leadership and 
intellectuals advocate a progressive viewpoint regarding women which is not aligned with the 
one promoted by Abul Ala Mawdudi (the party’s founder and theoretical leader) during the 
early days of the party. Mawdudi acknowledged the crucial role of both genders in the 
development of Islamic civilization. He asserted the importance of the individual identity of 
women, as they are directly responsible to God for their own deeds. According to Mawdudi, 
Islam ensures equality and rights for both men and women, with some specific obligations for 
each gender. Thus, men are responsible for working for the family, while women are 
responsible for taking care of the household. Shehabuddin’s argument is that the Jama’at has 
made these recent adaptations due to ongoing social and political progress, and specifically 
through the establishment of a democratic polity and encounters with secular social 
organizations. She concludes that the contemporary Jama’at leaders are starting to recognize 
women’s individual places and roles in society in addition to their domestic obligations, 
which were central in Mawdudi’s discourse concerning women in Islam (Shehabuddin, 
2008). 
 
CONCLUSION  
The Jama’at, then, an Islamic revivalist movement, is generally identified as a religion-based 
political party or a religio-political movement with a strong emphasis on social issues. 
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Ideologically, this party strives for the revival of an Islamic state in Bangladesh – and 
ultimately in the world – which it considers as its chief collective religious obligation. In 
reality, this party has been struggling to strengthen its position in the electoral politics of 
Bangladesh. From both perspectives, the party regards society and the people in it as the 
primary catalyst for change.  
The movement has developed through a great deal of transformation in its 
methodology and scope since its initiation in the 1940s. On the other hand, the primary 
objectives and ideology of the movement remain unchanged and are devoted to Islamic 
revivalism. In Bangladesh, apart from its rivalry with secularism and communism, the 
movement is particularly haunted by its collaboration with the Pakistani army during the 
liberation war of 1971. However, the Jama’at still holds a significant place in national politics 
as the fourth most popular party, and also as a significant catalyst in the formation of 
coalition governments. With regard to social perspectives, this movement introduced a 
religious ideology which focuses more on social-political aspects of Islam than on personal 
piety aspects, thus playing a significant role in the formation of a collective religious identity 
in the mindset of many Bangladeshi Muslims. In order to achieve its primary objective of 
establishing Islam at the state level, the Jama’at mostly emphasizes preaching Islam, 
spreading Islamic principles through its activities, participation in political activities and the 
organization of social welfare. Following chapter will present a critical investigation of 
literatures on the primary issues of this research, namely social welfare and Islamic politics in 
the contemporary world.  
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CHAPTER 4: SOCIAL WELFARE AND ISLAMIC POLITICS 
Islamic revivalist movements’ participation in social welfare activities in Muslims societies is 
a recent phenomenon that is yet to be extensively studied by academics. In contrast, general 
social welfare policy has been one of the key areas of study in social science for a long time. 
Social scientists have long been advocating and analysing various concepts of social policies, 
and many of those conceptual frameworks are being put into practice in different countries 
and regions. There is thus a contrast between the wide scope of the literature in the broader 
area of study and the lack of literature concerning the specific area of this thesis. The topic of 
social welfare has been explored from numerous perspectives, producing a large number of 
conceptual frameworks and analyses and resulting in its being one of the major themes of 
both modern sociology and political studies. This plethora of studies supports current 
research which aims to put the social welfare aspect of Islamic revivalism into perspective, 
and to appraise it in relation to the socio-historical context of social welfare issues. However, 
the dearth of literature on the narrower field means that there are few case studies available to 
be compared with and tested against. More importantly, there is a shortage of theoretical 
frameworks by which to study this complex socio-political phenomenon, which has economic 
implications, also, for the societies in which it occurs.  
Therefore, this chapter aims to conceptually categorize the major studies in the 
existing literature and critically review them, in order to establish the context of current 
research, and also to justify the research questions and theoretical space of this study. As part 
of this process, the development of the existing literature on major conceptual aspects of this 
research topic, such as welfare policies and the modern welfare state, Islamic revivalism, and 
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the social welfare programs of Islamic political activism will be investigated. (A theoretical 
framework for this current research, based on scholarly precedents and basic characteristics 
of the field, will be outlined in the following chapter.)  
 
THE MODERN WELFARE STATE AND THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL 
WELFARE POLICY 
Social welfare is a noteworthy and complex issue in modern sociology, being tied up with 
myriad other sociological themes, such as social stratification, poverty, equity, political 
intervention, individual and family life, social work, social policy, citizenship rights and so 
on. Although throughout history providing welfare for the underprivileged has been always 
considered a general responsibility of an ideal rulership, the concept of welfare has become 
simultaneously more developed and more complex with the evolution of social and political 
practices. With the development of the modern governance system of the state and its 
economic practices in the last century, the state became increasingly involved in social 
welfare practices. According to Peter Flora and Jens Alber (2009, p. 48), the last two decades 
of the nineteenth century was the ‘take-off period’ of the modern welfare state in practice. 
Their choice of this timeframe is based on state expenditure rates with regard to social 
welfare and structural innovations. Scholars have varying opinions about the state social 
welfare system with regard to its current growth or decline, which will be discussed later in 
this section.  
I begin by inquiring into the philosophical foundation of the concept of social welfare. 
One of the common aspirations human beings usually share, irrespective of socio-political 
times and places, is to live in a state of well-being, in the company of other individuals, with 
the family as the smallest social unit. Meeting this demand, by providing people with the 
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support and resources necessary to allow them a minimal or satisfactory standard of living is 
a phenomenon of long standing in human society. A general definition of social welfare 
“could incorporate all organized societal responses that promote the social well-being of a 
population” (Ambrosino, Ambrosino, Heffernan, & Shuttlesworth, 2008, p. 4). In other 
words, “social welfare policy is collective strategy to address social problems”.45 It includes 
numerous activities such as education, health, psychological and material assistance, and 
support for families, adults and children.  
It could also be assumed that the existence of social welfare is as old as the existence 
of human society. People have always needed reciprocal aid to survive, the usual sources 
being the family or the tribe. David Macarov (1995) attempts to find historical traces of 
authority’s involvement in social welfare, and claims that the origin of the practice of welfare 
in human societies or in collective living patterns lies in antiquity. He mentions the 
Babylonian King Hammurabi, who composed the famous ‘Code’ more than 4,000 years ago. 
The Code mandated that society should help the victims of natural disasters. The practice of 
social welfare in varying degrees can also be traced back to other ancient civilizations. The 
Greek civilization had provision to support the poor, disabled soldiers, and the families of 
soldiers killed during battle. Miriam Hoexter (2003) argues that, as in Islamic civilization, 
religion has always had an important role to play in welfare in other civilizations, such as in 
those of early Greece and Rome, the early Christian Church and in the Indian subcontinent. 
In his study of the historical development of social welfare, Leslie Leighninger includes 
Muslim civilization, along with Judeo-Christian civilizations, in his statement that those early 
civilizations had divergent practices to provide help to the poor, and that this continuous trait 
of assisting needy people has been developed and transformed into the modern social welfare 
policies implemented in the industrialized countries of the contemporary era. For this 
                                                            
45 This is the definition by Bruce S. Jansson (1984) in Theory and Practice of Social Welfare Policy: Analysis, 
Processes and Current Issues, as cited by (Macarov, 1995). 
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religious attachment to ancient social welfare, he credits welfare practices as ordained in the 
doctrines of Judaism and Christianity (Leighninger, 2008).  
In modern times, the organizers of social welfare provision range from individuals to 
groups such as “federal, state, tribal and local government agencies; non-profit and for-profit 
organizations; religious institutions; and community groups” (Segal, 2010, p. 3). Overall, 
today’s social welfare tends to be limited to the policies and programs administered by the 
government for the support of its citizens, particularly in developed countries. Governments 
have taken several measures to provide social welfare to their citizens through various 
agencies and legislation, such as the Social Security Act (1935) of America (Ambrosino, 
Ambrosino, Heffernan, & Shuttlesworth, 2008). Thus, in the Western world, social welfare is 
a task performed predominantly by the state. This is implied in the following definition in 
The Social Work Dictionary, as cited by David Macarov (1995, p. 5): “Social welfare is a 
nation’s system of programs, benefits, and services that help meet those psychological, social, 
and economic needs that are fundamental to the well-being of individuals and society”. 
However, non-governmental and religion-based organized social welfare activities 
exist alongside the state-based system in almost every country and society in the world. 
While lecturing on faith and globalization, at Yale University in 2008, Tony Blair, former 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, acknowledged the contribution of Judaeo-Christian 
tradition in the Western concept of social welfare and the roles of different religion-based 
social welfare organizations in the modern era, such as the Islamic Relief, Christian Aid, 
Hindu Aid, World Jewish Relief, and Khalsa Aid (Blair, 2008).  
Alongside the feudal system, the church functioned as resource provider to the poor in 
mediaeval Europe. An early instance of government intervention in social welfare can be 
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found in the Statute of Labourers Act in England in 134946, which ordered that all able 
persons be employed within their parish, in the aftermath of the deaths of approximately two-
thirds of the English population from the bubonic plague. At that time, this decree also 
prohibited helping the poor, those in authority believing that such help might lead to idleness 
(Ambrosino, Ambrosino, Heffernan, & Shuttlesworth, 2008).  
The significance of the combined role performed by the church and the feudal system 
in social welfare increased to such an extent that by the end of the fourteenth century, 
following the division of the church during the Reformation era and the breakdown of the 
feudal system, poverty and social problems had become widespread in Europe. However, 
modern development of social welfare has its roots in the Act for the Relief of the Poor 1601 
(popularly known as the Elizabethan Poor Law) in England. In particular, this law made the 
secular local government units, named Parishes, responsible for the care of people in need. 
Another major event in the historical development of social welfare in Europe was German 
Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck’s several legislations on social welfare. Later, social welfare 
concepts were used to stabilize the United States after the Great Depression of the 1930s. It 
was similarly important in the whole of Europe in the post-World War II era (Ambrosino, 
Ambrosino, Heffernan, & Shuttlesworth, 2008; Ginsberg & Miller-Cribbs, 2005, p. 18; 
Macarov, 1995, p. 4).  
In modern-day North America, religion still functions as a strong catalyst in the 
organization of social welfare. Although the country was founded on the principle of 
‘separation of church and state’, this principle is now being challenged when it comes to the 
issue of religion-based social welfare. This is exemplified in the receipt of public funds by 
several religious organizations, such as Catholic Charities, Lutheran Social Services, and 
Jewish Family and Children Services (Segal, 2010). 
                                                            
46 This Act provided some conceptual foundations to later American social welfare legislation.  
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Social welfare policies development has gone through various stages and changes in 
different countries and societies. The experiences of a certain country in Europe may differ 
greatly from that of a country in Africa or Asia. This is due to the impact of various factors, 
such as the economic strengths and social approach of the country, government policy, 
political leadership and so on. Throughout the twentieth century, governments with left-
oriented ideologies were known for relatively more state intervention in different aspects of 
social life, and likewise in welfare intervention. Health care and education were generally 
regarded as the state’s responsibility in those countries which came under Communist rule. 
At the same time, capitalist economies had different approaches to and trends in welfare 
issues in different countries, adopted by different governments and policy makers of different 
times. So, it is obvious that the welfare issue has a strong relationship with the approach and 
understanding by governments of different ideologies. It should be borne in mind that an 
increase in the extent of state welfare is indicative of an increase in the extent of state 
intervention in the lives of individuals and families. Therefore, though welfare provision was 
nationalized in the Communist states, Marxists were critical of the concept of the welfare 
state as manifested in developed countries. They saw the Western approach to welfare as a 
means to ensure a better workforce, in order to sustain a capitalistic market-based society, 
and considered it a “result of dysfunctions within the capitalist system during the Great 
Depression” (Martin & Torres, 2004, p. 2). Through the welfare system, the state primarily 
intervenes in specific areas of social life, such as family life, education and health care. Louis 
Althusser explained the welfare state as an element of a capitalist network which imposes a 
dominant ideology on society (O'brien & Penna, 1998). In the following section, an overview 
of the state welfare practices in different regions of the world will be presented and critically 
discussed.  
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According to Giddens and Sutton (2013, p. 553), “most developed and developing 
countries in the world today are welfare states. By this, it is meant that the state plays a 
central role in the provision of welfare, which it does through a system that offers services 
and benefits to meet the basic needs of citizens for healthcare, education, housing and 
income”. Bilton et al. (2002, p. 240) state that the term ‘welfare state’ denotes “a system of 
government where the state is responsible for providing its citizens with a wide range of 
welfare benefits.”  
Welfare management by the state has a strong relationship with the taxation system of 
the country, as the public welfare expenditure must be met from the income of the 
government. Therefore the provisions of state-provided welfare is proportional to the tax 
revenues. In general, a country with higher tax revenues usually provides a higher budget for 
welfare for its citizens. However, tax revenues vary significantly from country to country. For 
example, in 2005, tax revenues represented 51.1 per cent of the GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product) in Sweden, 45.4 per cent in Belgium and 49.7 per cent in Austria, while at the same 
time in some other developed countries the percentage was less: 37.2 per cent in the UK, 34.7 
per cent in Germany and 26.8 per cent in the USA (Giddens & Sutton, 2013, p. 553). 
The historical development of social welfare implementation in Britain in the recent 
era has entailed various approaches, that are representative of the several political 
philosophies underlying them. While studying British government approaches to family 
structures, Tony Bilton and others mentioned that post-World War II Britain’s emphasis on 
the nuclear family system was influenced by two opposing ideas with regard to social 
welfare. The nuclear family model was emphasized from 1945 to 1979 by Conservative and 
Labour administrations, due to the concept that it helped to remove inequality among families 
by providing them with necessary provisions and access to an equal distribution of life 
chances. This school of thought, known as Welfarism, was “based on the view that 
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impoverishment and disadvantage were not matters of individual failure but socially 
constructed conditions characteristic of a stratified society that needed state intervention to 
ameliorate them” (Bilton, Bonnett, Jones, Lawson, Skinner, Stanworth, & Webster, 2002, p. 
240). 
The nuclear family continued to be emphasized by the Conservative administration, 
led by Margaret Thatcher, that gained power in 1979, but with a completely different view of 
social welfare. Between 1979 and 1990, the school of thought which is known as the New 
Right advocated the nuclear family structure as the means to “reward individualism, self-
help, enterprise and initiative, thereby reducing the state’s involvement in people’s lives” 
(Bilton, Bonnett, Jones, Lawson, Skinner, Stanworth, & Webster, 2002, p. 240). 
The New Right viewed social welfare provision as weakening the roles of successful 
individuals in the society and providing unnecessary support to its less able members. 
According propagators of the New Right, individuals are responsible for their own successes 
and failures; the state has no business to be involved. Welfarism was therefore considered 
“costly, unnecessary and morally repugnant” (Bilton, Bonnett, Jones, Lawson, Skinner, 
Stanworth, & Webster, 2002, p. 240). Though the necessity of a safety-net for the most 
underprivileged members of the society was acknowledged, it was proposed that any help 
should be distributed on a strictly means-tested basis, in order that it be given only to the 
poor. Thus the idea of a wide ranging welfare system covering most of the society was 
rejected. A new satirical term, ‘nanny state’, was coined, to voice the opinion that the 
‘welfare state’ was overprotective and counter-productive. However, Welfarism returned to 
British state policy in a newer version with the success of New Labour in the general 
elections of 1997 and 2001 (Bilton, Bonnett, Jones, Lawson, Skinner, Stanworth, & Webster, 
2002).  
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More than seven centuries after the enactment of the English Statute of Labourers Act 
of 1349, the neo-liberal economists in the West maintain a similar attitude, claiming that a 
reductionist approach to state welfare is necessary for economic development. In a recent 
radio interview, Australian Social Services Minister, Kevin Andrews, stated that the 
government should review the “unsustainable and relentless” welfare expenditure of the 
country, otherwise it will lead to a financial crisis (Woodley, 2014). On the other hand, 
scholars advocating the development of welfare policy argue that the well-being of all 
members of society is important for productivity and development (Midgley & Tang, 2001).  
In spite of these critics of ‘welfarism’, there is evidence that Western countries have 
achieved remarkable progress in designing and implementing social welfare for their citizens. 
In the current socio-political context, social welfare is an inevitable organ of the government, 
even though different countries have varying focuses, mostly associated with the governing 
party’s political philosophy. In this regard, Elizabeth Segal (2010, p. 57) says:  
Conservatives generally oppose government intervention as a waste of taxpayers’ money. 
Social programs are viewed as providing benefits to those who do not need them or as 
creating a dependency that encourages people to stop caring for themselves. […] Liberals 
generally support active intervention by the federal government. Social welfare policies are 
regarded as being so important that they should be legislated by the government.  
 
INADEQUATE STATE-RUN SOCIAL WELFARE IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES 
Islam, like almost all other religions, encourages charity, with zakat (almsgiving) being one 
of its five foundational principles. In addition, numerous other voluntary religious rituals, 
such as sadaqah (optional charity) or waqf (endowment), are part of Islamic practice. The 
development of Islamic thought in the history of the Muslim world has always been closely 
related to religio-social charity. In the days of the Prophet (PBUH), this practice helped a 
group of his companions to devote themselves to the purest of knowledge. For the following 
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fourteen centuries, in various parts of the world, this inalienable aspect of Islam was a core 
force in keeping the practice of Islamic knowledge alive through religious schools and 
modest-living religious scholars.  
Social welfare was always an inseparable part of governance in early and mediaeval 
Muslim nations. Beginning from the first Islamic state in Medina, under the supervision of 
the Prophet Muhammad himself, it was commonplace to support those in need on a regular 
basis from the state treasury (Bayt al-Mal). Umar bin Khattab, the second Caliph of Islam, is 
considered by many as the founder of child benefits, pensions for aged people and the 
disability benefit systems. A steady state of material affluence and the subsequent economic 
improvement of the societies under the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties have been examined 
and attested by numerous historians. This tradition continued during the Ottoman Empire 
(1299–1923). Danisoglu (1987) states that an old and strong tradition of providing education 
and social security was customary in the Muslim world under Ottoman rule, and was 
primarily motivated by conventional religious principles of equity and justice. This tradition 
officially declined under colonial rule over the Muslim majority lands and weak economic 
management and political instability became common features of the Muslim majority 
countries after the emergence of nation states in the last century.  
Unlike Western countries, most Muslim majority countries are underdeveloped, with 
more practical need for working social welfare policies. Although some Middle-Eastern 
countries are rich in natural resources, most of their governments have not developed any 
sustainable social welfare policy. Middle-Eastern traditional societies have an inherent 
tendency for social work. Helping the vulnerable and poor, an obligation ordained in the 
Islamic religious texts, is considered one of the natural duties of every person. Islam always 
has a significant role in shaping this mindset towards welfare policies in those societies. 
However, instead of developing an integrated state welfare system, most Arab countries 
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practice welfare through their traditional method, whereby people seek help through personal 
communication with tribal leaders. Poor and needy people in Saudi Arabia can receive help 
from the Ministry of Social Welfare, as from the 1960s the monarchy has promoted 
“education and social welfare benefits for all Saud citizens” (Chai, 2005, p. 5). However, this 
process suffers from long bureaucratic procedures, and mostly results in inadequate 
assistance. Instead, a person may go to the local governor, who is also a member of the royal 
family, to visit him personally and receive an ample financial donation. According to Hossein 
Soliman, “in the Middle East, it seems that a combination of religious, historical, ideological, 
cultural and geographical factors have influenced the emergence of social work” (Soliman, 
2013, p. 4). The result of not implementing a systematic welfare service is that a large 
number of the population live below the poverty line, a social reality partially manifested by 
roaming female and child beggars at the busy street junctions, in the most oil-rich country of 
the world. However, Qatar stands out as an example of the systematic implementation of a 
state welfare system, which ensures free education and healthcare for all its citizens. One of 
the outcomes of this is that the people of this country are less prone to protesting against the 
monarchy and are less affected by the recent ‘waves’ of the Arab Spring (Khatri, 2011). 
Currently, compared to the industrialized countries in Europe and North America, 
Muslims majority countries, mostly in Asia and Africa, are obviously underdeveloped with 
regard to the provision of state-organized social welfare for their citizens. Although almost all 
Muslim countries have state-run mechanisms in place for welfare purposes – for instance 
state institutions for zakat (alms) collection and distribution – these are not adequate for 
providing comprehensive care for underprivileged citizens, as compared with the state 
welfare systems in industrialized countries. With regard to the Middle-Eastern countries, 
John Gal and Rana Jawad (2013, p. 250) argue that the social welfare aspect of the 
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governance has been neglected in this region in modern times: “social policy has never really 
played a central role in public policy or in national development planning”.  
Revising the term ‘new-old’ (coined by John Madeley to explain the current role of 
religion in European politics) with the argument that religious influence in European politics 
is an old and continuous phenomenon, Jawad (2009) claims that religion and social welfare 
have an ‘old-new’ relationship in the Muslim majority Middle-Eastern region. She thus 
opposes the common sociological idea that religion, which is primarily concerned with faith 
and rituals, is not concerned with issues of social justice and rights, which are generally 
considered as secular notions. She attempts to establish a strong relationship – an old and 
continuous one – between religious motivation and practical social welfare work in the Arab 
nations. Through studying social welfare provision in Lebanon, she argues that the religious 
welfare organizations are among the most active in providing help for the needy. She also 
demonstrates that these social welfare provisions have impacted on the political thought of 
the general population to a great extent in Lebanon. Although Lebanese Islamic political 
movements were included in her study, the primary focus was on all sorts of non-
governmental social welfare organizations.  
Non-governmental social welfare in Muslim countries has recently been receiving 
attention in academia. In the Muslim-majority countries in the African region, issues of 
private versus public social welfare organizations are explored, especially in Sudan, Morocco 
and Senegal. Additionally, Islamic social welfare organizations in Nigeria and Ghana have 
been studied from different perspectives. In a book edited by Holger Weiss (2002), several 
writers examine social welfare provisions in these countries and claim that private religious 
social welfare organization has a more ‘solid foundation’ in African local Muslim societies, 
through different religious institutions such as Sufi orders and charitable religious educational 
institutes, than does public or government involvement in social welfare provision. In fact, 
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the weak economic condition of their governments has resulted in the growth of ‘Islamic 
economics’ in many African countries. Holger also asserts that state failure to provide 
adequate welfare in many African countries, just as in many other Muslim countries 
throughout the world, has resulted in the rise of Islamism, an ideology ideally claiming to 
bring “ demand of ‘social justice for all’ which, according to the propagators of Islamism as 
well as Islamic economics, would materialize through an Islamic welfare system, a system, 
which only an Islamic state would be able to establish” (Weiss, 2002, p. 15). However, his 
focus of discussion was on the theoretical place of zakat in Islamic social welfare and he did 
not provide any empirical evidence of this phenomenon occuring in African countries. In this 
context of theoretical explanation, Rudiger Seesemann (2002) presents a different case study 
of Sudan, where the government has been controlled by the Islamists since the military coup 
in 1989. He states that the Islamist government has been propagating a religious argument 
that the hardship experienced in this worldly life will result in more rewards in the hereafter, 
while claiming that the West (particularly the former British colonial rule) is responsible for 
the economic underdevelopment of the country. Moreover, while failing to provide adequate 
welfare to the poverty-stricken Sudanese victims of war and natural disasters, the government 
has spent most of the ‘welfare’ revenue for military purposes, providing financial support to 
fighters and the families of ‘martyrs’.  
In the case of Iran, Kevan Harris mentions that the country has achieved notable 
development in matters related to literacy, education and the alleviation of poverty, achieved 
through its economic growth before the 1970s. The 1979 Islamic revolution did not hinder 
welfare development; rather, the new regime successfully managed to overcome the 
economic crisis experienced during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 to 1988. Moreover, it managed 
to establish a strong welfare state, with primary health care and housing provision, that 
resulted in a scarcity of non-government welfare organizations in the country (Harris, 2010). 
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This claim concerning Iranian welfare development is supported by Eric Hooglund’s (2008) 
argument that the revolution in Iran facilitated a power shift from the secular and Western-
oriented elite class to the clergymen and technocrats of middle-class and lower-class origins. 
This new political leadership has proven beneficial for the rural poor of the country. 
Regarding Muslim majority countries in Asia in general, John Esposito (2008, p. 4) 
excellently summarizes his observations regarding the Islamic political movements’ roles and 
involvement in social welfare activities in those countries:  
Governments and opposition movements appeal to Islam to enhance their legitimacy and 
mobilize power support; Islamists or Islamic activists (sometimes popularly referred to as 
fundamentalists) engage in political and social activism. Some have won elections as mayors 
and parliamentarians and served in cabinets and as prime ministers. Others have created 
strong social movements that are effective institution builders. They have created new 
institutions in civil society, offering education, along with legal and social welfare services, 
and they have established Islamic banks, insurance companies, publishing houses newspapers, 
and web-sites. A small though deadly minority of religious extremists use violence and 
terrorism in attempts to destabilize or overthrow regimes.  
As a result of the inadequacy of government social welfare support, there are a large number 
of private and non-governmental welfare organizations working in the Muslim countries of 
Asia and Africa. Most of those organizations have religious affiliation, claiming to be Islamic 
charitable organizations or non-governmental organizations. Beginning from the mid-
twentieth century, Islamic political parties have also become increasingly involved in such 
social welfare activities. In the following sections, the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism in 
general and the political branch of Islamic revivalism in particular, along with the social 
activities of those political movements will be reviewed, with the aim of explaining the 
emergence and existence of the Jama’at in Bangladesh as a social welfare providing entity.  
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ISLAMIC REVIVALISM: A CALL FOR RELIGION-BASED DEVELOPMENT 
It is a common phenomenon among religions that some groups engage in renewal and reform 
from time to time as a way of returning their religion to its purer form. This revivalist thought 
and engagement usually attempts to revive the roots and origins of the religion according to 
religious scriptures (Peters, 2010, p. 70). In the very early stage of Islamic history, Umayyad 
caliph, ‘Umar bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (682–720), is considered as the pioneer of religious renewal. 
This is because it was he who first re-established the governance of the early Islamic era, the 
period of the Prophet and the subsequent four ‘rightly-guided’ caliphs, during a time when a 
lavish monarchy ruled the powerful and expanding Muslim state. Another prominent 
revivalist in Islamic history was Abū Ḥāmed al-Ghazāli (1058–1111), who, through his 
scholarly works, successfully reduced the conflict between orthodox Islamic studies and 
philosophical thought.  
The idea of Islamic revivalism has its roots in the religious scriptures. As narrated by 
Abu Huraira (R), the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was reported to have said that Allah 
promised that every hundred years He would send someone to renovate the religion (Hadith 
No. 8592, Al-Hakim, p. 567). According to general Muslim theological opinion, the 
explanation of this Prophetic Tradition is that the concept of ‘renovators of the religion’ does 
not necessarily mean that someone will perform miracles, or inflict a state of dependency on 
a person with a certain set of characteristics. Rather it implies the need for continual effort to 
ensure that religion advances with the progress of time, and that this task could be led by an 
individual or a group of individuals or even by the state (Al-Asqalani, 1959, p. 295; Al-
Dhahabi, 1921, p. 180). Simultaneously, the importance of the development of society in a 
collective sense is given emphasis here. Finally, every Muslim is responsible for striving 
towards progress, in addition to there being some people who are able to lead this endeavour 
and bring about greater changes due to the divine assistance they receive.  
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It is noteworthy that this Prophetic Tradition was interpreted by Mawdudi in a way 
that opposes some traditional interpretations. His flexible interpretation of this Hadith 
(Prophetic Tradition) does not confine itself to a specific timeline, the beginning or the end of 
the calendar century. Nevertheless, no century, according to Mawdudi (Maududi, 1963, pp. 
32-33), will be devoid of people who will stand against ‘ignorance’, remove all kinds of 
impurities from the body of Islamic practice, and re-establish Islam according to “its original 
form and spirit”. He also asserted that this task of ‘rejuvenating Islam’ is not necessarily 
specifically the responsibility of one individual and only once a century; rather, it “may imply 
a single person, a group of persons or even organisations of people” (Maududi, 1963, pp. 32-
33). In explaining this Prophetic Tradition, Mawdudi clearly opposed the traditional 
interpretations and attempted to increase the significance of the organizational practice of 
Islam, which he considered to be one of the basic objectives of Muslim life.  
To place the concept of Islamic revivalism in a contemporary context, it can be seen 
that a very complex set of understandings and interpretations has evolved around it. While 
some scholars, such as Jamal al-Din Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, have explained this 
phenomenon in a positive way, others, such as Muhammad Qutb and Abul Ala Mawdudi, 
have emphasized problematic areas relating to contemporary Muslim socio-political spheres. 
Although both sets of scholars agree that there is persistent conflict between Islamic ideology 
and Western modernity, their interpretations of these two terms differ and they even use 
different linguistic terms in connection with them.  
Additionally, the modern-day process of Islamic revivalism is manifested in the 
endeavours of Muslims to survive the socio-cultural challenges that have primarily been 
imposed throughout the centuries of the civilizational paradigm shift from the East to the 
West. The experience of Western colonial rule in recent centuries has further accentuated this 
urge for self-development in many Muslim countries, where religion has also been identified 
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as one of the decisive factors behind geo-political conflicts. The quest for development has 
resulted in a focus on different areas of Muslim societies, such as spirituality47, reformation 
of religious knowledge and practices, education, political power and economics.48 
Interestingly, some Muslim revivalist intellectuals49 have proposed the adoption of modernity 
to varying degrees into Muslim societies. In the context of increasing tension between liberal 
Western and traditional Islamic principles and practices in the nineteenth century, it was their 
desire to emphasize the societal development of Muslims, supported by the modern Western 
knowledge, rational thinking and individual independence that had become features of 
Western civilization by that time (Browers, 2013; Kurzman, 2002; Rahnema, 1994; Rane, 
2010). Therefore, they are usually labelled as ‘reformers’ rather than ‘revivalists’50. Several 
terms are employed in the study of different trends of Islamic movements and their 
implications often overlap. In general, the term ‘modernist’ is used as a synonym of 
‘reformer’. On the other hand, the Jama’at is considered as adhering to the ideal of re-
establishing Islam through a primary focus on politics; this trend is often seen as political 
revivalism, fundamentalism, and sometimes resurgence.  
The concept of Islamic revivalism becomes more diverse when a developed 
understanding is reached with the emphasis on different focus areas, and the local 
experiences of various Muslim communities in different parts of the world are taken into 
consideration. Furthermore, to many scholars, religious Islam and the secular historical 
                                                            
47 Tasawwuf and Tablighi schools of thought are examples of focusing on spirituality as well as ascetic and 
humble living with the objective of reviving Islam in society.  
48 Focus on education, politics and economics and similar modern social issues in the Islamic revival is a recent 
trend which was propounded in the late eighteenth and the twentieth century by scholars like Jamal al-Din 
Afghani, Muhammad Abduhu, Mawdudi, Syed Qutb and Muhammad Iqbal.  
49 Modern Islamic reformists, such as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Muhammad Abduhu, Rashid Rida and Jamal al-
Din Afghani, considered this approach as the roadmap for the development of Muslim societies.  
50 As mentioned earlier, ‘revival’ in contemporary Islamic studies implies an urge for development on the 
foundation of original religious scriptures and practices. However, when Muslim leaders are called ‘reformists’ 
it implies that their call for development has a primary focus on development itself.  
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progress of society are not two distinguishable issues; rather they both evolve around 
identical human issues.  
In any discussion of Islamic revivalism as a model for the development of Muslim 
societies, the economic aspect of the development is an unavoidable issue. According to 
Umar Chapra (1998), the emerging trend of Islamic revival poses a need to enquire about the 
quality of Islamic development and the possible role of Islamic teachings in supporting this 
development using the existing resources of the Muslim countries, in order to reduce 
macroeconomic imbalances in those countries. Islamic revivalist movements’ involvement in 
social welfare organization is certainly a very significant aspect of this economic relationship 
with the society in which they are located. However, the broad phenomenon of contemporary 
Islamic revivalism is articulated by Jan Ali from three different perspectives: the socio-
economic and political perspective, the historical-cultural perspective and the defensive 
reaction to modernity perspective. According to the first view, Islamic revivalism is an 
outcome of discontent and grievance. The second analysis focuses on “a positive relationship 
between success of Islamic societies and government”, while the third explains Islamic 
revivalism as the attempt to purify Islam from ‘foreign accretions’ derived from modernity 
(Ali, 2012, pp. 23-24).  
To sum up, revivalism is a perpetual part of Islam (as in any other faith) which began 
in the early era of Islamic history. Various Muslim scholars and leaders attempted to reform 
religious practices, emphasizing different aspects of their religion, according the needs of 
their times and places. In the modern age, Islamic revivalism was pioneered by several 
religious personages. Among them, the early phase included Shah Wali Ullah Dehlawi (d. 
1762) in India, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1787) in Arabia, Uthman ibn Fudi (d. 
1817) in West Africa and Muhammad al-Sanusi (d. 1859) in North Africa. Their common 
aim was to revitalize Islamic practices in community life, in an era when most of the Muslim 
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communities around the world suffered under colonial rule. In general, they did not focus on 
confronting the colonial rulers; rather, their priority was educating the masses and inspiring 
them to return to practising religion in their lives.  
In the following decades, Muslim scholars increasingly became aware of the 
backwardness of Muslim communities with regard to their cultural, social, political and 
economic conditions. During this phase, prominent revivalist scholars, such as Jamal al-Deen 
Afghani (d. 1897) in Asia, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (d. 1898) in India, Muhammad Abduh (d. 
1905) in Egypt, Muhammad Ilyas Kandhlawi (d. 1944) in India and Said Nursi (d. 1960) in 
Turkey, advocated the reform of educational and religious practices, while some of them 
strongly emphasized an approach to integrating modern knowledge, especially science, into 
Muslim education. To them, cleansing religious practices or developing education was the 
aim of religious revival. With these scholars focusing completely on religion and education, 
some others adopted a critical approach and blamed Western civilization for the decline of 
Muslim societies. Religious scholars, such as Syed Qutb (d. 1966) in Egypt and Abul Ala 
Mawdudi (d. 1979) in India and Pakistan, theorized a call for ‘establishing Islam in every 
aspects of life’, which sees religion as being able to perform its obligatory function only 
when the society is ruled by it. Therefore, this new trend has its central focus on politics as 
the way to gain governance and establish Islam. This focus was described by Milton-Edwards 
as “the agenda of Muslim renewal or revival centred on both a personal and political 
dimension to identity. Islamic revivalism was apparent not only in increased religious 
observance of rites such as Ramadan, mosque building, Muslim dress and customs and 
prayer, but was translated into political and social action around Muslim perspectives of 
governance, civil society, economic reform and law” (Milton-Edwards, 2014, p. 55). The 
former trend is recognized as the apolitical trend of modern Islamic revivalism manifested 
through religious movements such as the Tabligh Jama’at or educational institutions such as 
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Aligarh University. The latter has come out as the political trend of Islamic revivalism. This 
study focuses more on the social welfare activities organized by groups espousing this 
political Islamic revivalist trend.  
 
THE NOVELTY OF SOCIAL WELFARE PROVIDED BY ISLAMIC POLITICAL 
PARTIES  
The absence of state-managed social welfare in Muslims countries has meant that the 
management of social welfare has been assumed instead by private enterprises (both 
individual and collective), religious and secular charity organizations, NGOs and political 
parties. One of the curious aspects of this framework is the undertaking of social welfare 
provision by Islamic political parties, extending their reach beyond conventional political 
activities. This is now a common phenomenon, with Islamic political parties playing a 
significant role, globally, in organizing social welfare. The organization of social welfare by 
contemporary Islamic political parties needs to be examined and understood, in order to 
recognize its significance in Muslim societies. Due to its novelty, this phenomenon of social 
welfare has yet to be studied intensively. However, there are scholars who have initiated 
research in this area in some Muslim countries. Furthermore, the concept of social welfare 
and its organization by various authorities, including governments, in the modern world is 
also pertinent here. The following section will survey and evaluate relevant literature on 
Islamic politics and social welfare, with the aim of building a foundation for this research. 
Works on this topic will be critically reviewed and information gaps will be assessed. 
Indonesia, with the largest Muslim population of the world, has seen the rise of 
Islamic political movements’ participation in social welfare activities. Among a dozen 
Islamic political parties, Partai Kedilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party) acted as the 
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frontrunner in this regard. The PKS is appraised as “an Islamic political party par excellence 
with a solid and cohesive membership. It has acted not only as a formal political party, but 
also as a movement providing wide-ranging social services” (Latief, 2013, p. 181). In 1999, 
PKS established an organization named PKPU (National Humanitarian Agency), exclusively 
for carrying out social welfare activities. The PKS in Indonesia and the Jama’at in 
Bangladesh have aspects of great similarity. Both parties adhere to the ideology of political 
Islamic revivalism and both are organized through strictly defined membership ranks. In the 
same way that the PKS formed PKPU, the Jama’at established ISWCC (Islamic Social 
Welfare Council Chittagong) in 1977 (which is the subject of the primary case study of this 
research). However, Hilman Latief (2013) concluded that in Indonesia the intense social 
activism by the Islamic political parties is an outcome of the Islamization of the urban middle 
class.  
A similar finding, with small variations in connection with the social welfare 
activities of Islamic political parties in the Arab region, was reported by Clark (2004b). In her 
book, Islam, Charity and Activism, she illustrates the client–provider relationship in the 
activities of Islamic social welfare organizations in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen. Her primary 
argument is that the Islamic social welfare institutions are strengthening the horizontal ties 
between the service providers and the middle-class service consumers in these countries. This 
strong relationship provides great political benefit for Islamic parties. In this process, as she 
argues, the vertical tie between the service providers and the poor who, unlike the middle-
class, receive free services, is given less attention in the activities of Islamic social 
institutions (ISI), especially in Egypt. She mentions that though the poor receive numerous 
benefits from ISIs, the ‘sense of shared meaning’ is weak or nearly absent. Therefore, she 
concludes that the social services administered by Islamic organizations are mostly benefiting 
people other than the poor, while “the poor are neglected or, more accurately, alienated from 
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the Islamist social and political vision” (Clark, 2004b, p. 38). Both Latief and Clark recognize 
the significant role of middle-class Islamic activists in organizing social welfare provision in 
Indonesia and Egypt, with Latief identifying the poor class as the beneficiary in Indonesia, 
while Clark found that the middle-class consumers were receiving the most from these 
welfare activities in Egypt.  
Political aspects of Islamic social welfare activities are identified by Quintant 
Wictorowics and Suha Farouki from a very different perspective in the case of Jordan. The 
country lacks an open democratic polity, being ruled by a strict royal family through a 
parliamentary monarchy, but Jordan nevertheless has several Islamic parties. Among them, 
the most influential one is the Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami), a political 
wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, that has ideological similarities with the Jama’at in 
Bangladesh. However, Jordanian law strictly prohibits any relationship between social 
welfare and political activities, by stating that social and welfare activities can only be 
organized to provide social services without any intention of financial gains or other personal 
gains, including political ones. Therefore, although Islamic social organizations and political 
parties such as the Islamic Action Front have interlinking interests and passive 
communication, they do not formally interact with each other. In the context of this apolitical 
nature of Islamic social welfare activities in Jordan, Quintant and Farouki claim that those 
activities have a political nature that “lies at the symbolic and discursive level”, instead of 
having a direct association with any political parties (Wiktorowics & Farouki, 2000, p. 686). 
It is also important to mention that Islamic humanitarian organizations are 
increasingly accused of being associated with terrorist funding. For instance, Hamas (Islamic 
Resistance Movement), an ideological offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, was 
originally formed in 1987 as a non-profit religious and charitable organization. It entered into 
politics in 2006, winning a landslide victory in the national election. Jacqueline Benson 
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(1999) mentions that, according to a rough estimation, 95 per cent of Hamas’s activities are 
associated with social welfare and religious work, whereas 5 per cent have terrorist 
affiliation. Such multifaceted political organizations are generally regarded by Western 
governments as terrorist organizations. With the global political situation moving rapidly 
towards general hostility, and with increasing political instability in particular areas, many 
Islamic political parties, such as Hamas in Palestine, Hezbullah in Lebanon and Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, are now held responsible for their ties with armed terrorist activities. 
Interestingly, all of those organizations are now becoming increasingly active in providing 
humanitarian aid in the conflict-ridden areas of the Arab world.  
One example of social welfare involvement by a recognized terrorist organization is 
found in Pakistan and studied by Samina Yasmeen. She claims that an organization named 
Jamat-ut-Da’wa, an offshoot of the banned terrorist organization, Lashker-e-Toiba, has 
received acceptance in society as a social welfare organization, and that this has been 
possible “due to the state’s failure to meet the needs of its citizens, including the provision of 
education and relief and rescue efforts after natural disasters” (Yasmeen, 2012b, p. 408). 
State failure has also created a similar context in Bangladesh, where government welfare has 
proved to be inadequate. However, in Bangladesh, there is no evidence of any extremist 
Islamic organization’s involvement in systematic and organized social welfare provision. The 
reasons and motivation behind this phenomenon of non-government social welfare provision 
in the Muslims countries are examined by Fulya Apaydin. According to her analysis, based 
on research on Turkey, Sudan and Germany, existing literature on this topic has adopted two 
explanatory approaches. She calls the first one a ‘cultural approach’ which highlights the 
religious motivation of Islamic charity works. The second is a ‘political approach’ that 
highlights the political opportunities achieved through social work by the ‘nonstate 
organizations’ in seeking “change in political governance structure and/or formal and 
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informal rules of political completion introduce new opportunities” (Apaydin, 2013, p. 208). 
In the case of the Jama’at in Bangladesh, most of the the social welfare organizers claim to 
engage in welfare activities due to their religious motivation. However, in reality, it was the 
political motivation to mobilize popular support for their political cause that was strongly in 
evidence during the fieldwork for the present study (see Chapter 7).  
 
CONCLUSION 
One of the intrinsic features of Islam is the close and active relationship of religion 
with governance and social administration. Islamic political parties, in postcolonial Muslim 
countries, are striving to establish Islam at a state level, according to their own various 
interpretational ideologies. The primary identity of the Jama’at in Bangladesh is that it 
represents the transnational political trend of Islamic revivalism. Hence, it is imperative to 
understand the notion of Islamic revivalism to appreciate the Jama’at. The deep inner urge to 
attain ‘worldly’ development for the Muslim Ummah (Arabic: lit. nation, community) has 
certainly influenced the involvement of these religion-based political parties in their several 
socio-economic activities. 
The Jama’at, the brainchild of Mawdudi, one of the leading religio-political revivalist 
scholars of contemporary times, has become, in Bangladesh, a major religion-based political 
party that has a systematic welfare provision program in operation. Similar activities of 
comparable organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, 
Hamas in Palestine or PKS in Indonesia, have been studied from various perspectives. No 
study was found which focused on a case study of the Jama’at in Bangladesh. However, some 
researches (although very few due to the novelty of this phenomenon) in other parts of the 
world have revealed several examples of cause and effect with regard to the social welfare 
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involvement of Islamic political parties. Underdevelopment of the state economy, religious 
motivation and political opportunity mobilization were among the major causes in most 
places. In both Egypt and Indonesia, studies found that middle-class people took a significant 
role in both organizing and gaining benefit from this welfare work. However, such Islamic 
political parties have a track record of successfully exploiting this social welfare resource in 
their political process, for example, in Turkey, Egypt and Palestine where Islamic parties 
have even formed governments. On the contrary, even though it became involved in social 
welfare activities a long time ago, in the late 1970s, the Jama’at in Bangladesh is currently 
facing a structural decline in both politics and society. This research will attempt to explore 
the social welfare activities of the Jama’at as well as the reasons behind the current situation.  
Islamic activism in general is a very wide and indefinite term, that may include both 
the large-scale and the smaller and more personal religious activities. Individual endeavours 
to achieve divine blessings through helping others, or small-scale community development 
projects with religious motivation occur in every society. There are also several national, and 
even global, Islamic organizations and NGOs in various countries, actively working for social 
welfare purposes. In conducting this research, my primary objective is to study the social 
welfare provision run by the branch of Islamic activism which might be designated the 
political trend of contemporary Islamic revivalism. Although this has not yet been widely 
researched, most studies in this area have used a social movement theory approach (for 
example, Clark’s (2004b) study on the Muslim Brotherhood’s social welfare programs in 
Egypt, Jordan and Yemen) to analyse its characteristics and development. In Bangladesh, the 
Jama’at clearly utilizes social welfare provision as a significant avenue of resource 
mobilization. The following chapter, based on the literature reviewed and the elements of the 
field research, will clarify the best and most suitable theoretical framework for this study. 
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CHAPTER 5: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
A social phenomenon is best examined either through existing theories, or through 
developing new theories, if none yet applies to that phenomenon. Theories assist in 
systematically interpreting and explaining the data as well as predicting future outcomes. In 
order to understand a particular human behaviour or enterprise, one theory or a combination 
of theories constructs a theoretical framework. This research will also employ its own 
theoretical framework to explore and understand social welfare provision as organized by the 
Jama’at in Bangladesh.  
There are numerous definitions of a theory with regard to its workability in the social 
sciences, as rendered by various scholars. According to Kerlinger (1986, p. 9), “[a] theory is a 
set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions and propositions that presents a 
systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of 
explaining and predicting the phenomena”. Mangal and Mangal (2013, p. 35) defines a theory 
as “a set of logically consistent statements comprising of a number of laws, principles or 
beliefs capable of explaining and predicting a phenomenon”. Schweigert (2011, p. 13) 
explains the theory as “a set of related statements that explain and predict phenomena. The 
statements used in a theory can be laws, principles or beliefs”. An overview of the definitions 
quoted above clarifies three basic objectives of a theory: to describe, explain and predict. 
Therefore, we may deduce that a theory is a collection of interrelated concepts and principles 
that can describe, explain or predict a phenomenon by comparing similar variables.  
This chapter aims to describe the theoretical framework of the present study. To 
establish the background, and to comprehend the history and development of this scenario, it 
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will examine major theoretical approaches as applied to the study of the social welfare 
activities of Islamic political parties in the Muslim world. Further, it will draw a framework 
and justification of the researcher’s own theoretical device, a synthesis of two social 
movement approaches – resource mobilization theory and political process theory – 
employed to examine welfare programs of the Jama’at in Bangladesh.  
According to Charles Tilly (2004a), any of the following four approaches could be 
employed in applying a theory to a sociological phenomenon:  
1. Subsuming the phenomenon of interest directly under the theory  
2. Borrowing an informative metaphor without insisting on strict correspondence  
3. Using the well-developed theory to pose telling questions about the phenomenon, 
but not supposing that the answers would remain the same  
4. Extracting certain mechanisms and processes from the existing theory, rather than 
adopting the theory as a whole, in the hope that some mechanisms and processes 
work in the same way within the new domain  
In studying the social welfare organization of the Jama’at in Bangladesh as a social 
movement, it is difficult to follow the first approach of incorporating the phenomenon 
entirely with any particular existing theory. Islamic political revivalism is a very modern 
socio-political trend, for which various scholars have employed various explanatory theories 
using different theoretical frameworks. Since less academic work has been done focusing 
expressly on the social welfare sector of this political trend, this academic void is more 
intense, and it is not helpful to resort to metaphorical usage without a meticulous analysis. 
Therefore, this research will integrate suitable theories and test the observed phenomenon 
against the conditions and assessments of those theories. This approach is chiefly a synthesis 
of the third and fourth strategies proposed above. Before discussing the relationship between 
a suitable theoretical framework and the subject matter, and its relevance, it is necessary to 
examine the major social movement theories.  
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SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES 
Defining social movements is an arduous task, as several trends have been developed among 
scholars, stressing different aspects of this collective action. In the 1960s, grievance was 
considered as the primary cause of social movement formation. This ‘deprivation’ approach 
is evident in Ted Robert Gurr’s account: “relative deprivation is the basic precondition for 
civil strife of any kind” (Useem, 1981, p. 263). In the following decades, most scholars 
started looking at social movements from a political perspective. For instance, David West 
defines a social movement as an extra-institutional political organization which attempts to 
“generate social power in order to achieve collective goals for their common benefit” (West, 
2013, sec 1.1). Similarly, Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper assert “social movements are 
conscious, concerted, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change society by using 
extra-institutional means” (Goodwin & Asper, 2015, p. 3). This simplified political concept 
of a social movement is refined in the exposition introduced by Charles Tilly, where he 
challenges its being used loosely to indicate ‘all sorts of popular causes’. According to Tilly, 
a social movement is a distinctive form of contentious politics that combines three major 
elements: “sustained campaigns of claim-making, an array of public performances, and 
repeated public displays of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC)” (Tilly, 
2006, p. 183). Sidney Tarrow also adopted this contentious politics approach, but focused on 
wider characteristics in defining social movements as “collective challenges, based on 
common purpose and social solidarities, in sustained interaction, with elites, opponents, and 
authorities. This definition has four empirical properties: collective challenge, common 
purpose, social solidarity, and sustained interaction” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 9).  
Unlike North American scholars, European academics focus on the cultural aspects of 
social movements. Johnston and Klandermans note elements such as ‘organizations, 
resources, structural preconditions, networks and rational choice’ as parts of a ‘backward’ 
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and conventional definition of social movement, whereas ‘customs, beliefs, values, artifacts, 
symbols and rituals’ are elements forming a progressive definition of a social movement. To 
them, a social movement is a collective action that responds to cultural change and 
domination. Different cultural elements, such as ‘symbols, values, meanings, icons and 
beliefs’, interact reciprocally with social movements: they shape the movement and are 
shaped and reshaped by the movement (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995). Emphasizing 
cultural aspects, Hank Johnston (2014, p. 23) attempts to define a social movement in a wider 
sense as follows:  
The social movement concept is a high-level abstraction that embraces complex sociocultural 
phenomena whose boundaries, ideally, are drawn by how three basic dimensions of social life 
converge: (1) the structural-organizational sphere; (2) shared ideational and interpretive 
elements; and (3) networked performances that confirm, elaborate, and give life to the first 
two.  
To summarize, social movements are an informal collective action that deals with cultural 
elements of social life, based on contentious political thought. A social movement may result 
in several social movement organizations. For instance, the environment movement in North 
America includes different organizations such as Greenpeace, Earth First, and the World 
Wildlife Fund. Other movements have received greater attention in contemporary times in 
Europe and North America, such as the movements organized around issues of civil rights, 
armed conflict, women’s rights and suffrage, environment, workers’ rights, global justice and 
so on. Although social movements have occurred all over the world – mobilization of opinion 
against the caste system in British India, or internal resistance to South African apartheid, for 
example – Western sociologists naturally developed their concepts based primarily on the 
social movements in their own part of the world. Later, their attentions expanded to include 
social movements worldwide, and various types of social movements in different countries 
were explored. For instance, in a book first published in 1989, several urban social 
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movements in Peru, Argentina, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Brazil, Chile and the 
Philippines were studied from various perspectives (Schuurman & Naerssen, 1989).  
Currently, social movements constitute a major and crucial area of research in 
sociological study worldwide. Charles Tilly, considering social movements as a part of the 
modern democratization process, views them as being non-existent three centuries ago. This 
new form of politics was instigated by the Western Europeans and North Americans in the 
late eighteenth century. From there it later spread to other parts of the world (Tilly, 2004b). 
However, this Western approach ignored the human nature of collective contentious protest 
that was certainly manifested in all ancient civilizations – as it was also in recent Islamic 
civilizations within different empires and monarchies. The Kharijite movement, for instance, 
in the late seventh century, rejected the authority of government and the wider community 
and demanded their own extreme interpretation of socio-religious justice.  
In studying the development of social movement theories in modern sociology, 
Steven Buechler sketched three conceptual phases, contributed by six prominent personages, 
as the classical sociological approaches that preceded the genesis of modern social movement 
theories. First, Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) (who revised 
Marx’s work) are generally not considered as social movement theorists, but their analysis of 
class alienation and capital exploitation, as having a deep-rooted relationship with workers’ 
grievances, certainly made a major contribution to social movement theories constructed by 
the Western sociologists in the late nineteenth century. Second, Max Weber (1864–1920) and 
his student Robert Michels (1876–1936) (who later elaborated Weber’s work) produced some 
core ideas regarding collective action, such as the explanation of the causes of social action 
and the importance of the ideas behind it, or the typification of social authority and 
charismatic leadership discourse which contributed to later social movement theories. Third 
and finally, Emile Durkheim’s (1858–1917) work on social integration and religious ritual, 
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followed by Gustav Le Bon’s (1896–1960) crowd analysis had rich implications in the later 
study of social movements (Buechler, 2011, pp. 9-55).  
In the twentieth century, development of social movement theories occurred in two 
geographical locations in different ways. North American scholars emphasized collective 
behaviour and resource mobilization approaches, whereas new social movement theory 
originated in Europe. Suzanne Staggenborg noted that the Chicago school approach of 
collective behaviour, founded by Robert Park and Ernest Burgess in the 1920s and later 
developed by scholars such as Herbert Blumer, Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, focused on 
participants’ action in social movements. This approach branched out into mass society 
theory, which considered collective behaviour as an intense reaction to social isolation, and 
relative deprivation theory, which emphasized grievance as the primary reason for 
participants’ engagement in collective action. In the 1970s, the North American proposition, 
steered by scholars such as William Gramson, Dough McAdam, John McCarthy, Mayer Zald 
and Charles Tilly, shifted to a resource mobilization and political process approach. This 
approach argues that socio-political connectivity, rather than social isolation, and the 
availability of various moral and cultural resources cause social movements to occur. 
Eventually, these two approaches created a synthesized model that explains social 
movements as ‘political entities aiming to create social change’. On the other hand, various 
European social scientists, such as Jurgen Habermas, Alberto Melucci and Dieter Rucht, 
studied new types of social movements in the post-industrial era, primarily focusing on issues 
like new types of structures, constituents, identities and cultural innovations (Mcadam, 1996; 
Mccarthy, 1996; Staggenborg, 2008; Zald, 1996).  
In sociological terms, social movements are originally informal, and mostly without 
organizational structures; rather, they are formed by interactions between different actors of 
collective actions with a distinct collective identity, acting to resolve or influence clearly 
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identified political and/or cultural conflicts (Porta & Diani, 2006). However, modern social 
scientists have extended social movement theories to examine and study various aspects of 
formal and organized religious, political and social organizations. In the case of social 
welfare provision by the Jama’at in Bangladesh, the actors are identified in two phases. The 
broader phase includes different social welfare organizations that work under the umbrella of 
the mother organization of the Jama’at. In a narrower context, the participants in these social 
welfare activities, both the providers and recipients, play roles in shaping the whole 
phenomenon. However, this welfare provision is administered through an organized 
structure, with some informal interactions between the actors, which facilitate their motives 
and agendas. In the following section, theoretical approaches to studying similar 
organizations will be investigated.  
 
ISLAMIC ‘POLITICAL’ REVIVALISM 
Contemporary Islamic revivalism is an umbrella concept that could be broadly categorized 
into two types with regard to ideological interpretations and affiliations with political 
activities of the state or the society. Political Islamic revivalism, commonly referred to as 
‘political Islam’, is generally explained by its advocates and ideologues from a historical-
institutional point of view. To conceptualize this phenomenon, religious scholars apply texts 
from the two primary sources of Islamic knowledge: the Qur’an and the Sunnah (Prophetic 
Traditions). Further, historical arguments are built on the exegeses of the Qur’an (Tafsir) and 
of the Sunnah (Sharh) and the life of the Prophet and consequent pious generations (Sirah). 
These are followed in the hierarchy of importance by other secondary sources, such as 
consensus (Ijma), analogical reasoning (Qiyas), juristic discretion (Istihsan), objectives of the 
Islamic law (Maqasid al-Shariah), public interest (Masalih al-Mursalah), local tradition (Urf) 
and so on. In this approach, all of these elements contribute epistemologically to justifying 
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and outlining the formation of Islamic politics in the modern world. Several Muslim scholars 
are notable in this regard. For instance, Mawdudi argued that the fundamentals of the Qur’an 
demand that a Muslim obey the political authority of Islam, regardless of time and place, and 
that the real understanding of the terms employed in the Qur’an to embody the essence of the 
religion uniformly advocates political activism in varying degrees in order to establish 
Allah’s rule in this world (Al-Maududi, 1996). However, this interpretation by Mawdudi was 
criticized by scholars of the influential Deoband school of thought, the oldest and most 
orthodox Islamic educational ideology on the Indian subcontinent, for being an overly 
political interpretation of religion. According to Manzoon Nomani, one of the renowned 
Deobandi scholars, Mawdudi’s excessive focus on politics resulted in sedition, offering 
“legitimacy for the atheists” and shaking “the very foundation of Islam” (Ahmad, 2009a, p. 
S156).  
Syed Qutb expressed views similar to Mawdudi’s, but with more focus on 
confrontation between Islam and anything non-Islamic. He considered a governance or 
scheme of life that is guided by any system other than the authority of Allah as Jahiliyyah 
(ignorance). Therefore, an active movement, rather than a mere theory, to consistently 
confront this ignorance is a social necessity in Muslim communities. According to Qutb, 
“Islam is not merely a belief, so that it is enough merely to preach it. Islam, which is a way of 
life, takes practical steps to organize a movement for freeing man” (Qutb, 2006, p. 85).  
Participation by Islamic political parties in the democratic political system is an 
extraordinary and recent phenomenon experienced in post-colonial Muslim countries. In the 
twenty-first century, this Islamic political activism is considered as one of the mainstream 
trends of global Islamic revivalism and has naturally attracted intense academic attention 
from socio-political analysts worldwide, attempting to understand its characteristics, motives 
and developments. Islamic revivalism itself is a broader concept, that encompasses a 
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multitude of active approaches to reviving the basic spirit of Islam and employing it in 
modern life. Social welfare programs organized by Islamic political parties are a much more 
recent phenomenon, yet to be extensively investigated. An exploration of the literature 
revealed some relevant research, involving case studies of Islamic welfare programs in 
several Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Sudan and the 
Congo. A similar case study in India, which is a Muslim-minority country, was also found. 
However, not one piece of thorough research has been done into such social welfare 
programs in Bangladesh.  
Theoretical explanations of Islamic political movements, in many cases, are subject to 
an ‘essentialist’ approach. The ‘essentialist’ reading of Islamic political movements reduces 
this complex social process to certain narrow and limited essential features. While it explains 
Islam as a cultural process, this approach creates a discontinuity between traditional Islamic 
history and the modern world. This results in a perception of the governance of Islam in 
particular, and the religion of Islam in general, as having been limited to times and 
communities of the past, and thus as being sometimes incompatible with the diverse 
expressions of the modern age (Tugal, 2002). Unlike Mawdudi, who considers 
Westernization and secularization within modernity as problematic, and not modernity in 
general, scholars such as Bernard Lewis and Bassam Tibi have adopted the essentialist 
approach by presenting an over-simplistic dichotomy between Islam and modernism, which 
supposes that there has always been a clash between Islam and ‘modern’ civilization. From 
this approach, contemporary Islamic religious movements are seen as an outcome of constant 
conflict – a reactionary force emerging from the Muslim world as a rebellious response 
towards all aspects of modernity. Islamic political activism is viewed as a system that is 
fundamentally incongruous with modern concepts such as democracy (Tibi, 2008), and in this 
viewpoint, Islam is considered as a cultural faith system that may become modern with 
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necessary reformation . Though he mentions “a record of helping the suffering urban masses” 
as being a trait of Islamic democratic political forces in the Middle East, Bernard Lewis, one 
of the famous modern-day advocates of the essentialist approach, also viewed those Islamic 
political parties as mostly authoritative and intolerant of the opposition (Lewis, 2010, p. 87). 
However, Lewis’s approach, towards Islamic revivalism in general and Islamic political 
revivalism in particular, is questionable, as he has previously stated his view of the Islamic 
legal system, as being the core of this religion, as inherently problematic, rigid, anti-
modernity, and anti-democratic (Lewis, 2010, p. 40).  
This ‘essentialist’ detachment between Islamic historical background and the 
contemporary social realities of Muslim communities left a void in this discourse. A 
‘contextualist’ approach attempted to fill this in and explain the phenomenon of Islamic 
political activism through different contexts of Muslim societies. Yavuz (1995) considered 
interplay between internal and external socio-political factors as the basic reason for the 
development of Islamic political consciousness, and thus he argued that the relationship of 
Islam to ethnic identities is contextual. Similarly, Turner (2003) illustrated Islamic political 
action as a response emerging through the synthesis of foreign intervention and internal crises 
in Muslim societies. Criticizing this contextualist trend, Husnul Amin stated that “the 
problem with these explanatory models is the explanation of the Islamist phenomenon subject 
to external conditions. This approach undermines the inherent explanatory power of Islamist 
ideas and worldviews” (Amin, 2010, p. 40).  
 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES AND ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES 
Islamic revival, including both political and apolitical notions within revivalist thought, is 
itself a developing concept in modern academia, which is yet to be studied thoroughly. For 
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instance, in studying a non-political contemporary Islamic movement, the Tabligh Jama’at, 
Ali (2006) looked at contemporary Islamic revivalism through a combination of theories of 
church-sect, deprivation and Mawdudian Islamic revivalism. The dearth of academic 
literature in this field is a major reason for the shortage of relevant theories. 
Social movement theories have recently been brought into the discourse to appraise 
Islamic political movements. Among them, ‘relative deprivation theory’ and ‘collective 
behaviour theory’ are frequently cited, as they emphasize features such as the defensive 
reaction in Muslim political identity which emerged in Muslim societies in response to 
several factors, for example, the experience of Western colonial rule, socio-economical 
discontent, or generalized beliefs. The theory of ‘relative deprivation’, a term first used by 
Samuel A. Stouffer in 1950, “assumes social movements are the outgrowth of the feeling of 
relative deprivation among the large numbers of people who believe they lack certain things 
they are entitled to – such as better living conditions, working conditions, political rights or 
social dignity” (Tischler, 2011, p. 426). Relative deprivation theory constitutes a partial 
representation of collective behaviour theory, which became the dominant paradigm among 
sociologists by the middle of the twentieth century for explaining social movements. 
According to Herbert Blummer, although everything social might be regarded as collective 
behaviour, spontaneous and unregulated behaviour is different from that governed by norms 
and traditions. Several sociologists, mostly from the Chicago school, introduced various 
models and elements of collective behaviour, and as a whole, this is generally considered as 
the classical model of social movements. Collective behaviour theories are also referred to as 
strain or breakdown theories, because they generally regard social movements as the outcome 
of social disruption, mostly due to deeply felt grievance, rather than being part of a standard 
political process (Buechler, 2011; Morris, 2004; Staggenborg, 2008). 
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 Jean-Paul Carvalho considered ‘raised aspirations, low social mobility, high income 
inequality and poverty’ as the key determinants of emergence of a religious revival. He 
argued that there are two factors that contributed to the development of contemporary Islamic 
revival: the dilemma of raised but unfulfilled aspirations among the educated middle class, 
and discrimination and poverty suffered by the lower middle class (Carvalho, 2009). 
In evaluating the political development of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, Isani 
(2011) discusses another aspect of social movements. Whereas a social movement usually 
experiences four stages in its lifetime – emergence, coalescence, bureaucratization and 
decline – apart from repression, co-optation, success or complete failure (Christiansen, 2009), 
according to Isani, the Jama’at in Pakistan arose with an enormous potential, but failed to 
follow its own theoretical ‘masterframe’ and therefore eventually declined.  
Previous research has analysed diverse trends of Islamic movements from the social 
movement theory perspective. In the seminal book, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement 
Theory Approach, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz, Hafez (2004) studied the Algerian Islamic 
movement, Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004) studied the Egyptian Islamic Movement, 
Robinson (2004) studied Hamas in Palestine and Schwedler (2004) studied Islah Party in 
Yemen. All of these scholars used different social movement theories, although they focused 
on the organizational aspects of Islamic political parties rather than on their social welfare 
activities. For instance, Hafez (2004, p. 38) asserts that the anti-civilian violence adopted by 
the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA)) in Algeria is an element of the 
radicalization process of this group that is ultimately “connected to the broader political 
process of violent contention”. In an attempt to fill the theoretical vacuum of academic study 
regarding the Islamic Resistant Movement (Hamas) in Palestine, Robinson (2004) argues that 
this party is intelligible through a combination of its political perspectives, resource 
mobilization process and cultural framing in its local context. In the Turkish context, Islamic 
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revivalist movements are defined by Yavuz (2003) as a utilization of cultural and political 
‘opportunity spaces’.  
While the key phenomenon of political Islamic revivalism suffers from a lack of 
theoretical explanation, certainly the social welfare activities of modern Islamic political 
parties have received even less attention. Nevertheless, there are a few works that have 
studied social welfare activities of Islamic political movements in different countries. For 
instance, Janine A. Clark (2004a; 2004b) studied social welfare provision by Islamic activist 
groups in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, using resource mobilization theory, and argued that the 
Islamic social service institutions are successful social movement organizations by their 
nature and characteristics. Rana Jawad (2009) analysed political and non-political social 
welfare activities, including those of Hizbullah, in Lebanon and concluded that social service 
is both instrumental and of intrinsic value to the role of religion in society.  
With regard to the Jama’at in Bangladesh, its primary identity is as a political party. 
Besides this, it also extends its activities into different socio-religious aspects of people’s 
lives. The Jama’at certainly adheres to the global trend of Islamic political organizations that 
strive to establish Islam at a state level, in line with their own methodologies and 
understanding of religion. Although the Jama’at, in its party website, claims to be a ‘spiritual 
party’ (Jamaat-E-Islami, accessed on 10/05/2013), in reality, its emphasis on political 
activities represents a different trajectory. As a result, the Jama’at is primarily recognized as a 
religion-based political party in Bangladesh. However in the party website (Jamaat-E-Islami, 
, accessed on 10/05/2013), it defines itself as follows:  
Jamaat e Islami is not a conventional religious, political, social or cultural party only. Jamaat 
performs as a spiritual party as spiritual life is important in Islam. Jamaat performs in the 
political arena because Islamic law can’t be implemented without political force. Jamaat 
concentrates upon social service and social reform as strong emphasis has been given on 
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social service and social reform in Islam. In this sense, Jamaat-e-Islami is a complete Islamic 
movement. 
 The party website also clearly articulates that establishing Islam in society (Iqamat-e-Deen) 
is a duty upon every Muslim, following the life of the Prophet, which necessitates a united 
purpose in life – hence the movement. In order to achieve this stated objective, the party 
attempts to combine a ‘top-down approach’ (positioning Islam as the driving force of its 
society) with a ‘bottom-up approach’ (training individuals to be more devoted and pious 
Muslims). The party website states:  
It was not possible even for a prophet to accomplish this duty individually. So, prophets 
executed a movement making them united who came under the shade of faith. It is tough to 
lead life as a complete Muslim in a society where Islam is not in force. And, the task of 
establishing the Deen of Allah is in no way possible without being united. (Jamaat-E-Islami) 
 There are other Islamic movements, such as the Tabligh Jama’at, that clearly emphasize the 
‘bottom-up approach’, with the aim of establishing Islam in society by changing the 
individuals in it. There are also institutions, such as religious educational ones (Madrasah), 
local Islamic preaching organizations, religious figures known as the Pir, with a large number 
of followers, and Sufi institutions, all of which have their own place in Islam in Bangladeshi 
society. All of these religious authorities negotiate among themselves with various degrees of 
interrelation and confrontation, thereby maintaining the place of religion in Bangladeshi 
society. In this multifaceted context, the endeavour undertaken by the Jama’at to organize 
social welfare programs points to its aim of reaching out to the diverse range of the masses. 
Along with the religious motivation behind it, this is an absorbing case for socio-
ethnographic investigation.  
Institutionalized social welfare provision acts now as a major element in the whole 
program structure of the Jama’at. In the Bangladeshi political context in general, and 
concerning the topic of social welfare provision in particular, this phenomenon can be better 
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understood through a combination of resource mobilization and political process theories. 
Although concurrent religious motivation is obvious in the social welfare provision organized 
by the Jama’at, this party is also striving to achieve political improvement, one of the tools 
certainly being the strength of its organizational effort in social welfare. Staggenborg (2008) 
mentioned several aspects of resource mobilization theory, such as the central role of tangible 
and intangible resources in organizing collective action, the role of movement entrepreneurs 
and their ability to mobilize the conscience of constituents, and the role of formal or informal 
structures and their influence on a movement’s development. In the study of the organization 
of social welfare provision by a political party, these elements will play a crucial role in the 
examination of empirical data. Moreover, the inseparable political identity of the providing 
organization requires investigation into the role of political opportunities in the mobilization 
and outcome of this phenomenon. Later sociologists have worked an approach synthesizing 
these two theories, called the ‘classical social movement agenda’ due to its significance, 
which “views social movements as political entities aiming to create social change” 
(Staggenborg, 2008, p. 18). The motives and outcomes of the social welfare program of the 
Jama’at will be examined through the elements of this integrated approach.  
As a political party, the Jama’at was in a coalition government for a five-year term, 
and was in opposition most of the time in the history of independent Bangladesh. Like any 
other political party, it has its own agendas, activities and participation in the political arena 
of the country. However, in addition, it runs a compulsory, ongoing education program 
among its activists and supporters all over the country. In order to remain within the 
organizational circle and move up the leadership ladder, every Jama’at activist has to 
continue studying the movement’s literature. This literature, primarily based on the writings 
of Mawdudi and other like-minded Islamic authors, includes vast subject areas such as 
different branches of Islamic knowledge, politics, society, economics, ethics, and so on. 
137 
Apart from these political and educational aspects of the Jama’at, it makes another major 
contribution to Bangladeshi society through its social work and welfare services.  
The Jama’at-administered charity programs are of different types, ranging from 
distributing relief to the victims of natural disasters and donating winter clothes to the 
homeless and the poor, to providing financial and material assistance to the needy, such as 
orphans and widows, on various religious occasions and festivals. Nevertheless, the primary 
focus of this study is on two well-established and continuous welfare channels: charity 
medical services and education management for the poor. Other occasional welfare activities, 
such as one-off or casual financial and material assistance, relief distribution, winter clothes 
distribution and so on, will also be included in the data analysis (see Chapter 7). The network 
of social welfare activities in Bangladesh, as run by the people associated with the Jama’at, is 
unparalleled in its nature and magnitude. None of the other conventional political parties, or 
even smaller Islamic political parties, has such organizational emphasis on carrying out social 
services for the underprivileged class. To date, no academic study has been conducted 
concerning this distinct socio-political feature of the Jama’at in Bangladesh. This social 
movement aspect of a political party needs to be understood through appropriate social 
movement theories. According to Porta and Diani (Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 5-6), there are 
four core sets of questions to be posed in social movement analysis, as follows:  
The first set of questions refers to the relationship between structural change and 
transformations in matters of social conflict. Can we see social movements as expressions of 
conflicts? And what conflicts? Have there been changes in the main conflicts addressed by 
social movements? And along what line? Another set of questions has to do with the role of 
cultural representations in social conflict. How are social problems identified as potential 
objects of collective actions? How do certain social actors come to develop a sense of 
commonality and to identify with the same ‘collective we’? And how can specific protest 
events come to be perceived as part of the same conflict? Where do social movement cultures 
and values originate from? A third set of questions addresses the process through which 
values, interests and ideas get turned into collective action. How does it become possible to 
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mobilize and face the risks and costs of protest activity? What are the roles of identities and 
symbols, emotions, organizations, and networks, in explaining the start and persistence of 
collective action? What forms do organizations take in their attempts to maximize the strength 
of collective challenges and their outcomes? Finally it has frequently been asked how a 
certain social, political, and/or cultural context affects social movements’ chance of success, 
and the forms they take. What does explain the varying intensity over time of collective 
violence and other types of public challenges against power holders? Do the traits of political 
systems and their attitudes towards citizens’ demands influence challengers’ impact in the 
political arena? How do protest tactics and strategies change over time, and why? 
Based on this approach, the current study will enquire about the reasons working behind the 
emergence of social welfare provision organized by the Jama’at in Bangladesh, the problems 
and prospects it has experienced during the last three and a half decades, major social welfare 
activities and real outcomes.  
For this, a synthesis of resource mobilization theory and political process theory will 
be employed to test and validate the empirical data. With regard to the resource mobilization 
aspect, individual participants in the social movements are considered as the rational actors. 
They, both providers and recipients, will be interviewed in order to understand their 
perspectives. Resources of this social movement, both tangible (funding, infrastructures, 
activities) and intangible (commitment, motivations, experiences) will be investigated. 
Staggenborg (2008, p. 17) mentions that “studies have suggested that organizations with 
more formalized or bureaucratic structures are better able to sustain a movement over time, 
whereas informal organizations are better at innovating tactics and taking quick action in 
response to events”. The structural framework and strategic development of social welfare 
activities of the Jama’at will also be scrutinized to understand whether this statement is in 
line with the reality of the party or not. From political process perspectives, the role of a 
favourable or adverse political environment of the country in developing this phenomenon 
will be examined, along with the opportunities and outcomes it has provided to the providers 
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and recipients. Finally, a combination and comparison of the abovementioned topics will 
ethnographically explore those social welfare activities in Bangladesh for the first time and 
provide answers to the question: why has a religion-based political party become involved in 
social welfare provision in a Muslim majority society in the context of Bangladesh? This 
analysis will eventually lead to the examination of the success and failure of social welfare 
activities of the Jama’at in an attempt to find out how and to what extent the Jama’at has 
succeeded or failed in mobilizing this innovative resource to gain political opportunities and 
what are its similarities with and differences from major Islamic political parties in other 
countries.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Similar movements from around the around the world, for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Welfare Party, have been studied by scholars, with emphasis on their social welfare 
organization. An investigation into the social welfare activities of the Jama’at in Bangladesh 
will add a novel and valuable perspective to this field of knowledge. Moreover, the answer to 
the primary question of this research – why and how does a religion-based revivalist 
movement involve itself in social welfare organization in a secular state? – will introduce a 
case study which can be compared with its counterparts in other Muslim societies. In this 
process, as will be shown in Chapters 7 and 8, the most important question to be posed is: 
what went wrong with the Jama’at in Bangladesh, that it has failed to mobilize this valuable 
resource of social welfare provision (unlike several Islamic political parties in some other 
countries) even after four decades of operation? It is hardly possible to make up for the dearth 
of academic studies in this field with just one research project; nevertheless, this study will 
also seek to understand the resource mobilization process of the Jama’at, employing a social 
movement theory approach, to provide an empirical foundation for future studies. The 
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findings of this research will fundamentally depend on data collected through a combination 
of fieldwork conducted over a period of seven months, a three year correspondence with the 
movement and academic research. The methodology adopted during this research, along with 
its justification and implication, will be discussed in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the methodology that was adopted in carrying out this research on the 
social welfare programs of the Jama’at-e-Islami, the largest religion-based political 
movement in Bangladesh. The place this movement holds in national and international 
politics was discussed briefly in the previous chapter’s literature review, and will be 
elaborated in Chapter 6. In addition, a reference to the movement’s social and political status 
will be made here followed by a rationalization of the methodology. Although it is the fourth 
largest of the major political parties of Bangladesh, with regard to public support as well as 
votes received in national elections51, the Jama’at is certainly the most discussed political 
party of the country. Continuous and conflicting negotiations between left-wing secularist 
supporters and right-wing nationalists in the Bangladeshi political arena have created a 
unique opportunity for this Islamist political movement. This movement is the most debated 
in the national media and in intellectual political discourses nationwide due to its 
controversial role during the war of liberation in 1971.52 Furthermore, the recent global 
emergence of Islamic revivalist political activism in various Muslim countries has added 
strength to the significance of the Jama’at.  
                                                            
51 In the 8th National Parliamentary Election of Bangladesh, held on 1 October 2001, the Jama’at was the third 
most successful major party, winning in 17 constituencies (4.28 per cent of the total vote cast) among the total 
of 300, whereas Bangladesh Nationalist Party won in 195 (40.97 per cent), Awami League in 58 (40.13 per 
cent) and Islami Jatiya Oikya Front in 14 (7.25 per cent). In the 9th National Parliamentary Election, held on 29 
December 2008, the Jama’at came in fourth in terms of total votes received, with 4.70 per cent of the total. 
Awami League received 48.03 per cent, BNP received 32.50 per cent and Jatiya Party received 7.04 per cent in 
this election. Opposition parties, including the Jama’at, boycotted the latest, the 10th National Election, which 
was held on 5 January 2014 (Commission, 2002; Commission, 2012b).  
52 On 1 August 2013, the High Court of Bangladesh cancelled the registration of the Jama’at under the National 
Election Commission, which means the party is barred from contesting in the national elections. The Wall Street 
Journal mentioned this as being ‘styles after Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood’ (Al-Mahmood, 2013). However, 
major opposition parties boycotted the following national election, and local leaders of the Jama’at participated 
in several local government elections afterwards without bearing the party’s name. 
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Social welfare activities of the Jama’at comprise diverse events and involve many 
different people. Their experience and opinions were investigated during seven months of 
ethnographic fieldwork, which included one-to-one semi-structured interviews, focus group 
discussions and extensive participant observation. The purpose of the fieldwork was to 
explore the social welfare activities of Jama’at-e-Islami in Bangladesh, along with the 
primary aim of gaining an understanding of the reasons behind the espousal of such 
systematic social welfare programs by a religion-based political movement in a Muslim 
majority secular state. This chapter describes the tasks undertaken in achieving that objective 
during the fieldwork, along with those conducted before it and afterwards. It is necessary to 
outline the methods adopted for gathering and analysing data, as well as the reasons that 
those specific methods were applicable, in order to apprehend the arguments of this thesis 
and relate them to the methodologies of the research. Therefore, this chapter presents a brief 
description of the field and the major events during the fieldwork, an explanation of the 
qualitative research method and the data gathering process, a clarification of the data analysis 
phase, and a description of the participants in the study.  
 
RESEARCH METHOD  
In investigating this little-understood phenomenon, the most important question of the study 
will be: why does a religion-based political movement provide organized social welfare 
services in a secular state? In order to answer this, other issues need to be addressed. 
Understanding the organization of this welfare provision requires ethnographic investigation 
of the existing welfare services, objectives and motives from the point of view of the 
providers, as well as the experiences and perceptions of the recipients.  
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The service provider studied in this research, namely the Jama’at, is a political 
movement that has almost always been an opposition party in Bangladeshi politics. The only 
exception was the five year period between 2001 and 2006, when it was part of a coalition 
government led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Since the Awami League came 
into power in 2008, the Jama’at has been facing the worst time in its history. The movement 
has been struggling against a very adverse government for the last six years. One of the 
central leaders of the movement was recently hanged by an internationally controversial and 
condemned war crimes tribunal and most other central leaders of the Jama’at are waiting for 
the gallows. Moreover, the high court of Bangladesh has recently revoked the registration of 
the party under the Election Commission, which has resulted in its being temporarily 
suspended from participating in the elections. This long history of facing oppression has 
made the people of the Jama’at protective and secretive by nature when discussing internal 
issues. Given such a mindset, proper research data collection from the people involved 
requires time consuming narrative discussion. With regard to the recipients, most of those on 
this welfare program are from the underprivileged class, and illiterate. Many were reluctant to 
give information for various reasons, including shame of their social stigma, fear of losing the 
welfare assistance and various negative experiences.  
From all of the above, it is clear that the nature of this research demands studying 
people’s lived experiences in their own life-setting, rather than removing them from their 
familiar context. As Berg (2004, p. 7) says, in relation to this issue:  
Qualitative research properly seeks answers to questions by examining various social settings 
and the individuals who inhabit these settings. Qualitative researchers, then, are most 
interested in how humans arrange themselves and their settings and how inhabitants of these 
settings make sense of their surroundings through symbols, rituals, social structures, social 
roles, and so forth.  
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In social research, the quantitative paradigm is dominated by positivist views, considering 
observation or experience as the only means of achieving objective knowledge in a scientific 
way. On the other hand, the qualitative paradigm is influenced by relativist and social-
constructionist approaches. The relativistic approach consists of several variants, which are 
generally referred to as qualitative research. It predominantly recognizes that the reality of the 
social world cannot only be determined through natural scientific approaches, as the subject 
matter of this area, human beings, carries heterogeneous values, ideas and meanings attached 
to their social reality, and those social constructions are subject to diverse interpretations 
(Robson, 2011).  
More importantly, the core research question of this study, that is, the inquiry into the 
reasons behind the existence of such welfare provision in Bangladesh, should be addressed by 
an interpretive and descriptive approach. Another important fact to consider when analysing 
the social welfare program of this religion-based political movement in Bangladesh is that it 
is a very new area of study. An extensive search of the literature revealed some recent 
research on the topic with regard to Islamic movements in countries like Egypt, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Palestine, Turkey and Indonesia, as described in the literature review in Chapter 2. 
Due to the scarcity of literature on the subject, this present research is important in explaining 
this social phenomenon. The particular characteristics of the study and its context as outlined 
above together point to the need for a carefully designed qualitative method (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2006, pp. 2-3; Rossman & Rallis, 2003, pp. 8-12). I found this to be the best data 
collection method for this research as it suits the naturalistic genre of qualitative inquiry. 
This study also seeks to analyse the subjective understanding of the people involved 
in any specific social welfare program. This is a complex process occurring in a real place 
and time. Experiencing and analysing a great deal of detailed communication will lead to an 
understanding of the contexts and current reality here. The qualitative method is appropriate 
145 
“because thoughts, feelings, beliefs, values, and assumptive worlds are involved, the 
researcher needs to understand the deeper perspectives that can be captured through face-to-
face interaction” (Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p. 53). Initially, the data gathering method of 
this research work consisted of semi-structured interviews53 only. Later during the fieldwork, 
it included focus group discussions and participant observation, as these were found effective 
in collecting data, particularly from the receivers’ class. This additional method will be 
described in detail in the relevant sections of this chapter.  
 
DATA COLLECTION 
The fieldwork began on 7 August 2012 and ended on 5 March 2013. Altogether, almost eight 
months of activities were dedicated to gathering the data about the social welfare activities of 
the Jama’at in Bangladesh. The first two weeks of this period were significant as this was the 
second half of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. During this month of religious 
significance, it is common practice for Muslims around the globe to increase their charitable 
activities, and this usually intensifies during the last ten days of Ramadan. Similarly, in 
Bangladesh, it is an important time of the year for the Jama’at with regard to their social 
welfare organization. Several charity programs are organized at this time, as well as the 
collection of a large portion of the party’s welfare funds for the year. Everyday throughout 
this first two weeks of the fieldwork, I attended several charitable events, for example, 
programs for distributing zakat (alms), iftar (breakfast food) and Eid54 clothes, organized by 
                                                            
53 “An in-depth interview is a one-to-one method of data collection that involves an interviewer and an 
interviewee discussing specific topics in depth” (Nasr, 2005, p. 112). 
54 The Arabic word ‘Eid’ means festival. Muslims have two annual religious festivals: Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-
Adha. Here the word suggests Eid al-Fitr, which is celebrated at the end of Ramadan, the Islamic holy month of 
fasting. The other Eid, Eid al-Adha, is celebrated, basically by sacrificing animals, during the Arabic month of 
Dhul-Hijjah, the time of annual religious pilgrimage. 
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the Jama’at in different areas, and spent time in their city office in order to become 
acquainted with their welfare activities during this peak period.  
A small-scale pilot research study was conducted, by me, prior to the acceptance of 
my research proposal through confirmation of candidature in the university. In this phase I 
communicated with at least 20 people relevant to the research and had a thorough 
correspondence with them through emails and telephone calls. This communication 
confirmed my previous understanding that the Jama’at is earnestly emphasizing its social 
welfare agenda following the example of other successful Islamic revivalist movements, such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Justice and Welfare Party in Turkey. This 
correspondence also revealed some achievements of the movement in Bangladesh, 
accomplished through its social welfare agenda, as well as some shortcomings experienced 
by it. This initial research helped in producing the research proposal, supported by some 
empirical data. In 2010, during the planning phase prior to the fieldwork, I had also 
communicated with several central and local Jama’at leaders by telephone regarding the 
project, thus ensuring their cooperation. However, by the time I arrived in Bangladesh, on 7 
August 2012, the political situation had changed suddenly. Top Jama’at leaders had already 
been arrested between January and July 2010, accused of committing war crimes during the 
liberation war in 1971. A controversial International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) had been set up, 
but there was a general perception that the trial would take years. However, the government 
began a crack-down operation on the opposition activists in mid 2012. On 6 December 2012, 
the magazine, The Economist, published a report on leaked Skype conversations and email 
correspondence between the chief judge of that ICT and an expatriate Bangladeshi lawyer 
living in Belgium. According to the report, these conversations and emails indicated that the 
upcoming verdicts of the ICT had been pre-determined by the government and that the whole 
procedure was being carried out for political gain, not justice. Later, on 9 December 2012, a 
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Bangladeshi national newspaper, Amar Desh, published the transcript of those conversations, 
which resulted in the newspaper being banned and the editor arrested. Despite the fact that 
audio recordings of those conversations became available on Youtube and other internet sites, 
the government went ahead with the tribunal, even after major flaws were exposed in its 
activities, in addition to the leaked conversations.  
During this time, police also started to arrest Jama’at leaders and activists 
indiscriminately, even going so far as to arrest their family members, including women and 
children. In addition, their residences and business buildings were vandalized and anyone 
with a beard or wearing a burqa55 or any other form of Islamic dress was harassed in the 
street and sometimes arrested. All of these events meant that the situation in the country was 
extremely unstable during the period of my fieldwork. As the Jama’at was the focal point of 
this turmoil, people associated with the movement became more secretive than ever and extra 
care was taken to protect their activities. Despite the earlier guarantees of cooperation, upon 
my arrival the Chittagong City Jama’at office told me that the party would not allow me to 
conduct any interviews, record anything or make any personal enquiries. I then had my first 
meeting with the president of Chittagong City Jama’at in Dhaka and he asked me for an 
elaborate explanation of the research project. On the following day, he gave me a full 
interview and allowed me to interview only city Jama’at leaders and intellectuals. He also 
gave me permission to participate in social welfare activities as an observer and to take notes. 
Hence, I adopted the participant observation method from the beginning, in order to gather 
research data, along with conducting regular informal conversations with the service 
providers and recipients. I joined several welfare events organized by the Jama’at in Dhaka 
and Chittagong as a passive participant without any active role, and talked to people freely to 
gather information through informal discussion. After three weeks of building this rapport, a 
                                                            
55 A burqa is a long and loose dress for women, covering them from head to feet and usually black in colour, 
worn by many Muslim women.  
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pattern of participating in tasks was fixed, according to the field conditions. In an average 
week, I tried to maintain a schedule of spending the working hours of two days in the charity 
schools, two days in the charity clinics and another day in the main office of the ISWCC. As 
a participant observer, I discussed several topics with the service providers (the organizers, 
teachers, doctors and other staff members of those institutions) and with the recipients (the 
students, their guardians and medical patients). All the time I took short field notes in such a 
way as not to make others uncomfortable, and wrote elaborated accounts of those notes from 
time to time.  
After two and a half months of fieldwork activities within these limited stipulations, I 
was finally allowed to conduct interviews and focus group discussions with local activists 
and recipients of welfare activities, on 14 October 201256. However, the participant 
observation method had already proved to be useful in my understanding of the nature of this 
welfare provision and in gathering ethnographic data. I therefore continued using this method 
along with interviews and focus group discussions till the end of my fieldwork on 4 March 
2013.  
 
PARTICIPANTS AND SAMPLING STRATEGIES 
Participants in this study were predominantly divided into two categories, according to their 
association with the party’s social welfare activities: providers and recipients. Both categories 
comprised different subgroups. The providers included Jama’at leaders, activists, leaders who 
were specifically responsible for party welfare organizations, doctors, teachers, and staff 
working in the welfare organizations. The recipients included medical patients receiving 
treatment in the charity clinics, parents of the poor students studying in the charity schools 
                                                            
56 As a formal documentation of this permission, the President of ISWCC approved an application written by 
me. A copy of that application is added to the Appendix.  
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and recipients of one-off or occasional welfare and financial or material assistance organized 
by the Jama’at. Their connection with the research topic and the roles they played in the 
welfare activities will be discussed in later chapters. Recipients’ names have been altered to 
protect their identity, and the identity of some providers, usually the activists at field level, is 
also protected in this research for their safety. All such people were given pseudonyms. 
However, some providers, city-level leaders and intellectuals consented to the use of their 
real identity. Their designations in the organizations and their roles in the social welfare 
activities are widely known to the public and it is impossible to hide their names when the 
specific post is mentioned.  
The recipients of the social welfare provision comprised different types of people. 
Initially, two interviews were attempted with the recipients. Later, focus group discussions 
were found to be a better method for collecting data from them. A brief description of all 
participants is given in the Appendix.  
The sampling process is important in determining the extent to which findings can be 
generalized (Bouma & Ling, 2005, p. 113). In order to achieve maximum useful participation 
from all subgroups listed above, a combination of two non-probability sampling methods57 
was exercised. Quota sampling was used to ensure participation by all subgroups. Quota 
sampling is defined by Berg (2004, p. 36):  
A quota sample begins with a kind of matrix or table that creates cells or stratum. The quota 
sampling strategy then uses a nonprobability method to fill these cells. The researcher may 
wish to use gender, age, education, or any other attributes to create and label each stratum or 
cell in the table. Which attributes are selected will have to do with the research question and 
study focuses.  
                                                            
57 Non-probability sampling is a process that does not include a random sampling process. Rather, the samples 
are selected by the researcher, with consideration of sample group characteristics. In order to ensure 
representation of different types of participants from the providing and receiving classes of this welfare 
organization, I had to communicate with them and consider their roles in the organization.  
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Among the subgroups, the snowball sampling was adopted to reach maximum potential for 
reliable sources of information. Snowball sampling technique is defined by Hennink, Hutter 
and Bailey (2011, p. 136) as follows:  
The snowball sampling technique is used when you need to gain access to certain types of 
people or to a particular group, but you know only a few people who fit the category and there 
is no publicly available listing. In this technique you gather your sample by first approaching 
those who are available and ask them to nominate others that they know, and then they 
nominate still others. 
In this way, I was able to classify the necessary participants from the different subgroups 
before approaching them. I communicated with people from all those subgroups and, along 
with procuring their participation, sought information from them about others who would fit 
into those categories. 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
One-to-one interviews were one of the primary methods of data collection in this research 
work. They allowed me to accumulate significant information about the experiences and 
opinions of relevant people. In-depth interviews with the welfare providers associated with 
the Jama’at and its charity organizations, medical centres and schools, deepened my 
understanding of their history, activities, motivation and other aspects of their social welfare 
organization. Interviewing those key informants was of great value in data collection for this 
study as they were able to provide specialized knowledge and recount experiences regarding 
the research topic. The following descriptions clarify the significance of these interviews.  
Key informants are individuals who possess special knowledge, status, or communication 
skills, who are willing to share their knowledge and skills with the researcher, and who have 
access to perspectives or observations denied the researcher through other means. (Gilchrist & 
Williams, 1999, p. 73)  
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Whereas social researchers speak of ‘respondents’ as people who provide information about 
themselves and thus allow the researcher to construct a composite picture of the group those 
respondents represent, informants are members of the group or other people knowledgeable 
about it who are willing to talk about the group per se. (Rubin & Babbie, 2011, p. 358)  
Interviewing is considered one of the principal data collection strategies of the qualitative 
research method, delivering a great degree of flexibility and a wide range of findings. It is 
defined as “a conversation with a purpose” (Berg, 2004, p. 75), or “a conversation in which 
the interviewer establishes a general direction for the conversation and pursues specific topics 
raised by the respondent” (Babbie, 2010, p. 320). Among all kinds of interviewing techniques 
(for instance, structured, semi-structured, unstructured, non-directive, focused, telephone, 
computer-assisted or web-based), the semi-structured interview enables greater freedom of 
queries. However, although very helpful and flexible in terms of data collection and robust 
inquiry, this method has some disadvantages as well. For instance, lack of careful 
consideration in interviewing might result in bias and a less comprehensive interpretation, 
excessive time consumption and so forth (Robson, 2011). However, the diverse 
characteristics of the participants and the naturalistic nature of the field data in the working 
setting of the activities providing social welfare in this study required intensive enquiry, and 
theoretical as well as practical advantages and disadvantages were considered carefully prior 
to the application of this method in the fieldwork.  
When designing this research project, it was estimated, based on the approximate 
number of working people in the field, that around 20 key informants among the service 
providers should be interviewed, in order to gain a deep insight into the whole cultural 
process. As this social welfare provision by the ISWCC is primarily based on three charity 
clinics and three charity schools, I intended to interview one organizer from each institution, 
with the addition of two more participants from the healthcare sector and two more from the 
education sector. Altogether, the plan was to include five policy-making Jama’at leaders who 
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were involved in the political activities of the movement, five who were directly responsible 
for organizing the movement’s social welfare activities, five activists and staff working in 
medical welfare and five working in educational welfare. However, the ratio of these four 
groups did not remain exactly the same during the fieldwork, primarily for two reasons: 
political circumstances made it difficult for many people to communicate, and, during the 
sampling process in the initial correspondence and participant observation phases of the 
fieldwork certain people from different subgroups were deemed more important to the 
interviewing process. After interviewing a few participants who worked especially in the 
charity clinics and schools, as teachers, physicians and staff members, and having informal 
and lengthy discussions with some of them in the initial phase of the fieldwork, it was clear 
that their experiences were similar. Although they represent the direct contact point with the 
recipients, they do not have any active role in the decision making system or welfare 
organization except for doing their jobs in return for a monthly salary. Therefore, I increased 
the number of Jama’at leader and activist interviewees who were found to play major roles in 
organizing those charity schools and clinics. Finally, a total of 19 informants participated 
through the semi-structured interviews, among whom 5 were policy-making leaders of the 
movement, 8 were leaders having particular roles in welfare organizations, and 3 were from 
medical clinics and three from charity schools.  
However, this reduction in the number of specialized informants from the medical and 
education welfare sectors had no negative effect on the data collection process. Rather, 
increasing the number of informants who were leaders of the welfare organization resulted in 
my receiving more inclusive data regarding both the medical and education sectors, as well as 
on other occasional welfare activities. Although the country’s political unrest was a major 
hindrance to the fieldwork, important and necessary key informants were finally interviewed 
after several attempts. Moreover, 7 among 19 interviewees were contacted afterwards for 
153 
another follow-up interview, as they were found to be relatively more resourceful in 
providing valuable data for the study.  
The interviews in this fieldwork carried an element of risk and some appointments 
were cancelled for fear of sudden police intervention. One of the important interviewees, the 
city branch Welfare Secretary of the Jama’at, changed his appointment three times, being in 
hiding and unable to move, and he was unwilling to inform me about his whereabouts. I was 
finally able to interview him in the office of a private school where he came to visit his son; 
he told me beforehand to be there. He was arrested by the police the following week like 
many others, as police from all local police stations were deployed to arrest any active 
Jama’at leaders and activists at that time. Another local activist of the Jama’at was killed, 
three months after I interviewed him, in a major clash in the city that took place between the 
Jama’at activists on one side and the police, together with the Awami League activists, on the 
other. I learnt of this incident over the phone after the completion of my fieldwork, while 
discussing some follow-up aspects of the research questions with another interviewee. All the 
Jama’at leaders, activists, doctors, teachers and staff interviewed were male, as there are no 
females involved in providing these social welfare activities. When asked about this lack of a 
female presence, the Secretary of the Jama’at58 explained:  
Although they are not visible, this does not mean that they are not involved in the activities of 
our organizations. We have a significant level of organizational activities among the women 
in our society. You will find it is mostly woman among the beneficiaries of our social welfare 
programs. However, our social tradition and religious practice is the reason for their absence 
in public life, or in administering any public event. An autonomous women’s committee 
organizes our activities for the women, which are mostly educational such as organizing 
lectures and study circles. They also reach out to the poor women in different suburbs and 
inform them about our social welfare programs, whenever it is deemed necessary and 
appropriate.  
                                                            
58 A detailed description of the secretary of Chittagong City Jama’at, is added in the Appendix in the List of 
Participants.  
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In the interviews with the service providers, the major focus was on their motivation and 
objectives as organizers of the social welfare programs. They were also asked to describe 
their activities, experiences and the obstacles and problems that they face in organizing social 
welfare. Most of the interviewees had been given, beforehand, a list of major themes and 
isues to be discussed, in case they wanted to prepare for the interview. However, the 
interviews were never limited to those themes or questions only. Rather, the list helped in 
providing the basis for the conversation, and the discussion with every interviewee was 
extended beyond those themes according to his personal interests, focuses and experiences. In 
this fashion, the following primary themes acted as the starting point for open-ended 
discussions with the interviewees:  
 When and how were you introduced to the Jama’at? 
 What is your experience with the social welfare programs of the movement?  
 What are the activities that could be named as the social welfare programs of the 
movement? 
 What is the history of the development of these social welfare activities of the 
Jama’at? 
 Why do you or your movement organize this social welfare provision?  
 What does the Jama’at achieve from these activities?  
 What are the problems faced by the Jama’at in organizing these activities?  
 What are the expectations of the organizers and their future plans?  
 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
Focus group discussion is another useful data gathering strategy in applied social research, 
which is now widely used in market and political research in order to recognize participants’ 
opinions in a social context. It involves interviewing a small number of people together, 
usually from 5 to 15, instead of one person alone, and can be structured, semi-structured or 
unstructured, like the one-to-one interview technique. According to Berg (2004), this strategy 
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has been in practice since World War II, when governments used it to study the effectiveness 
of radio programs among the members of the armed forces. However, Robson’s (2011) view 
is that this technique existed in the 1920s, when it was employed in market research, in order 
to identify various aspects of consumer behaviour. With the advancement of technology, 
web-based or online focus group discussion is a common practice nowadays. 
A significant portion of the data in this study was derived from discussion with the 
respondent participants, who were social welfare recipients, most of whom were financially 
dependent on the social welfare provision to partially meet their basic needs. Initially, the 
semi-structured interview technique was determined as the method of collecting data from the 
recipients. Upon obtaining permission from the organization, after spending the first two 
months as an observer, I arranged interviews with some patients of the charity medical 
centres and parents of the children studying in the charity schools. After several interview 
attempts it became clear that the predominantly underprivileged people remained hesitant in 
giving information even in a very private setting. There was a fear among them that the 
interviewer was somehow associated with the welfare providing organization, and that 
revealing any negative experiences might jeopardize any help they might receive. Even after 
reassuring the participants of confidentiality, only two of the ten interviewees honestly 
expressed their opinions; the others remained, understandably, silent and hesitant. This was 
particularly noticeable with the female interviewees, whose social behaviour and religious 
habits became an obvious hindrance in collecting data through one-to-one interviews.  
When separate focus group discussions were organized, twelve female patients of a 
charity medical centre participated, with the support of a female organizing assistant. At the 
beginning of the discussion, one of the officials of the welfare providing organization 
reassured the participants that this data collection session was being held exclusively by the 
researcher, who was not associated with the organization. It was also reiterated to them that 
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the collected information would never be traced back to any of the individual participants, 
and that the disclosure of their opinions would not harm them or create problems regarding 
future welfare services. This assurance was followed by a lively three hour discussion and 
valuable information was gathered.  
Although the political situation in Bangladesh was not favourable for organizing those 
focus group discussions freely and openly, I was able to conduct two more such discussions; 
one involved eight fathers who had children studying in two charity schools of the Jama’at, 
and the other involved bridegrooms whose marriages had been conducted in a welfare event 
organized by the Jama’at. This was a dowry-less mass marriage, where 30 underprivileged 
couples were married with the assistance of the Jama’at. Among these, ten grooms agreed to 
participate in a focus group discussion.  
In the focus group discussions, the men were asked various questions, based on the 
themes of this research. Moreover, many questions and topics were derived on the spot 
during the discussion, as had happened also during the semi-structured interviews with the 
providers. Basic questions asked, which acted as the baseline in those group discussions, 
were:  
 How did you come to know about this service?  
 How was your first contact made? And what has been your been experience since 
then with this service?  
 Why do you receive this service?  
 What are the problems you have been facing in receiving this service?  
 How do you evaluate the service providing organization in particular, and the Jama’at 
in general?  
 Has this service made any significant contribution to your personal and community 
life?  
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PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
In social ethnography, participant observation is an essential method of studying the issue in 
its natural setting. This method originated in the work of anthropologists (Robson, 2011), 
when they attempted to study small and homogeneous cultures in the late nineteenth century 
(Tedlock, 2005). To carry out a successful ethnography, the researcher is expected to spend 
an extended period of time among the participants, while taking part in regular activities and 
observing “their joys and sufferings as a way of obtaining material for social scientific study” 
(Tedlock, 2005, p. 467). In this method, the observer attempts to blend in with the 
participants of the study and seeks thereby to become part of the observed group to some 
extent. There has been a long debate about subjectivity versus the possibility of objective 
interpretation in adopting this method as a way of gathering social data. However, it is being 
widely practised in the field and is claimed to be ‘scientific’, as “objectivity can be 
approached through a heightened sensitivity to the problem of subjectivity and the need for 
justification of one’s claims (Robson, 2011, p. 309).  
During the whole period of my fieldwork for this study, I attended numerous welfare 
events organized by the Jama’at and its organic welfare organizations. In the days when no 
event took place, I was present in their offices, charity clinics or charity schools. I never acted 
as a complete participant, as I never concealed my identity as an observer. Most of the time, I 
was an ‘observer-as-participant’59, joining in with both providers and receivers. Furthermore, 
I was a ‘participant-as-an-observer’60 in a few large-scale welfare programs, such as relief 
distribution for the victims of natural disasters. In some other large events, I tried to stay most 
                                                            
59 “This is someone who takes no part in the activity but whose status as researcher is known to the participants” 
(Robson, 2011, p. 323). 
60 In a few events, the organizers introduced me to welfare recipients as an external researcher and asked me to 
sit with them on the stage. In those cases, I was not able communicate directly with the recipients. I also 
perceived that some of the recipients, due to their lack of knowledge about academic research, and being from a 
very poor class, considered me an informal part of the welfare providing organization and sought my help in 
getting assistance.  
158 
of the time with the recipients and attempted to understand their experience within their own 
circumstances.  
In this research, data collected from the welfare providers was intended to explain 
their motives and activities, while data from the welfare recipients was intended to enable an 
understanding of their experiences and perceptions. Initially planned research questions were 
determined on the basis of personal observation at different times and a reading of the 
existing literature. During the research proposal phase, the questions for the two participant 
categories were focused on obtaining this information. Participant observation during the first 
two months of the fieldwork added a valuable perspective. This period included observing a 
range of activities, starting from seasonal and occasional welfare provision, such as 
distribution of clothes among the poor during the Eid festival, provision of financial help for 
the victims of a fire accident in a slum and winter clothes distribution, to regular and ongoing 
welfare provision, such as the operation of two charity medical centres and two other charity 
schools, one of which also included an orphanage. During this observation period, a good 
relationship of trust was developed between myself and various participant groups. In 
addition, valuable information and insights were achieved through informal conversations 
with the providers and the recipients of occasional welfare provision. 
To summarize, all data was collected through 7 months of participant observation, 
interviews with 19 providers, 2 semi-structured complete interviews and 3 focus group 
discussions that involved a total of 45 recipients. All interviews and focus group discussions 
where consent was given were audio recorded. Additionally, I talked to around 20 welfare 
organizers and more than 100 recipients during this period. Rather than formal interviews, 
conversational inquiries were made, covering aspects of an event as they emerged. Finally, a 
regular journal was kept during the fieldwork, thus assuring an accurate record of relevant 
events and observations. This journal was, in fact, a detailed account of my field-notes 
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written almost every day during my participant observation activities. During the observation 
period, I noted down keywords, mentioned as ‘cryptic jottings’ by Berg (2004, p. 174), about 
conversations and events, as deemed necessary, trying to do it briefly without distracting 
other people’s minds or attracting any attention. I wrote a detailed description, based on those 
keywords, as soon as I left the field, and relevant descriptions were later developed into 
analytic notes during the data analysis phase.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Data collection methods for this research comprised the interviews, focus group discussions, 
and participant observation, in which the participants talked about their motives, experiences, 
perceptions and aspirations. All these discussions were transcribed, exactly, into Bengali 
texts. A literal translation into English is likely to result in a loss of the passive meanings, 
emphasis and implied perceptions that were realized during the discussions. Therefore, I 
translated necessary portions when needed, based on the audio files and Bengali 
transcriptions. Prior to the translation, I repeatedly listened to those audio clips and reread all 
the journal entries that I had written based on the field-notes.  
All the raw data was transformed into meaningful understanding by thematic analysis. 
Thematic analysis is defined as “to construct an index of central themes and subthemes, 
which are then represented in a matrix. …. The themes and subthemes are essentially 
recurring motifs in the text that are then applied to the data” (Bryman, 2008, p. 554). 
According to Ryan and Bernard (2003), looking for some characteristics such as repetitions, 
indigenous typologies or categories, metaphors and analogies, transitions, similarities and 
differences, linguistic connectors, missing data and theory related materials are some of the 
basic recommendations of thematic analysis. 
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This data collection process resulted in the accumulation of a great amount of 
information. The large raw data set was organized according to different variables, such as 
social service providers and recipients, males and females, young people and adults, and 
relationship to education or medicine or both. For the coding, the descriptive mode of 
selecting the key words and the analytical mode of finding out the key terms were employed.  
The themes used during the data analysis phase were planned and determined before 
the data collection phase, so that there would be coherence between the objectives of 
answering the research questions and the processes of data collection and analysis. However, 
some new insights and points of view emerged during the data collection phase, and those 
were taken into consideration.  
 
SALIENT FEATURES OF THE FIELD AND MAJOR EVENTS 
The Jama’at organizes welfare activities in education and health through various means. A 
complex network of organizations keeps these services running, with the Jama’at working as 
the primary decision making authority. Although the movement often carries out welfare 
services in its own name, a larger portion of those services is channelled through its sister 
organizations, due to strategic reasons. By regulating welfare activities through several 
officially apolitical social organizations, instead of organizing them directly, using the name 
of the political movement, the Jama’at has been able to garner government support in the 
form of more funds, approval and better access to the population. By doing this, it has 
established several social and community organizations, all over the country. It is common 
knowledge that these organizations are controlled by the Jama’at, just as their officials are 
appointed and supervised by the Jama’at on a regular basis. One such major organization in 
Chittagong City is Islamic Social Welfare Council Chittagong (Bengali: Islami Shomaj 
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Kollyan Parishad). Besides, two other organizations work under the umbrella of the Jama’at, 
targeting two specific organizations in society: Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation and 
Bangladesh Farmers Welfare Cooperative. Regular charitable, medical and educational 
services of the movement in Chittagong are organized through the previously mentioned 
ISWCC (Islamic Social Welfare Council Chittagong).  
Apart from organizing both regular and occasional welfare activities, this council has 
launched several ambitious initiatives, such as publishing a local newspaper, the Karnaphuli. 
It has also established a successfully run private university, International Islamic University 
Chittagong, and a medical college and hospital. As part of its welfare program, the council 
supervises several charity clinics, general schools, religious schools (madrasah), orphanages 
and an office to provide financial and material assistance to the poor.  
Taking into account all the social activities of the ISWCC in particular, and of the 
Jama’at in general, it is possible to classify them into two categories with regard to the nature 
of the welfare they provide. The first category would consist of regular medical and 
educational endeavours, such as International Islamic University Chittagong, ISWC Medical 
College and Hospital and five general schools in the city. These institutions run as regular 
business ventures where the patients or the students pay charges or tuition fees. However, 
these are less than what would be charged for hospitals and schools of similar standard, in 
order to accommodate services for lower-income people. Moreover, these institutions also 
provide free services to some selected consumers who are unable to pay anything.  
The second category of the services provided by ISWCC in Chittagong comprises 
three charity clinics, two religious schools and an orphanage, all providing free services to 
their poor beneficiaries. In a country where more than 76.5 per cent of the population live 
162 
below the poverty line, with less than 2 USD income per day61, people in need of such 
welfare service are certainly larger in number than the ones who can afford even the minimal 
cost. Figure 1 illustrates this ratio, where the middle circle represents the core target subject 
of this research work, charitable medical and educational activities of the Jama’at by itself 
and other organizations such as the ISWCC. (The outer circle is included as it represents the 
welfare provision by the movement itself.) A comparative representation of both these 
categories, with emphasis on the former, is included in this thesis to better clarify the 
phenomenon.  
 
 
Figure 1: Classifications of the social welfare program of the Jama’at 
 
The first significant event during my fieldwork was on the day after my arrival, in the 
last week of the religious month of Ramadan. A program was organized by a local unit of the 
                                                            
61 Information concerning the year 2013 in ("Data on Bangladesh in South Asia (By Country),"), in: 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/bangladesh, and in: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/business/03-Jun-
2014/earning-2-a-day-60-19-population-live-below-poverty-line.  
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Jama’at to distribute clothes among people in need, as a gift for the upcoming Eid festival 
celebration. There were 40 females, 25 males and more than 50 children present who 
received clothes.  
After a few days of initial observation in a medical centre, I attended another charity 
event organized in a slum by a different local unit of the Jama’at. It was on the day of the Eid, 
and the unit prepared food in a field just outside the slum and distributed it among more than 
400 people. Another event I attended was a dowry-less mass wedding62, where 30 
underprivileged couples were married. Following a major fire in a slum, a program was 
organized to distribute help among the afflicted families. On another occasion, the city unit of 
the Jama’at organized a program, which they do once a year, and distributed 15 sewing 
machines to selected women in need, from all over the city. Most of the recipients were 
widowed or divorced, and this particular sewing machine distribution program aims to bring 
about a sustainable change in their lives by helping them to secure self-employment.  
There is a perception in society that the beneficiaries of charitable welfare activities 
are generally poor and financially deprived people. Interestingly, the fieldwork uncovered a 
different situation. By means of interviews, focus group discussions and participant 
observation activities, it was found that there is a wide range of people from different social 
classes who are beneficiaries of Jama’at-run social welfare activities. Although mostly poor 
and underprivileged, some come from the middle and lower middle classes.  
Some other unexpected findings came out of this fieldwork: for example, a shortage 
of medical supplies which would normally have been considered as vital to an organization of 
this nature, a lack in motivating the teachers and educators, and shortcomings in management 
                                                            
62 Giving a dowry to the bridegroom is a traditional practice is Bangladesh that creates a heavy financial burden 
on the bride’s family, usually the father of the bride, and this practice results in several social difficulties. 
Islamic Farmers Welfare Federation, a sister organization of the Jama’at, regularly organizes this dowry-less 
marriage program on an annual basis. A detailed description of the event is provided in Chapter 7.  
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were discovered. There were also stories of incredible and life-changing events occurring due 
to the contributions of some welfare programs. These will be explored in Chapter 8.  
 
ETHICAL ISSUES 
The University of Western Sydney, where this thesis was undertaken, is compliant with the 
Australian Government standard in the matter of ethical aspects of its research works. As it is 
compulsory for every doctoral research project, I filled in the National Ethics Application 
Form on the government website63 and submitted it to the research office of the university on 
20 July 2012. This painstaking task of completing the 32 page form was overseen by the 
supervisory panel. The form included various ethically essential queries, such as the detailed 
description of the researcher, the research project and the participants, duality or conflict of 
interest, probable benefits and risks to the participants, the relationship of researcher to 
participants, the participant recruitment process, data collection and organization methods, 
the consent process, storage and disposal of information, expected research outcome and so 
forth64.  
The National Ethics Application was submitted to the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of the university, who approved the research proposal bearing the code number 
H9806, on 20 October 2012, with the provision that the Committee should receive an annual 
progress report and a final report on completion. Consequently, in October 2013, a progress 
report was submitted to the committee, and final progress report was submitted along with 
the final draft in March 2015. Ethical practices, as mentioned in the form, were maintained 
carefully during the fieldwork and afterwards.  
                                                            
63 https://www.neaf.gov.au  
64 For a description of ethical issues to be considered in social research, please see the form on the NEAF 
website, and Babbie (2010, pp. 62-86), Berg (2004, pp. 43-74), and Robson (2011, pp. 194-230).  
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Empirical data of this research is derived from semi-structured interviews, focus 
group discussions and participant observation. Moreover, many informal discussions 
occurred during the participant observation process. All participants in interviews and focus 
group discussions were provided beforehand with an elaborate information sheet and a 
clearly outlined consent form,65 both were written bilingually in order to convey accurate 
meaning, and were previously reviewed by the supervisory panel and the ethics committee of 
the university. To many participants, it was a new practice in the local context of Bangladesh. 
During my fieldwork, I came to realize that the common understanding in Bangladesh about 
research activities corresponds to anonymous surveys. Interviews and focus group 
discussions were very unusual and regarded as odd research method to most of the 
participants. Therefore, I tried to explain briefly how their participation would contribute in 
this research in places where I felt it necessary.  
Regarding consent, although some of them initially hesitated to put their signature on 
the form, this attitude changed after the methodological aspects and ethical issues were 
explained. Pertinent issues such as consent to participation, anonymity of the participants, 
confidentiality of information, and the right to withdraw were discussed briefly on many 
occasions, and particularly in all focus group discussions. The participants in informal 
discussions or those present during the participant observation were also debriefed about 
those issues to ensure that they remain conscious regarding the research. Altogether, these 
activities made a positive contribution towards gaining the trust of the participants during 
fieldwork, especially considering the instable political circumstances of Bangladesh during 
the fieldwork.  
The study involved a political party, Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami, which was facing 
subjugation during the period of the fieldwork from an oppressive government. However, no 
                                                            
65 Information Sheet, Consent Form and Withdrawal Form are attached to the Appendix of this thesis.  
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discussion or issue was derived that could instigate any potential risk or harm for the 
participants. This is due to the scope of this research which focused primarily on the social 
welfare activities of this party and did not include any discussion with regards to political 
activities or opinions. During the time of the fieldwork, August 2012 to March 2013, 
government pressure was initiated through several steps such as arresting leaders and activists 
of the Jama’at, banning the party from participating in elections, and bringing central leaders 
of this party in the court of law with allegations of war crimes that occurred primarily by the 
Pakistani Army during the 1971 liberation war (Jalil, 2010). Despite this political tension, the 
social welfare activities of this group were mostly uninterrupted during that time. 
The situation in the country has changed ever since, with three of the senior Jama’at 
leaders and another opposition leader from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party already executed 
by an internationally criticized crime tribunal66. Further, thousands of local leaders and 
activists all over the country have been killed, arrested and tortured by both police and 
government party activists (Pennington, 2015; Quadir, 2015). Recently as November 2015, 
government officials started enlisting all business and charity endeavours established or 
administered by Jama’at, with allegation of financing terrorism (Ahsan, 2015). No actual link 
between the Jama’at and the extremists has been proven so far. Although a widespread 
criticism of this claim as an opportunistic utilization of current global security situation is 
apparent (Hashmi, 2015), the welfare activities of this party are nevertheless looking at an 
uncertain future at the moment.  
Taking all these facts into consideration, informing the participants about consent 
process and right to withdraw was strongly emphasized by the researcher. There was some 
reluctance to provide information felt from the side of some participants, however, none 
                                                            
66 For more about War Crimes Tribunal, where all convicted and executed defendants are opposition political 
leaders, please refer to: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-22/bangladesh-executes-two-opposition-leaders-
for-1971-war-crimes/6961554, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32263541, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34892606.  
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withdrew their participation during the events and during the follow-up contacts as well. 
Some interviewees expressed that any information about their organization will be 
manipulated against them. One local leader of the party told specifically that he is afraid that 
the information will be used by ‘Western intelligence agencies’ against the party as, 
according to him, any Islamic party is a vulnerable target in the war against terror, 
irrespective of its association or enmity with the extremists. In all instances, I mentioned their 
right to participate or withdraw at their own will at any time. On the contrary, some 
participants instead encouraged an honest and unbiased discussion about their party, and 
some of them were eager to inform the world about their party. I had to remain aware of all 
possible exaggeration and understatement at all times, by constantly cross-checking their 
accounts against facts in the field noticed during participant observation. The combination of 
distinct cultural construct of Bangladeshi society, complex and unyielding internal sphere of 
the Islamists situated inside that society and hostile political environment made this research 
difficult. Although my background as a Bangladeshi gave me a unique opportunity to gain 
access to this adverse situation, I tried my best to remain primarily concerned about the 
academic objectivity of this research and the participants’ safety.  
During the final weeks of fieldwork, I had follow-up meetings with some key 
informants, mostly Jama’at leaders and intellectuals, and naturally the discussion about my 
experience and initial findings took place. I informed them about major positive and negative 
observations that would be analysed in detail in this study. Although some of them argued 
with different viewpoints, none of them denied or opposed those plausible research outcomes 
completely.  
In order to protect the anonymity of the participants of this research,  all names have 
been changed. Protection for the children was also observed, as no participants were under 18 
years old. In the case of the charity schools students, their parents participated on their behalf 
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in the study, as they were in a better position to inform me about their relationship with the 
welfare service providers.  
Overall, there was no payment or remuneration provided to the participants of this 
research for their participation. In one exception, at the end of a focus group discussion, I 
found out that many of them suspended their work in order to participate in this research. As 
all of them were very poor, I provided each of them with their one day work’s worth, which 
is less than three Australian dollars, to compensate for their time. It was not decided or 
declared previously, therefore it had no bearing on the participation. However, token gifts 
were presented to some of the one-to-one interviewees, and light snacks were served during 
focus group discussions, as they are suitable with local culture. This created a comfortable 
environment and initiated relevant informal communication. None of these was considered or 
understood as any sort of return for their wholly voluntary participation.  
All participation was audio-recorded and transcribed digitally. Relevant portions of 
texts were translated by the researcher who is a native Bengali speaker.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Taking into consideration the basic elements of the framework of this thesis, such as the 
research questions and the complex structure and nature of social welfare services 
administered by the Jama’at, as well as the diversity of the people associated with them, the 
qualitative method has proven to be the most suitable approach to data collection from the 
field. In addition to semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, continuous 
participant observation was a powerful tool for gaining very important insights into this 
social movement. Altogether, the data gathering phase greatly helped to build up essential 
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knowledge of this extraordinary endeavour of organized social welfare provision by a 
religiously based political movement in a secular state.  
By discussion with the welfare providers through long one-to-one interviews and with 
the recipients through focus groups, a comparative understanding of their motives and 
experiences was developed. In addition, participating in regular welfare activities provided 
me with an opportunity to grasp the real complexities of this phenomenon, and, consequently, 
to understand it through the empirical study of relevant movement activities. After seven 
months of fieldwork, collected data was analysed thematically in order to approach the 
primary research questions, apply the relevant theory to the subject of this study and thereby 
meet the research objectives.  
There were huge security issues arising during the fieldwork, as the movement was 
facing a great degree of oppression by the government. Although the social activities of the 
movement were slightly less affected than its political activities, it was still necessary to be 
very careful when collecting data. Throughout, nobody was harmed by this study and no law 
was broken. Ethical issues were considered with utmost priority during all phases. However, 
this sudden security situation of the country has a curious relationship with the topic under 
research.  
The founding fathers of the country, leaders of a secular party, the Awami League, 
incorporated secularism into the constitution, in 1972, as one of the four state principles, 
together with nationalism, socialism and democracy. The principle of secularism was later 
revoked in 1977 and replaced by ‘absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah’. However, 
the current government, led again by the Awami League, restored ‘secularism’ in 2010 
(Islam, 2013). Saidul (2011) has branded this process as ‘ultra-secularization’ and mentioned 
‘massive crackdown on Islamic parties’ as one the key strategies taken by the government – 
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the Jama’at being the prime target in this intimidation process. All these factors will be 
apparent in the empirical data that lays the foundation of analysis of this case study.  
The following chapters will empirically investigate the social welfare activities of the 
Jama’at in Bangladesh, exploring them in order to understand the reasons for and outcomes 
of this curious phenomenon – social welfare provision by an Islamic political revivalist 
movement in a secular state.  
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CHAPTER 7: SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAM OF THE 
JAMA’AT: THE ETHNOGRAPHY 
This chapter studies the social welfare programs of the Jama’at, ethnographically reporting its 
activities and their manifestation. It explores these programs serving the social welfare 
agenda and their real-life implementation. It also attempts – based on empirical data derived 
from interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation – to critically 
understand these programs, as well as understand the outcomes secured by them. In doing so, 
the chapter presents a case study of the Jama’at’s activities in Chittagong, the commercial 
capital of Bangladesh, which is generally considered one of the strongholds of support for the 
party. 
The Jama’at has established several organizations that work as its social welfare outlet 
alongside some welfare activities organized directly in the party’s name. The Islamic Social 
Welfare Council Chittagong (ISWCC), established in 1977, is the first among such 
organizations. This organization was the central point of study in this research. Besides this, 
activities of other organic welfare organizations of the Jama’at were also given attention, 
according to their place in the party’s overall social welfare framework. All of these activities 
could primarily be categorized into two major areas: 1) continuous charitable works in 
education and healthcare, and 2) occasional charitable works to assist the underprivileged 
poor. Before presenting a description of these works, a brief outline of their historical 
background will set the context of the current phenomenon.  
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SOCIAL WELFARE OF THE JAMA’AT THROUGH ISWCC IN CHITTAGONG 
Prior to the British colonial era and during Mughal rule in the fifteenth century, the name of 
the city of Chittagong was Islamabad (lit. City of Islam). Sir William Hunter (1877) 
colloquially translated this Farsi word as ‘Residence of the Faithful’. This appellation was 
mainly due to the powerful role of religion in the society and local culture, as well as the 
increasing number of Sufi preachers in this region at the time. According to Hans Harder 
(2011), this name was given by the Mughal ruler Aurangzeb in 1666, and the previous name 
of this region was an Arakanese word ‘Cattala’ or ‘Cit-taut-gaurm’ meaning ‘do not make 
war’ which was restored as ‘Chittagong’ by the British rulers in the eighteenth century. Some 
historians consider Chittagong Port as the early contact point with this region of the Arab 
traders who brought Islam here in its first century (O'donnell, 1984). Continuing from this 
historical background, Chittagong is considered as one of the most religiously influenced 
places in Bangladesh. Traditionally, this region is known for its association with several 
movements which have inherent religious motivation against British colonial rule. Moreover, 
Chittagong is ‘home’ to various Mazar (Sufi tomb/shrine), and practices of several Sufi 
schools of thought are common in Chittagonian culture (Harder, 2011).  
During the eighteenth century and most of the nineteenth century, several Islamic 
reformist movements were developed in the Bengal region. The teachings of major Bengali 
revivalist Islamic figures, such as Shah Wali Ullah and Haji Shariatullah, calling the Muslims 
to revive textual practices of the religion and to reject innovations in religious practice 
(Bid’ah) were widespread in the eastern and northern regions (Uddin, 2006). However, those 
movements were relatively less popular in Chittagong in the south. Rather, the majority of the 
people there continued with their religious practices, blended with local culture and Sufi 
teachings.  
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At the same time, the concept of religion-based politics was introduced into this 
region at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Khelafat Movement, an all-Indian 
movement in support of the Turkish Caliphate, was active in Chittagong, as in all other places 
with a Muslim majority. Later, in the nineteenth century, religious intellectual leaders, such 
as Maniruzzaman Islamabadi and Ataur Rahman, played a significant role in local politics 
during British colonial rule. Their campaign and struggle to gain rights for the Muslim 
population were strongly supported by the local Muslims, as the Hindu–Muslim social 
relationship at that time was based on grievance and discrimination (Alam, 2007; Samaddar, 
2014). During that period, those movements were focused on protesting against the 
oppressive Hindu landlords (Jamindars) and British rulers, as well as calling for educational 
and social development for Muslims. Afterwards, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Muslim League 
was the most popular political party in this part of the country. This party advocated the ‘Two 
Nation Theory’, calling for separate states for the Muslims and the Hindus. The party was 
inspired by an ideology that considered religious identity as being at the core of nationalist 
existence. Most of the Muslim League leaders were secular, and, unlike those now espousing 
current Islamic revivalist thought, were therefore less interested in the implementation of 
Islamic principles in politics and society (Khimjee, 2013; Sisson & Rose, 1991).  
It was in this socio-political atmosphere that the Jama’at started working in the mid-
1940s. After the partition of India and the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, it slowly but 
steadily gained influence in both provinces of Pakistan, East and West (Nasr, 1994). Early 
activities of the Jama’at in East Pakistan, currently Bangladesh, were initiated in the southern 
region of Barisal in 1956 (Majidi, 2003). Within the next couple of years, the Jama’at spread 
to the provincial capital, Dhaka, as well as to Chittagong. Initially, the party consisted of a 
group of like-minded student leaders influenced by reading literature authored by Mawdudi, 
who started gathering together and preaching their ideology among other students.  
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From the very beginning, the Jama’at advocated the implementation of Islam at a 
governmental policy-making level and promoted its slogan, ‘Islam is a complete way of 
living’ (Nasr, 2005). Interestingly, in Chittagong and elsewhere in Bangladesh, it avoided 
confrontation with religious practices that were long influenced by the local culture and 
concentrated more on competing with other political parties such as the Muslim League and 
the Nejam-e-Islam Party, another influential Islamic political party of that time. According to 
Nazmuddin Maudud,67 a 74-year-old prominent Jama’at intellectual:  
Here I talk about the time before independence, before 1971. Other Islamic parties used to 
complain that the Jama’at is pro-American, or American agent. This was because we were 
thinking and working in a progressive way... we did not want to stir up mass emotion before 
gaining people’s confidence. You need to be pragmatic and rational if you want to achieve 
something fruitful. You have to achieve religious authority if you want to discuss religious 
issues. Moreover, we had to prioritize solving problems... it was a time when many educated 
people of our society didn’t care about Islam. They had great influence over general people. 
They were writers, teachers, leaders; all popular in national level. Human being loses 
everything, all senses, when fanatic nationalism arises. At that time, I have heard by my own 
ears many people saying things about Islam publicly which are unspeakable. In order to resist 
Pakistani oppression, they were even ready to leave Islam... the Jama’at thought otherwise. 
Their opinion was to find solution inside Pakistani framework. At that time, most people in 
Dhaka, in universities and government offices, became mad with Bengali nationalism. It was 
like mass hysteria. The Qur’an said ‘Do not die unless you are Muslims’. Being Muslim is 
your prime identity, you – as a Muslim – have no option to prioritize another identity... the 
Muslim League was propagating Secular nationalism, and the Nezam-e-Islam party was 
unpopular in political arena, they had no appeal to educated minds because they are so 
confined in traditional Islam... (so) the Jama’at wanted to educate people about Islam, serve 
them through welfare activities, not confront them (Interviewed at his residence in Dhaka on 
25th September 2012).     
‘Social Reformation and Social Welfare’ had been the third of the four officially proclaimed 
agendas in the party’s constitution (Jama'at-E-Islami, 2011). However, the other three – 
preaching of the ideology, organization of the activities and political reformation – dominated 
                                                            
67 All interviewees’ names are fictitious to maintain confidentiality.  
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the Jama’at’s activities in its early days in the 1970s. The Jama’at’s first organized effort 
involving social welfare activities in this region was to distribute relief support to the poor 
and homeless around the coastal area, who were affected by the devastating cyclone of 1969 
(Abdur Rahim,68 an ISWCC leader, interviewed in his office in Chittagong on 27th December 
2012).  
The importance of social welfare as an integral part of the Jama’at activities was 
manifested in a later event. The party was banned in the newly-born Bangladesh, due to its 
previous support for the Pakistani government during the 1971 war. The situation changed 
dramatically when President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated in 1975 and the pro-
Indian secular Awami League was removed from power. It was not until 1979 that the 
Jama’at started working again in Bangladesh using its official name, although its members 
had continued working during the years between 1975 and 1979 under the names of different 
local organizations, such as Islamic Social Welfare Council, Islamic Labourers Welfare 
Federation, Islamic Farmers Welfare Organization and Ideal Teachers Association, among 
others (Khan, 1996; Majidi, 2003). These were either non-political social welfare 
organizations or non-political religious organizations, quietly mobilizing pro-Jama’at people 
and carrying out their activities – mostly religious, social and educational – without being 
involved in national politics.  
The Islamic Social Welfare Council of Chittagong (ISWCC) was established in 1977, 
by people who had been Jama’at activists in the 1960s. Almost all of them had been forced to 
flee the country, or go into hiding for a long time, after the independence of Bangladesh in 
1971. They started coming back gradually when the political situation eased after the regime 
change in 1975. Instead of entering into politics directly, during the military rule of the late 
1970s, they formed ISWCC, a non-political social welfare organization, in order to continue 
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advocating their ideology. Asaad Mahmud,69 an ISWCC leader, recounted his involvement 
with the organization:  
I joined the Jama’at in 1966, I was a college student at that time... however, many events took 
place... It was a time of turmoil, socially and politically. So, ISWCC was established at a later 
time. It started its formal activities in around 1977. I was assigned to work here... I always 
have a personal tendency to mix with general poor people. Since then, I worked mostly in 
Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation in different cities, and now I’m back in the ISWCC 
since 1997... we had very limited fund and activities in the eighties, all offices were in the 
same compound. This office building of the ISWCC – as you can see now – we moved here 
after 2001... however, our focus is now on social welfare activities, such as organizing 
religious programs, schools, clinics and so on, nothing political (interviewed in the ISWCC 
office on 1st December 2012).  
The establishment of ISWCC in Chittagong was a revolutionary milestone in the history of 
the Jama’at in the new country of Bangladesh. It was undoubtedly an ingenious decision, that 
paved the way for the Jama’at’s return to the political arena in later years. Initially, ISWCC 
concentrated on establishing a few schools that then became the nucleus for the movement in 
those days. This created an opportunity for the party leaders, most of whom were previously 
student leaders with a good academic education, to be employed in the teaching profession. 
Besides, it helped them to regain an honourable and acceptable place in the local society. 
During the following years, the activities of ISWCC were extended into offering free 
education for the children of poor families, establishing orphanages, providing 
underprivileged people with basic medical services and distributing relief assistance during 
natural disasters, such as cyclones and floods. Considering the socio-economic condition of 
the country, these activities successfully gave the party a foundational status in local society. 
Moreover, it was naturally convenient for pro-Jama’at people to proclaim that the motivation 
for these social welfare activities came from religious aspiration. However, a leader of the 
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Chittagong city Jama’at with special role in the welfare provision, Rafiqul Islam,70 agreed 
that his party has a ‘pragmatic motive’, alongside religious aspiration, driving these social 
welfare activities:  
Our first and primary motive, behind all these social welfare activities, is to serve our Islamic 
perspective. Our religion ordered us to serve humanity, to serve people in need. Islam is to 
guide people, as it is said in the Qur’an ‘Hudallinnas’, guidance and welfare of all human 
beings. It didn’t say that it is for the Muslims only... every person should help elderly people, 
children, people who are facing troubles, and so on. So, the Jama’at also tries to do for this 
cause as it can. I know, these activities can be explained as a way to gain popularity, and I 
wouldn’t deny the fact that they help our party sometimes, but that’s not our objective. As a 
political party... every member of the Jama’at, including me, we need to assimilate with our 
own population. We can mix with public through those activities. Therefore, the Jama’at 
emphasizes strongly on those activities... you may find that we contribute much for the poor. 
Our country is poor and the population is huge. I would consider success from another 
perspective. If we can encourage our people to help needy people for the cause of Islam, that 
is a success to me. I can say that ninety percent of the Jama’at manpower, if not hundred 
percent, are somehow associated with social welfare activities, whatever little or big the 
degree is (interviewed in Chittagong on 1st January 2013). 
On the other hand, one of his deputies in the welfare division of Chittagong city Jama’at 
Executive Committee, Yeasinul Kabir71 argued that there is no political or ‘worldly’ motive 
for these welfare activities, rather it has merely a religious motive. As he says:  
I understand what you have mentioned about others’ opinion, but as I see it... there is a Hadith 
(prophetic tradition) ‘help your brothers whether they are oppressed or oppressors’. When it 
comes to the social welfare activities of our party, we don’t see who supports which party. I 
want to give an example. After the great cyclone in 29th April 1991, we built around two 
hundred houses in Parua Para village. This is my own village in South Chittagong. It was a 
great disaster, thousands died and village people were helpless for weeks. They had nothing. 
We started with emergency food and clothes, then provided materials to build houses to the 
neediest families. We distributed such support in more than three hundred villages in South 
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Chittagong. This was one of biggest relief work in our history, supported by overseas fund. I 
don’t know whether you can remember or not, there was a big shipload of aid that came to the 
Chittagong port at that time. We worked for the next six months... In the National Election of 
1996, Advocate Shamsuddin Mirza (the Jama’at candidate for parliament membership) 
received a total of 66 votes from my village. Think about it. Each house doesn’t contain one 
person, there are several family members in every house. If we would get two votes only from 
each house we built five years ago, there would be four hundred votes for Mr. Mirza from my 
village. But it didn’t happen that way. Political vote  is a different issue, and we do not work 
for worldly gain. If we focus on that in our social welfare activities, we would not remain as 
an Islamic idealistic movement... there were families who were in better situation and 
therefore we provided less support for them, but I know that they voted for us... so, it’s a 
complex issue, and you shouldn’t judge our political condition from the viewpoint of our 
social welfare activities (interviewed in Chittagong on 5th January 2013). 
Both leaders are true in their statements regarding the motive of Jama’at’s welfare activities. 
During the fieldwork, it became clear that the Jama’at people focused more on religious 
motivation and idealistic aspiration. However, they have also been becoming concerned 
about their practical and political outcomes, as there have been some attempts to regulate 
their welfare activities. There is lack of strategic planning which they are now considering. 
Currently, regular and ongoing financial supports are predominantly given to the people who 
are associated with the party. Although welfare activities like relief distribution during 
natural disasters, or ongoing charity schools and clinics are open to everyone, regular 
monthly financial supports are not provided to everyone who applies for that. Before 
discussing this fact in the following analysis chapter, it is pertinent to study the organizational 
structure of the Jama’at in providing social welfare.  
The success of ISWCC in Chittagong inspired like-minded people all over the 
country. Hospitals, clinics, schools and research centres were formed in the early 1980s in 
almost all regions of the country, by people who were both non-officially and officially 
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associated with the Jama’at (Aref Haidar,72 a leader and member of the Executive Committee 
of Chittagong city Jama’at, interviewed in Dhaka on 24th and 25th September 2012). Thus, the 
establishment of ISWCC was a pioneering step in the history of the political comeback of the 
Jama’at.  
The Jama’at was officially re-established in Bangladesh in 1979, when the new 
government allowed it to start working again. It took the name Jama’at-e-Islami Bangladesh, 
instead of Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan, as it had been called before independence in 1971. After 
1979, the Jama’at continued to employ its resources for its fourth agenda, social welfare, as 
well as continuing ISWCC. The party still has its own activities for social welfare purposes, 
together with the ISWCC which works as the major outlet for this specific objective. 
Moreover, several other organizations, such as the Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation, the 
Islamic Farmers Welfare Organization and the Ideal Teachers Association have been 
established and are run by the members of the Jama’at.  
This network of organizations and activities has formed a complex web of social 
welfare activities. Understanding this structure is important when analysing the social welfare 
program of the Jama’at, as all social welfare activities are administered through this network. 
All of those organizations embody a larger perspective of social welfare activities, while 
relating to the Jama’at as the mother organization, with ISWCC as the primary outlet. Other 
secondary organizations have their own functions as well. Before looking into the activities 
and their objectives, it is important to examine this network.  
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THE NETWORK OF ORGANIZATIONS 
One of the major characteristics of the Jama’at is its organizational structure and working 
procedures. It is a cadre-based organization, where everyone has to climb up the 
organizational ladder by fulfilling certain criteria. For instance, starting with the rank of 
‘Supporter’, members will go through the levels of Worker, then Associate Member and 
finally Rukon73 (lit. Foundational Member) (Jama'at-E-Islami, 2011). These ranks are 
achieved through a combination of two basic means: 1) participation in party activities and 2) 
the completion of the study syllabus set for each rank. People’s commitment to fulfilling 
these two requirements, along with their religious practices and personal characters, are 
assessed by the respective committees and, if the committee members agree, are promoted to 
the succeeding rank. For instance, a local committee makes decisions concerning the Active 
Member level, the city committee decides about Associate Member level and the central 
committee decides on eligibility for the Rukon level. A person eligible for the rank of Rukon 
must take an oath to attain that status (Shafiul Azim,74 a leader and member of the Executive 
Committee of Chittagong city Jama’at, interviewed in the Jama’at office in Chittagong on 
16th November 2012).  
At the micro-level, a ‘block’ of members carrying out the Jama’at’s activities is called 
a unit. This is usually composed of 10 to 20 activists, with a committee comprising Unit 
President and Secretary, plus other secretaries for finance, preaching, social welfare and so 
on. Each administrative subdivision (Thana) is divided into several units according to the 
manpower in that subdivision. All subdivisions also have similar administrative committees 
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that work under the divisional or city committees. Finally, all divisional and city committees 
are accountable to the central committee of the Jama’at in Bangladesh.  
The Central President of the Jama’at in Bangladesh is called the Amir-e-Jama’at (lit. 
Leader of the Jama’at). There are two higher consultative committees of the Jama’at called 
Kormo Porishod (lit. Working Committee) and Nirbahi Porishod (lit. Executive Committee). 
These committees comprise the Amir-e-Jama’at, a few Naeb-e-Amir (lit. Deputy Leader) – of 
whom there are currently three – a Secretary General and several Assistant Secretaries 
General – currently, eight. In addition, there is a central committee, called Majlis-e-Shura (lit. 
Consultative Committee), that is formed by the representatives of all divisional and city 
committees from all over the country. This central Consultative Committee elects all of the 
central leaders bi-annually, except the Secretary General. The newly elected Amir nominates 
his Secretary General at this same committee meeting (Shafiul Azim,75 a leader and member 
of the Executive Committee of Chittagong city Jama’at, interviewed in the Jama’at office in 
Chittagong on 16th November 2012). 
In the current research, my ethnographic study of the Jama’at was limited to the 
party’s activities in Chittagong City and most important members of the city committee, in 
consideration of their ranks and positions in the party hierarchy, were interviewed. Also, 
some unit presidents and activists who are relatively more active in the social welfare area 
were selected through the snowball sampling process and were interviewed. Every local unit 
of the party has its own social welfare activities and they submit a regular monthly report to 
the city committee. The Chittagong City President of the Jama’at, the Secretary General and 
the Social Welfare Secretary jointly allowed me access to the welfare reports of the years 
2011, 2012 and 2013. These reports provide a detailed structural overview of the welfare 
activities administered, and the funds spent by the party in Chittagong.  
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Unlike the Jama’at, the Islamic Social Welfare Council of Chittagong (ISWCC) 
works as a non-political organization and is registered under the social welfare ministry of the 
government of Bangladesh. This council is administered by its own committee, comprising 
President, Secretary, other secretaries and 60 members who have the right to elect the 
committee bi-annually (Asaad Mahmud,76 an ISWCC leader, interviewed in the ISWCC 
office on 1st December 2012). The association between the Jama’at and the ISWCC is not 
officially proclaimed – the ISWCC is registered as a non-political social welfare organization 
and the Jama’at is a political party. However, it is common knowledge that the council works 
as the primary social welfare outlet for the party. At the same time, these two organizations 
maintain a safe distance from each other, at least officially, as the Council is bound to submit 
annual reports and audit reports to the government. The members of the ISWCC are usually 
Jama’at leaders and activists or like-minded people with contributions to make in 
philanthropy and social welfare. A previous president of the ISWCC was the Chittagong City 
president of the Jama’at in the eighties. He started working for the ISWCC after another 
elected president took charge of the Jama’at city committee. Similarly, the current president 
of the ISWCC was previously a member of the city Consultative Committee of the Jama’at. 
Moreover, the current Secretary General of the ISWCC was the president of the Chittagong 
City committee of the Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation, another organization that works 
as a sister organization of the Jama’at, particularly for the labourers. 
The Jama’at’s method of organizing social welfare activities through different non-
political organizations has intriguing similarities with the social welfare administration of 
another Islamic political party in Turkey. Jenny White (2012, p. 61) explained:  
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A major reason for the success of WP77 (and, after it, VP and AKP), however, was its style of 
mobilizing supporters. The party perfected a face-to-face, personalized style of mobilizing 
‘cells’ of neighbors on the basis of local solidarities. In other words, in addition to the 
business-as-usual patron–client relations common to all political parties in Turkey, WP relied 
on networks and horizontal relations, that is, relations among neighbors. These personal 
networks were mediated by a system of associations, foundations, and informal organizations 
formally unconnected to a party. It also allowed the system to continue to accumulate support 
even when a party was closed down. The networks made the Islamist movement independent 
of the party and encouraged the enthusiasm of activists, who saw this as ‘their’ social 
movement.  
Social welfare organization by Islamic political parties in Turkey is considered one of the 
most successful cases worldwide, as Islamic parties started to join the government there in 
the 1990s and the AKP formed a single party government in 2002. However, although the 
Jama’at has formed a complex network of organizations also, there are fewer of those 
officially unconnected social organizations in Bangladesh, and they maintain a very close 
relationship with the mother political organization. 
Besides ISWCC, the Jama’at established two autonomous organizations: the Islamic 
Labourers Welfare Federation and the Islamic Farmers Welfare Organization (Aref Haidar,78 
a Chittagong city Jama’at leader, interviewed in a hotel in Dhaka on 24th and 25th September 
2012). The activities of these organizations are limited to their respective target groups, and 
despite having been run for more than three decades, their influence is insignificant. The 
Chittagong City offices of both of these organizations are situated in the same premises in the 
Chittagong City Jama’at office. The ISWCC has its own office building in a different place, 
which indicates that it has relatively more autonomous power of administration compared to 
the two previously mentioned organizations. However, the presidents of both the labourers’ 
and the farmers’ organizations were also interviewed.  
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In summary, the Jama’at carries out social welfare activities under the party name at 
all levels of the party structure. Unit-level activities are intense, regular and close to the 
people of the small area that the particular unit covers. All of the units under a subdivision 
branch also occasionally organize social welfare activities for the poor people of that 
subdivision. The City of Division branch also organizes such programs from time to time on 
a larger scale, incorporating several subdivisions. These activities are generally event-
oriented rather than being a regular and continuous program, for instance, helping the people 
affected by a natural disaster, distribution of zakat (alms) during the month of Ramadan 
(Arabic month of fasting), distribution of financial help, clothes and food during the two 
religious festivals (Eid) of the year and assisting poor people with their marriage ceremonies 
(Annaul Welfare Reports of Chittagong city Jama'at, 2011; 2012; 2013).  
Regular social welfare programs are generally administered by ISWCC, which does 
not carry the name of the party. However, it is commonly known that the real authority 
belongs to the party structure. ISWCC runs three fully operational schools, three orphanages, 
three religious schools (madrasahs), two mosques and three charity clinics. Moreover, 
ISWCC is also involved in partially administering a private university and a fully equipped 
hospital with a medical college (Asaad Mahmud,79 an ISWCC leader, interviewed in the 
ISWCC office on 1st December 2012). The Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation has 
comparatively little effect in the field. It distributes zakat and other financial help 
occasionally among the poor and needy labourers. It also protests against government 
policies and actions that are harmful for the labourers. But its role and influence are much 
less than those of the active leftist labour organizations. Similarly, the Islamic Farmers 
Welfare Organization has some occasional activities, such as distributing financial help 
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among needy farmers, distribution of seasonal seeds and fertilizers and so on (Aref Haider,80 
a Chittagong city Jama’at leader, interviewed in Dhaka on 24th and 25th September 2012). A 
detailed outline of all of these social welfare activities is given in the following section.  
 
SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS 
When asked about the social welfare programs of the Jama’at, the Chittagong City Secretary 
of the organization began his response by emphasizing that social welfare is one of the four 
permanent principal programs of the party. The Jama’at has declared these programs in 
article 6 in the party manifesto as:  
1. Introducing the authentic form of Islam to all citizens of Bangladesh  
2. Organizing interested people and educating them  
3. Social reformation and service for humanity based on Islamic principles  
4. Reformation of the government and policies through constitutional means  
According to the a city Jama’at leader, Shafiul Azim81, the party inspires and 
encourages everyone, from the leaders to the field-level activists and supporters, to become 
social workers, and therefore one of the five conditions of joining the party as an activist is a 
degree of involvement in social work.82 He said that  
[a] complete calculation of the social welfare activities undertaken and initiated by our 
organization is impossible to estimate. You will get a comprehensive idea of these activities 
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186 
by looking into both our monthly and yearly reports. But the actual work done is spread from 
the root level of the society. The reports will show the declared tasks that were done officially 
and reported in the unit level in every suburb, and finally combined together for the city level 
report. However, that report does not always include, for instance, a Jama’at worker who 
helped his ill neighbour out of the inspiration received from the party. The party always 
teaches its manpower to practice Qard-e-Hasana83 with relatives and neighbours in need. 
Usually, this kind of personal level activity is supposed to be included in the report, but many 
a times it is not. (Interviewed in the Jama’at office on 16th November 2012) 
It was clear from speaking with the interviewees, that the city-level leaders of the Jama’at, as 
well as the top officials of its welfare organization, ISWCC, have a thorough understanding 
and knowledge of the social welfare activities administered by the party. This has been made 
possible by their having access to the reports of the party and their participation in the party’s 
activities all over the city. As for the local activists, they gain a theoretical knowledge of 
relevant tasks by reading the party manifestos and literature and by joining in the party 
training programs. Individual local units have their own priorities and involvement in various 
types of welfare tasks, primarily meeting the practical needs of their local areas and, 
sometimes, special efforts prioritized by the local leaders. In the next section, the social 
welfare activities of the Jama’at will be described, as revealed through the interviews and 
party reports.  
The city-level report of the entire activities program undertaken by the Jama’at in 
2012 is divided according to the party’s four permanent programs. Under each program, 
several tasks carried out in 2012 were reported, within five categories:  
1. Planning at the beginning of the year  
2. Implementation throughout the year  
3. Increase or decrease in number of activities  
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4. Increase or decrease in percentage of same  
5. The target for the following year  
Amongst the four permanent programs covered in this report, the third is entitled 
Social Reformation and Service. This program contains five subsections:  
1. Prayer organization and lectures in the mosques  
2. Organization of local libraries and social clubs  
3. Participation in local community organizations  
4. Community activities  
5. Welfare for all people  
There are 43 tasks reported under these subsections and the characteristics of those 
tasks are diverse. Some of these tasks are: giving lectures in the mosques; maintaining a 
library for the local people and offering education services, including education in writing 
and literature; providing agricultural training and tree planting in public places; helping to 
organize and participating in funeral prayers and visiting sick people; providing 
unconditional loans (Qard-e-Hasana) and giving financial support to the poor; providing 
medical services, such as eye treatment camp, circumcision camp and blood donation camp; 
organizing and implementing relief distribution for the victims of natural disasters and 
clothes distribution on various occasions; running programs to increase social awareness of 
various issues (Annual Welfare Reports of Chittagong city Jama'at, 2011; 2012; 2013).  
Among these many tasks, major welfare activities will be discussed here based on the 
proportion of the report dedicated to them and their relative importance in the bigger picture 
of party activities. Most of the interviewees mentioned five tasks as their primary social 
welfare activities, and the data in the party report, as well as participant observation during 
the fieldwork, support this claim. These tasks are:  
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 Medical services 
 Educational services 
 Financial aid  
 Material support  
 Relief distribution  
 
MEDICAL SERVICES 
Within the overall social welfare program of the Jama’at, the party’s main focus is on 
providing medical services to the poor and underprivileged people in the community. When 
asked about the Jama’at’s welfare activities, most respondents immediately mentioned two 
sectors: medical and educational. The medical service also provides huge benefits for women 
and the number of female patients in the Jama’at charity clinics is considerably larger than 
the number of male patients. The overcrowded environment, sub-standard living conditions, 
malnutrition and other factors which usually exist in underdeveloped countries are 
commonplace also in Bangladesh. Moreover, gender-discriminating socio-economic 
circumstances make it harder for women to have their medical needs met. Given this 
situation, it is understandable that large numbers of female patients benefit from the Jama’at 
charity clinics.  
Of the 17 providers interviewed – Jama’at leaders, ISWCC leaders and officials – 8 
singled out medical services as their primary sector of welfare provision. The ISWCC 
President said:  
Although the education sector should be prioritized in theory, as this would be the most 
important issue to develop our society and the country in the long run, the prevailing situation 
has compelled us to work more in the medical sector. In our annual report and planning 
papers, you will find education at the beginning. In the same report, you will see that the 
medical sector is the largest in terms of funds spent and the numbers of people who benefit. 
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Need of education is an ideal matter, but we have to comply with the demand of the practical 
situation (interviewed in the ISWCC office on 27th December 2012).  
Currently ISWCC runs one allopathic/general charity clinic and two homeopathic charity 
clinics in Chittagong. Apart from that, the organization actively participates in administering 
a fully operational hospital. Clinics are smaller primary health care centres, where patients 
can visit a doctor to get prescriptions and medicines. The one hospital that ISWCC has been 
administering since 1989 was recently transferred to another authority and developed as a 
medical college hospital, with a medical school attached. The new authority is called 
International Islamic University Chittagong Trust (IIUC Trust), another venture of the 
Jama’at. The IIUC Trust President is the city president of the Jama’at, and ISWCC has three 
representative members on the Trust Committee. This administrative change was undertaken 
to ensure more funds and resources for the hospital, as the available manpower and annual 
budget of the ISWCC is not enough to run a fully functioning hospital, along with a medical 
school. A brief overview of the contributions made by these charity medical services run by 
ISWCC, from 197784 till 2003, is presented in Table 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
84 According to the ISWCC President, the organization provided free medical services to the poor in its 
organizational office for two years, prior to the establishment of its first separate charity medical centre in 1979.  
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Table 4: Charity medical services of ISWCC 
Name 
Jhautola 
Homeo-
pathy 
Clinic 
Jebunnessa 
Homeo-pathy 
Clinic 
(closed down 
1989)85 
Darush Shefa 
Allopathic 
Clinic 
Madarbari 
Homeo-pathy 
Clinic 
ISWCC 
Hospital 
(transferred 
to IIUC 
trust 2011) 
Total 
Year of 
establishment 
1979 1980 1982 1987 1989 
1979–
2003 
Number of 
patients who 
received 
treatment and 
medicine 
111,543 1,2141 85,365 65,581 261,568 536,201 
Circumcision - - 4,085 - 1,978 6,063 
Vaccination - - - - 19,139 19,139 
Eye treatment - - - - 6,489 6,489 
Birth delivery - - - - 90 90 
Pathological 
services 
- - 3,168 - 8,410 11,578 
 
Apart from these small-scale but permanent medical centres, some other occasional medical 
services are provided for the poor by the Jama’at, sometimes under its own name, and 
sometimes through ISWCC. These services are infrequent, but the practical situation of the 
local society and the immense unmet needs of the poor have made the services indispensable 
to the masses. One of the city-level leaders of the party, an elected councilman in Chittagong 
City Corporation and is considered as one of the most active Jama’at leaders in welfare 
activities in city level, described this situation as follows:  
We do social work through our own organization, and sometimes through other organizations. 
You need to understand the political situation of different areas of the city. In some areas, the 
Awami League or BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] have a stronghold, and they would not 
like signs with the word ‘Jama’at’ on them. So, our people build social and community clubs, 
but you will not find their activities in our party report. However, even the people of Awami 
League or BNP know that these organizations are administered by our people. The patients 
                                                            
85 The clinic was established in a slum with the support of a local philanthropist named Abdul Hamid. After his 
demise, his descendants wanted the land back. ISWCC did not have enough funds to continue the service in that 
area. According to the ISWCC President, it was therefore shut down and never reopened.  
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going there to receive the services know that they are Jama’at people. Because we always talk 
about our Deen [religion], we try to motivate them to read the Qur’an. For others, as long as it 
does not bear the name of the party [Jama’at], they do not object. As far as we are concerned, 
the work is more important at the moment. We will put our name when an appropriate time 
comes. I am happy to tell you that that we have around 86 suburb-based social organizations 
in this city. Some of them are regularly active, most are occasional though. Now I will tell 
you what they do. They collect funds from the local rich people and distribute help among the 
poor. We have many natural disasters every year, as you know. During these cyclones and 
floods, they do relief work. They organize medical camps all year round. There may not be 
many, but if each club organizes one event a year that adds up to a large number with many 
contributions by the end of the year. They do circumcision camps, dental treatment camps, 
blood donation camps, free medical camps and special medical camps for women run by 
female doctors. In a few places, they provide weekly or monthly free medical prescriptions 
and basic medicine for the poor people. In Potenga [a backward suburb of Chittagong], we 
provide this medical camp on the last Friday [weekly holiday in Bangladesh] in every month. 
(Interviewed in his local council office on 17th December 2012) 
On the last Friday of the month of this interview, I visited the premises of this medical camp 
in Potenga, which were found to be a one-room club office in a densly populated slum. The 
signboard in front of the club office read ‘Mukto Kafela’ (Bengali: lit. Free Caravan).86 One 
physician was present, along with several volunteers coming and going throughout the day. 
Around 50 patients, more than half of whom were women with children, visited the physician 
up until 5pm. They received prescriptions and were told to go to a certain local pharmacy to 
get the medicine free. There was one volunteer assistant who kept records of the medicines 
prescribed and consulted with the doctor during the day. I learnt that the club received 10,000 
taka (around 150 AUD) from the party and that the total expenditure of medicines prescribed 
that day should not exceed that limit. As a student, the attending doctor had been an activist 
leader of the student wing of the Jama’at. He worked in these medical camps, voluntarily, 
twice a month – once in Potenga and once in Halishahar.  
                                                            
86 ‘Kafela’ is an Arabic word which has been adopted into Bengali. Its intentional use in the name implies an 
association with Islam.  
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The party organized five circumcision camps in Chittagong in 2011. That same year, 
ISWCC organized three similar camps in Chittagong City. This day-long event takes place in 
lower-income suburbs, usually in a school or community centre, where the necessary 
facilities for circumcision are made available for poor parents who bring their boys there for 
the free surgical procedure. On 12 November 2013, I attended one such circumcision camp in 
Bakalia. It was organized in a local school at the weekend; a total of 48 boys were 
circumcised between 9am and 4pm. Two physicians and two medics with the relevant basic 
medical instruments, desensitizers and medicines and around ten volunteers were organized 
by ISWCC. Local activists of the Jama’at had circulated the news in that area prior to the 
event, had listed the boys and their parents and given them coupons with serial numbers. 
Similarly, the activists of the Jama’at also organize vaccination camps from time to time and 
actively participate in government-announced national vaccination day programs. A city 
Jama’at leader with special role in the social welfare activities explained:  
we are a political party, but I am grateful to Allah that this party has given us some avenues to 
serve humanity. After each big natural disaster in the last two decades, we have exhausted all 
our resources to help the people left with nothing but their lives. I can remember some events 
where the person’s life was changed forever. There was a widow who was completely 
helpless and about to become a street beggar. One of our activists communicated with her, 
and we provided her with a sewing machine and some training. Now, she is financially 
secure, a respected working woman. The most important contribution made by us, in my 
opinion, is the medical service. I don’t know whether you can imagine the actual condition of 
the poor people. Some of them would simply die without any treatment. Some of the children 
would not be given vaccines for polio or other dangerous diseases, if we were not there on 
time. We do organize circumcision camps in the slums. Usually, the boys are young, but 
sometimes older. Once I found a teenage boy of around 17 or 18 years old, who was not 
circumcised and felt unable to tell anyone due to shyness and social stigma. We try to 
organize these services to such needy people. It benefits their health as circumcision is not 
only a religious issue, but also a health issue. We try to raise their awareness about health 
issues. (Interviewed in Chittagong on 1st January 2013) 
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During my seven-month stay in the field, no dental or eye care camps were organized 
either by the Jama’at or by ISWCC. When asked about this, an ISWCC leader said,  
dental and eye camps are not as frequent as other medical services. Usually we organize four 
or five such events a year. These are in fact a preliminary check-up for the very poor people. 
Most of them suffer from dental and eye problems due to their poor living conditions and 
lifestyles, but they continue to ignore those problems unless they become severe. Then they 
go to the government hospitals for treatment and suffer more. We do not have the ability to 
remedy this situation fully, for instance doing surgery for a major eye or dental problem, but 
we try to organize one-day camps and check their health. If the problem is curable by 
medicine or primary treatment, we give it to them. Sometimes the problems require long-term 
treatment or even major surgery. In that case, the attending dentist or eye-specialist gives the 
patient some basic medicine along with a short letter of recommendation to some specific 
doctors who are party activists. When the patient visits them, they try to treat them. If the 
procedure and medicines are very expensive, then we also try to give financial support. 
However, such cases seldom occur, probably 20 or 30 times altogether in a year. (Interviewed 
in the ISWCC office on 1st December 2012) 
The contribution towards the charity medical services made by the Jama’at is an integral 
aspect of the discourse of Islamic social welfare in Bangladesh. Shibir, the student wing of 
the Jama’at, is well known for its stronghold among medical students all over the country. 
Apart from the Jama’at’s charity medical services, vast numbers of physicians associated 
with the party are running hundreds of clinics, hospitals, pathology centres and other service-
oriented businesses related to the health sector. In every city of Bangladesh, there are private 
and commercial hospitals that are publicly known to be administered by Jama’at members. 
Although these hospitals do not provide a free service, they are usually known to charge less 
than those run by the government and offer a better service and ethical behaviour. As a result, 
they have a good reputation and the Jama’at also gains some degree of acceptance for being 
behind these endeavours.  
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EDUCATION  
Education is considered to be one of the primary services provided by the Jama’at. The 
second permanent objective of the party, according to the official manifesto, is to educate 
people. The first objective, preaching Islam and introducing it to the people in its authentic 
form, is also strongly related to education. The educational activities of the Jama’at consist of 
several regular programs, such as lecture programs in the mosques, maintaining small-scale 
public libraries in different suburbs through party units, literature programs, study circles, 
discussion and lecture programs on different occasions and so on. I have joined a mass event 
called Qiyam al-Layl (Arabic: lit. night-stay), that was organized in a local mosque and had 
around 60 participants. It started at 11pm with a two hour workshop on a chapter of the 
Qur’an – participants were divided into three groups and each group was moderated by a 
Jama’at Rukon (full member). After a short interval for sleep, everyone woke up at 4 am for 
Tahajjud (complementary prayer) followed by Fajr (morning prayer). On another occasion, I 
joined a local unit program where 14 local activists sat together in their unit office and 
listened to the guest lecturer’s presentation on the topic of the importance in Islam of unity 
and obedience to the leadership. Another big event, called TC (Training Camp), was 
organized in Dhaka for selected local leaders from different districts. It was organized on the 
weekend in a school building and was kept secret due to the political situation of the country. 
I visited the event on its last day for one hour. The schedule of the event showed that the 
whole two days were packed with lectures on different religious and political topics.  
The Jama’at has slowly advanced in the formal education sector of the country and, 
after around four decades of continuous endeavour, party members are now associated with 
various schools and colleges in every district and sub-district in Bangladesh. The most 
notable achievement, to date, by the Jama’at in the education sector in the whole of the 
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country, is the establishment of a private university, the International Islamic University 
Chittagong. Established in 1995, this is currently the largest private university of Bangladesh, 
with around 15,000 students in 14 departments. One of the longest serving staff members of 
the ISWCC, who has been working with the organization for last 22 years, said,  
ISWCC had a core role to play in establishing IIUC in 1995. During the first two years, and 
until it was able to employ sufficient people and build an autonomous structure, we 
maintained everything to do with the finance, construction, employment, curriculum, 
government inspections and approvals and so on. The president of the ISWCC at that time, 
the late Mr. Shamsuddin, was the vice-president of IIUC Founding Syndicate. The president 
of that syndicate was the late Sheikh Abdul Jabbar. Other renowned and philanthropic people 
like him were on that committee and all of them played vital roles in the early years of the 
university. However, you cannot detach ISWCC or our party [the Jama’at] from this 
university, which is now internationally known. The current properties of the university 
would be worth more than one billion taka now. They have their own large campus with so 
many buildings and hostels, students and teachers from different countries, but the first office 
in 1995 was a building with nine rooms only, and the rent was paid by the ISWCC. The 
founding secretary of this university was the late Mr. Badiul Alam, who was then secretary of 
the ISWCC also. We have three representatives in the syndicate committee now, one of them 
is the current president of Chittagong City Jama’at. (Interviewed in the ISWCC office on 28th 
November 2012) 
Among the 77 private universities in Bangladesh, IIUC is well known for its quality 
education with low tuition fees and lenient fee charging schedule and the substantial financial 
aid available for students with good results who are experiencing a financial crisis. The high 
cost of tuition fees in the private universities led to a social situation in Bangladesh where 
only students from affluent families could afford to study at them. Conversely, a large portion 
of IIUC students come from middle- and lower-income families. However, this university is 
not actually a welfare project, although it makes a passive contribution to the social welfare 
of the community. Regarding the Jama’at’s involvement in establishing private universities in 
Bangladesh, a city Jama’at leader said: 
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The IIUC is a great success; we hope that this university will make a contribution in the future 
that we cannot even conceive of right now. There are three other private universities that were 
established later and the people associated with the Jama’at had roles to play in their 
establishment: Manarat University and Bangladesh Islamic University in Dhaka, and Leading 
University in Sylhet. But they are more private enterprises and the party never gets directly 
involved in administering those universities, unlike the IIUC (Interviewed in Chittagong city 
Jama’at office on 16th November 2012).  
Apart from these private universities, the Jama’at is involved, with varying degrees of 
influence, with several hundred schools in the country. In almost every city and in rural areas, 
it is publicly known that these schools are being run by people associated with the Jama’at. In 
Chittagong, ISWCC is currently running five such secondary schools. However, like the 
IIUC, these are also private schools, where the students have to pay tuition and other fees. To 
provide welfare or charity-based education, the Jama’at runs a religious education complex in 
the suburb of Nasirabad and a religious school in Agrabad. The religious education complex 
is called Abu Huraira Complex, named after a scholar companion of the Prophet of Islam. 
This complex includes a secondary-level religious school with 850 students, a Hifzkhana 
(specialized boarding school for the memorization of the Qur’an only) with 82 students, a 
technical institute where the students from poor families get vocational training, and an 
orphanage for 200 boys, who are also students in the above-mentioned religious school and 
technical institute. The other religious school, in Agrabad, is not a government approved 
institute, but rather a religious education centre, teaching around 250 young boys and girls in 
the morning and around 40 adult males at night (Secretary of the ISWCC, interviewed in the 
ISWCC office on 1st December 2012).  
Apart from these charity-based educational services, the ISWCC also runs some 
morning schools in several suburbs in Chittagong, of which I visited three. Each of these had 
more than 150 students, both boys and girls. An ISWCC leader said:  
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We have several Maktab [religious morning school] in various places in the city. We pay the 
local Imams [appointed leader of the prayer in the mosque] to spend one to two hours in the 
early morning for this, and we provide the syllabus and curriculum. These schools are free, 
and open for all children in the locality, seven days a week. We try to educate the children 
with proper recitation of the Qur’an, basic Arabic, religious rulings that are appropriate for 
children, good moral character development through story-telling, basics of daily prayer and 
other Islamic rituals, and so on. We regularly communicate with the parents as well. We try to 
listen to their problems, and help them through consultations. Most of the children come from 
very poor families, whose parents are rickshaw-pullers, daily labourers, housemaids and even 
beggars. There are some children from the solvent families as well. They go to the general 
schools. However, some of the poor children remain there after the Maktab-time, and we 
appoint another teacher to teach them basic writing, reading and math. These venues are 
called Child Education Centres. Among the approximate 30 Maktabs we organize in this city, 
there are 6 such Child Education Centres currently operating. There is another program that 
we organize on a regular basis. Each year, we organize at least two training programs for all 
the teachers from all of our educational institutes. We listen to their problems, experiences 
and expectations, and we motivate them to instil Islamic values into the students. While 
talking to you about our charity medical and educational services, I feel a need for organizing 
such a program for our doctors and other medical staff. Unfortunately, we don’t have 
anything like that for them. I know that they, along with the environment of our medical 
centres, encourage the patients to learn and practise Islam. But a training program might make 
it more effective. (Interviewed in the ISWCC Office on 27th December 2012) 
Regarding charitable educational services, one of the local Jama’at leaders, a school teacher 
by profession, said in his interview:  
In many cities, the Jama’at started their work through educational activities, in the early days 
after independence. For instance, in my home city Bandarban87, this is literally true. Before 
being involved in any political activities, the then president of the Jama’at in Bandarban City 
was a school teacher. He, along with some like-minded friends, started an orphanage and a 
religious primary school where many homeless children got refuge. There were many 
children living on the streets, their parents, or one of them, having died at the hands of the 
rebel group ‘Shanti-Bahini’, and they had no one. These people collected funds from the rich 
class, and from the Middle-East, and now they are operating three orphanages in the 
                                                            
87 Bandarban is a hill-tract city under the greater Chittagong division, situated around 46 km from Chittagong 
CBD.  
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Bandarban area. This morning I met a person who grew up in such an orphanage there, and 
now works in the IIUC as a lecturer. He has a wife and two children. I remember him being 
taken out literally from a roadside paddy field to an orphanage run by the Jama’at. 
(Interviewed in his school office in Chittagong on 28th January 2013) 
 
FINANCIAL AID 
One of the major outlets of the welfare activities of the Jama’at is through providing one-off 
financial aid to people in need. The city committee of the Jama’at has 18 local units, which 
are called Thana. According to the Jama’at city secretary, each Thana spends 40 per cent of 
its collected funds for welfare purposes in its own locality. This amount is usually around 
20,000 Bangladeshi taka (BDT) per month, which equals around 300 US dollars (USD). For 
some Thanas the amount would reach up to 50,000 BDT (around 700 USD) every month. 
Apart from occasional welfare distribution, most of this fund is spent through direct financial 
aid to the poor. Additionally, the city office of the Jama’at also spends a minimum of 200,000 
BDT (around 3,000 USD) every month in providing people with direct financial aid (Shafiul 
Azim,88 a city Jama’at leader, interviewed in Chittagong city Jama’at office on 16th 
November 2012).  
This financial aid is given under various conditions. Qard-e-Hasana (unconditional 
loan) is highly encouraged through the party study materials and activities. A person in need 
of a large amount of money, usually for the marriage of one of his or her children, or for 
setting up a small business, or for the medical treatment of a long-term severe illness, would 
receive this loan without any interest or time limit imposed. Most importantly, it would be 
forgiven and forgotten if the person were unable ever to repay it. Also, any poor person in 
need can apply to the Jama’at city office or local offices for Sadaqah (lit. donation), which is 
                                                            
88 This name is fictitious to maintain confidentiality. 
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an one-off non-refundable financial aid. After assessing the application, the Jama’at usually 
gives 2,000 to 5,000 taka, according to the situation. A city Jama’at leader elaborated this:  
Our financial aid is primarily of two types, sadaqah and qard-e-hasana. Many receivers will 
never be able to return that loan, they are really poor. In some cases, we simply waive it after 
a long time. Some return it after they get better in business or job. Sadaqah is consistently 
given to random poor people every month. However, qard-e-hasana is encouraged more 
within us. This is an important Islamic tradition as well... many of our people are not very 
poor, they are from lower middle class or middle class. They don’t want to receive donation, 
but sometimes some of them fall in dire financial need. In those cases, we manage personal 
loans from our own people if the payback is guaranteed. Sometimes we raise fund to provide 
loan if it’s long term or uncertain, considering the financial condition of the receivers. In 
some rare and important cases, we provide that loan from party fund as well. All these 
decisions are made after much discussion in the relevant committee (Interviewed in 
Chittagong city Jama’at office on 16th November 2012).  
Table 5 shows the reports of financial aid provision by Chittagong City Jama’at, including all 
34 Thanas under the city office, in 2010 and 2011.  
Table 5: Financial aid given by the Jama’at city office89 
Name 2010 (in BDT) 2011 (in BDT) 
Qard-e-Hasana (unconditional loan) 9,757,156  9,279,515 
One-off financial aid 2,996,064 7,287,000 
One-off financial aid particularly for 
medical treatment purposes 
96,517 711,277 
 
The ISWCC office also carries out this task regularly, alongside the Jama’at city office and 
local units. In ISWCC, this financial aid is collected through zakat (Islamic alms) and spent 
on people who are eligible to receive zakat according to Islamic rulings. Table 6, below, 
shows the areas where the ISWCC contributed and the number of people who benefitted 
during the period from 1977 to 2003. The individual amount of aid is not mentioned in this 
                                                            
89 Based on Annual Welfare Report of Chittagong city Jama’at, 2011 and 2012.  
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report. However, it was understood during the fieldwork that, currently, each applicant would 
usually receive 4,000 to 5,000 BDT, an amount which is certainly greater than it would have 
been in the early years.  
Table 6: Number of recipients of one-off financial aid from the ISWCC90 
Cause of need for financial 
assistance 
Number of recipients  
Total Number 
1977–2002 2003 
Medical treatment  4,987 110 5,097 
Marriage 1,763 120 1,883 
Students’ admission and 
exam fees 
939 36 975 
Monthly scholarship for 
poor students 
315 16 331 
House renovation 997 31 1,026 
Supporting converted 
Muslims 
706 11 717 
Burial of unclaimed bodies 110 11 121 
Miscellaneous 1,023 65 1,086 
 
One of the Jama’at leaders explained when and where usually this financial aid is provided 
by saying:  
Most of financial aid, in fact, goes either for education or medical purposes. This money is 
given in extreme emergency situation, and when we are able to verify the facts of those 
applicants. For instance, a student can’t pay the fees of their final exam, or a person can’t pay 
the charges of their medical surgery in a government hospital, we provide support for them… 
to the extent of our ability… I can give you one example. Few months ago, once I was 
travelling to my office by Rickshaw. I noticed that the rickshaw-puller was a very young boy, 
and his speech was somehow different than the usual rickshaw-pullers. We talked, and I came 
to know that he passed the SSC (Secondary School Certificate) exam from Bakalia (an inner-
suburb in Chittagong city) High School. He was working to save money for his college 
admission fee. I told him to contact our local unit president; I also talked to him (local unit 
president). They talked to his father and some teachers, and eventually the local Jama’at unit 
gave him 3 thousand taka for that admission fee… I’ve just remembered one incident. Last 
year, I was sitting in our city office and some people brought a foreigner to our city president 
                                                            
90 Based on Annual Reports of the ISWCC, 1977 – 2003.  
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after Asr (afternoon) prayer (Chittagong city Jama’at office complex includes a mosque in its 
ground floor). He was an overseas student from Nepal, studying in Dhaka. He came to visit 
Chittagong, some hijackers robbed him in a street near to our office. He was Hindu, and it 
was a sad incident that a guest was robbed in our city. However, the city office gave him 
some money. He was very happy that he can go back to his university in Dhaka. He didn’t 
know anything about us, some random people from the locality brought him there. This 
shows that people know they can get help from us in case of emergency (Interviewed in 
Chittagong city Jama’at office on 5th January 2013).  
 
MATERIAL SUPPORT 
One of the welfare activities of the Jama’at is to provide the underprivileged with material 
support from time to time. This includes several types of aid, including warm clothes and 
blanket distribution during the winter season, clothes distribution during the Eid al-Fitr 
(religious festival at the end of Ramadan), sacrificed meat and food distribution during the 
Eid al-Adha (annual religious festival when the animals are sacrificed) and distribution of 
sewing machines among widows and other poor women (A city Jama’at leader, Interviewed 
in the city Jama’at office on 16th November 2012).  
During the fieldwork, I was able to attend all four of the above-mentioned programs, 
organized both by the Jama’at, under its own its name, and the ISWCC as well. These 
programs are organized through a system that has been developed through years of practice. 
Local Jama’at activists receive the budget estimation from their city office, or the ISWCC 
office, or the local offices and visit the slums prior to the program, where they communicate 
with their contact people, make announcements, assess the situation of the potential 
recipients, make lists of those receiving aid at the upcoming event and give them coupons 
with a serial number. According to the annual reports of the Chittagong City Jama’at, in 2011 
the party distributed 4,535 blankets, 10,334 items of winter clothing and 17 sewing machines 
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(Annual Welfare Report of Chittagong City Jama'at, 2012). The amount of clothes and food 
distributed during the yearly religious festivals was not mentioned in the annual report. 
However, around 100 people received clothes on the occasion of the 2013 Eid al-Fitr in 
Bakalia Thana, when I was present. I was told by a city Jama’at official that a total number of 
15 Thanas organized such programs on the evening before that day. In addition, the ISWCC 
also organizes similar programs on these occasions. According to its annual report, it 
distributed 32 sewing machines and 2,650 articles of winter clothing in 2012 (Annual Report 
of the ISWCC, 2013).  
Most of the interviewees from the Jama’at and the ISWCC mentioned several types of 
material support provided by their organizations. The ISWCC organizers emphasized their 
sewing machine distribution program. Large sewing machines are expensive in Bangladesh 
and a person can generally earn their family’s day-to-day expenses by working with this. 
These machines are usually given to the poor females, many of whom are widows and in 
most cases, recommended by local Jama’at leaders. On the other hand, the Jama’at leaders 
mostly discussed clothes and food distribution programs. A Jama’at leader elaborated this by 
saying:  
We provide a lot of support for poor people, in every city. I can talk more about my home 
town Rangamati91, every week at least one hundred poor families receive something random 
from Rangamati Jama’at office. People are very poor in that underdeveloped hilly area. We 
give them clothes, rice, lentils, baby food, blankets. You will always find something in 
Rangamati office. I know that we can’t help much, but at least we give few kilograms of rice 
when some starving families come to our office. We are a political party, not an NGO. We try 
to give instant support, our resources are primarily employed in our political and 
organizational activities. The ISWCC is dedicated for social welfare activities, so they can 
organize sustainable support where they will be able to follow up (Interviewed in Chittagong 
on 8th October 2012).   
                                                            
91 A major hill district in Chittagong division, located 77 km north of Chittagong city.  
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During the fieldwork, I attended clothes and food distribution programs organized by 
different local units of Chittagong city Jama’at. The last ten days of the month of Ramadan, 
followed by the Eid day, are considered most important times for religious charity in Islam. I 
was present at the events where the Jama’at distributed food such as rice, semai (a particular 
sweet food item of local culture that is cooked for the Eid festival) and clothes among the 
poor people. I also witnessed winter clothes and blanket distribution programs. Local units of 
the Jama’at organize campaigns to collect second hand clothes and blankets and then 
distribute them among the homeless people in the streets at nighttime.  
 
RELIEF DISTRIBUTION 
Bangladesh is a country prone to natural disasters and with underdeveloped infrastructures. 
Since independence in 1971, the country has endured five major cyclones, five great floods, 
ten tornados and several earthquakes and landslides. In all of those disasters, thousands died 
and millions lost their homes and everything they had. Additionally, accidental fires in slums 
are commonplace every year. Due to the deficiency in natural disaster management and the 
lack of government resources, NGOs and international aid organizations play a major role, 
even proportionately bigger than that of the government itself, in relief distribution after each 
of these natural disasters. Other political parties also attempt to reach out to the poor at these 
times. The Jama’at members are noted for their relief distribution during natural disasters, as 
they are generally known to be corruption free due to their religious attachment, whereas 
most regular politicians are known to extract profit from the situation and get rich during 
these times.  
According to the annual reports of the ISWCC, the organization distributed relief 
among 13,576 people between 1977 and 2002, and 649 people in 2003, all of whom were 
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victims of various natural disasters (Annual reports of the ISWCC, 1977 – 2003). After the 
cyclone of 1991, the ISWCC organized a massive relief distribution, house renovation 
program and medical treatment for the wounded, provided by several mobile medical teams. 
This effort was funded jointly by several national and international organizations, such as 
Rabita al-Alam Islami of Saudi Arabia, International Islamic Relief Organization of Kuwait, 
ISRA of Sudan, Muslim Aid of UK, Islamic Relief London, Al Faisal Foundation of KSA 
and Islami Bank Bangladesh Foundation. The ISWCC also organized large-scale medical 
support for the Rohinga Muslim refugees in 1992, who migrated to Bangladesh due to ethnic 
cleansing and communal riots in neighbouring Myanmar (An ISWCC leader, interviewed in 
the ISWCC office on 27th December 2012). According to the annual report of the Jama’at, the 
party distributed 2,380 pieces of clothing and 300,000 taka among fire victims in different 
slums in 2011 (Annual Welfare Report of Chittagong city Jama'at, 2012).  
Both the Jama’at and the ISWCC organize numerous relief distribution programs 
around the year. After any natural disaster, it is a common scenario that the Jama’at people 
provide relief support in the affected areas. All interviewees discussed their experience of 
participating in relief distribution programs organized by the party, almost all of them 
mentioned the relief work carried out in Chittagong after the great cyclone of 1991. Older 
leaders recounted the experience of relief work after the 1969 cyclone as well. Besides, every 
year the party organizes several relief distribution programs when a slum is burnt by fire. It is 
a regular incident in Bangladesh. I have attended such relief distribution programs during the 
fieldwork where I informally talked with the recipients to inquire about their situation. Some 
of their slum houses were burnt completely and the food and clothes provided by the Jama’at 
were certainly great support for them. 
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CONCLUSION 
The social welfare provision of the Jama’at is predominantly of two kinds: regular and 
irregular welfare programs. The regular welfare program comprises charity religious schools 
and medical centres, and the irregular welfare program is carried out through financial and 
material assistance on various occasions. The regular program is organized through a sister 
organization, Islamic Social Welfare Council Chittagong (ISWCC). Although the ISWCC 
administers various irregular welfare activities, such as relief distribution and financial 
assistance provision, most of these activities are conducted by the mother organization, the 
Jama’at.  
The social welfare program of this movement is administered through a complex but 
systematic and bureaucratic structure. It was understood, during the fieldwork, that the 
structure has long been established and the providers do not pay much attention to its 
development. This will be further clarified through analysis of relevant data. The following 
chapter will analyse the empirical data of this research, in order to understand the reasons for 
this welfare phenomenon and its existing outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 8: SOCIAL WELFARE OF THE JAMA’AT: THE 
ANALYSIS 
This chapter aims to analyse the emergence and existence of the social welfare program of 
Jama’at-e-Islami in Bangladesh, in light of two social movement theories: resource 
mobilization theory and political process theory. The chapter assesses the views of the service 
providers and receivers, ascertained through interviews and focus group discussions. Further, 
it includes other crucial findings garnered through participant observation during the 
fieldwork.  
In brief, this chapter reflects and reviews data obtained through communicating with 
the service providers and the recipients of the Jama’at’s social welfare provision in 
Chittagong City, through interviews, focus group discussions and through participant 
observation that includes informal conversations. The primary goal was to understand the 
roles played by the actors at different levels in this collective action and their relationships 
with each other and to explore the objectives of this welfare provision, along with its 
outcomes. To achieve this goal, the study attempts to understand participants’ responses, 
including their aspirations, experiences, frustrations, achievements and expectations. Finally, 
a critical analysis of participants’ perspectives, supported by the ethnography presented in the 
previous chapter, will provide answers, in a holistic fashion, to the research question of why 
and how this particular welfare phenomenon exists in Bangladesh.  
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FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  
The primary research question of this study has two parts. The study attempts to explore the 
reasons responsible for the existence of the Jama’at’s welfare programs. In other words, it 
aims at an understanding of why a religion-based political party has engaged in systematic 
welfare provision in a Muslim majority secular state. Additionally, this study seeks to 
explicate the outcomes of this social welfare provision, for instance, what the Jama’at, as a 
political party providing welfare, has achieved through these welfare programs in the last four 
decades.  
These two aspects of the research question need to be studied in an interlinked manner 
and they therefore require a framework involving a synthesis of two social movement 
theories. The second part, the outcomes and current condition of the party’s welfare 
programs, has mostly been described through the ethnographic study presented in the 
previous chapter. An analytical exploration of this aspect requires resource mobilization 
theory. As was elaborated in Chapter 5, on the theoretical framework of this thesis, resource 
mobilization theory argues that the collective action, and the movement’s prosperity or 
failure, are essentially associated with its maneuvering of tangible and intangible resources. 
According to John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, “the resource mobilization approach 
emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena. It examines 
the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkage of social movements to other 
groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used 
by authorities to control or incorporate movements” (Mccarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1213). The 
outcome achieved by this welfare provision will be explored by analysing the experiences of 
the people associated with it, either through organizing aid or through receiving it. Here, 
people, or the actors of this collective action, are regarded as the primary resource of the 
movement. The services offered through this organization will also be examined, as the 
208 
secondary resources. Combining insights gained from these two perspectives will clarify the 
current situation of this party’s social agenda in Bangladesh. The Jama’at, as a religion-based 
political party, certainly needs the popular support of the welfare receiving poor that it can 
gain through organizing these services. This study’s analysis of resource usage will also 
reveal to what extent reality has met this expectation. Answers to the second part of the 
research question will be achieved through discussing, with participants, the following 
themes: providers and clients of these services and their experiences; the religious, political 
and economic influences these services have on people’s lives.  
Many social scientists argue that the success or failure of a social movement depends 
not only on its resource mobilization, but also on its methods of negotiating with the current 
political elements, such as the state or the government, of the society. Resource mobilization 
theory thus emphasizes various aspects of the political process, such as the consequences that 
political opportunities, or ‘breaks’, have for the movement, or the organization of the 
movement’s structure. The operational method of the Jama’at’s social welfare activities was 
explored in the previous ethnographic chapter. Following on from that, the major theme here 
encompasses the motives, management strategies and experiences of the providers of these 
social welfare programs. A critical review of this theme will seek to elucidate the first part of 
the research question: the reasons behind the Jama’at’s organizing social welfare provision in 
Bangladesh.  
 
MOTIVES AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PROVIDERS  
Political parties are generally concerned about the social situation and they are expected to 
work towards socio-economic development. Apart from this general expectation, Islamic 
political parties, in various countries throughout the world, have attracted attention from 
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socio-political observers due to their contribution to and participation in social welfare 
activities. The major aims of this research are to explore the motives behind and objectives of 
the Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami’s welfare activities. A comparative discussion of the 
managing strategies of this welfare provision is necessary to give an understanding of the 
implementation and effects of these objectives. 
The 19 interviewees in the study who were instrumental in providing social welfare 
services represented a range of different classes and ranks among the Jama’at members: 
leaders, intellectuals, activists, office staff, doctors and teachers. All said that religious 
obligation was the primary reason behind their involvement in these social welfare programs. 
Most of them replied simply that it is an obligation imposed by Allah, and that the Jama’at, as 
an Islamic party, has to be involved in this cause. This same motivation is evident in replies 
such as: ‘to satisfy Allah’; ‘this is an integral part of Islam as shown by the practical 
examples in Prophetic life’; and ‘this is a duty set out in our religious texts in the Qur’an and 
Sunnah’.  
Of the 19 interviewees, 12 cited, in various terms, the motive of gaining acceptance 
among people through social welfare provision. One gave the example of zakat, saying that 
one of the Islamic objectives of distributing alms among the needy is to attract them to Islam. 
However, when asked about this objective, another person strongly denied that the party 
provides social welfare to gain popularity. The remaining 6 interviewees agreed that political 
gain played a part, and 3 of these argued that while the party does not work consciously to 
achieve this goal, it might come about as a natural consequence of its charity. They described 
how people receiving welfare help from the Jama’at often vote for other parties in national 
elections, and the party does not consider this a problem when selecting target recipients. On 
the other hand, one of the leaders clearly stated that when providing support under its own 
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name, the Jama’at unofficially seeks out people who are somehow associated with the party, 
or who support it politically. However, the welfare provision by the ISWCC is open to all, 
merely based on the needs of the people, without considering any socio-political background. 
Of the 19 interviewees, 10 also mentioned the objective of providing a service for mankind as 
a humanitarian responsibility that should be fulfilled collectively. According to a city Jama’at 
leader:  
Our objective is to satisfy Allah, as Muslims, by assisting people in need. It is our religious 
duty to serve the poor, to develop society and to practise our moral conscience according to 
the way shown by the Prophet. In order to make our society beautiful, peaceful and 
prosperous, we need to practise religious obligations and help each other. Political 
achievements will come naturally, but for the social welfare provision we focus fully on 
serving humanity. For political reasons, we have many other activities and tasks to do. 
(Interviewed in Dhaka on 24th and 25th September 2012) 
Most of the Jama’at leaders and activists engaged in welfare provision stressed the same 
sense of religious motivation and duty, directly based on religious obligation as ordained by 
Allah. One leader, however, explained this religious motivation from a different perspective. 
In his professional life, he works as an administrative executive in the social responsibility 
section of a large corporation. It seems that his involvement in social works administered by 
both the Jama’at and by general non-Jama’at and non-political organizations has given him a 
broad scope of thought and a pragmatic understanding. He integrated a realistic sense of 
humanitarian motivation with the theoretical aspect of religious obligation, thus:  
To me, our objectives for all social welfare tasks should be restoring human dignity. It is true 
that helping others is our duty as Muslims, but we do not understand why this duty was 
enacted by Islam. Whenever you read the Qur’an, you have to feel that every instruction 
given there is to restore honour and rights for the human beings in this world. In this aspect, 
Islam talks about human beings, not who is Muslim or who is not. All religions in the world, 
in fact, want to elevate the place of humans. To us, Islam is the best way to establish this 
honour. One of the biggest reasons why this honour is damaged is poverty. A person loses his 
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dignity when he cannot meet his own basic needs. Due to his poverty, debts, sickness, family 
and so on, he feels shame and neglected. Allah dislikes this situation for His slaves. 
Therefore, we have to work to restore him to his normal condition. We should not think that 
we are helping him by this work. Rather, we help ourselves here. Therefore, I, personally, try 
to encourage my fellow activists and friends to take the ‘rights-based’ approach in providing 
social welfare, instead of a ‘need-based’ one. (Interviewed in Dhaka on 12th October 2012) 
 
EXPERIENCES AND DIFFICULTIES 
While several interviewees agreed that the Jama’at might make political gains through social 
welfare provision to varying degrees, a few of them strongly opposed this claim, citing their 
experience in the field. One of the Jama’at leaders said: 
Vote calculation and political consideration in our country is different. Here, you should not 
expect political support by providing welfare. Most of them are very poor; you cannot 
imagine the hardship of their lives. You have tried to support them during the year, when they 
needed medical help or some financial aid, but everything changes overnight before the 
election-day. They receive 500 or 1,000 taka that night, and forget everything else. They 
forget the relief you have given to them, or the blanket or the food or even employment 
assistance. They have to buy food for the next day, and that money they receive is the most 
important thing for them at that moment. Besides, there are some other factors which also 
play roles in political elections. Sometimes they have to obey the leaders of their slum or local 
area. There is another thing, and I would say this is the most important thing here. The 
Jama’at is the third largest party of the country. While giving the vote, many think that the 
vote will be spoiled if it is given to the Jama’at, because they will not win. Then they vote for 
BNP if they are inclined towards Islam, or for Awami League if they are pro-secularism. This 
is a vicious circle which our party has not been able to break by gaining confidence among 
people. You can find hundreds of thousands of people who like us, but vote for either BNP or 
Awami League on election-day. (Interviewed in his NGO office in Chittagong on 27th January 
2013) 
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This motive of achieving practical gain was explained from another perspective by 
Nazmuddin Maudud92, who, at 74 years of age, is one of the leading Islamic intellectuals of 
the country, a retired government secretary, author and political commentator and former 
activist in the student wing of the Jama’at during his student life.  
It is good that the Jama’at works for society for the sake of Allah. It is also true that there is a 
sense among everyone that doing social welfare works feels good, we will gain popularity, 
our acceptance will increase, and people will think that we are helpful. But it hasn’t actually 
happened like this in the case of the Jama’at. I would say this is due to our weakness in the 
management of preaching Islam. You will find numerous people in this country who are 
against Islam and against the Jama’at. How could it happen that such a great portion of the 
population do not like the Jama’at, let alone politically support it, after the party has been 
working in this country for 50 years? This means, we thought that we would be able to reach 
the people, but in reality, we did not. Social welfare should be an integrated part of Da’wah 
[calling towards Islam], not a separate agenda. If we had been able to do Da’wah effectively, 
the society would have become more developed and poverty reduced. Now, we are providing 
some money, or very basic temporary medical treatment. If you look into their problems, as 
an Islamic preacher, you cannot stop at that. You want to educate them about Islam, about the 
world. You are aware of the need for healthy living conditions for their family. This is real 
social welfare in Islam, and one aspect among many of Da’wah. (Interviewed in Dhaka on 
25th September 2012) 
While explaining the difficulties faced by the Jama’at in providing social welfare services, he 
also brought up the issue of the 1971 liberation war: 
Another major obstacle, that is confronting the Jama’at in gaining proper benefit from its 
social welfare provision, is the stigma attached to us due to the political stance taken by the 
party during the liberation war. Every country has its own setting. Egypt, Turkey, Palestine; 
all of these countries where Islamic movements are able to perform better social welfare have 
their own environments, backgrounds and obstacles. The setting in Bangladesh, as a result of 
the 1971 war, has proved fatal and damaging in the long run. Moreover, continuous 
propaganda by the Awami League and lying in the name of history in the media and the 
education curriculum have made the situation worse. Now, the Jama’at or any Islamic 
                                                            
92 This name is fictitious to protect confidentiality.  
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movement has to face severe fanaticism in this country in the coming days. If we do not 
modify or change our approach in all we do, including social welfare, we will be destined to 
failure. (Interviewed in Dhaka on 25th September 2012) 
In reviewing the welfare activities of the Jama’at, one of the party’s intellectual figures, who 
is also a university teacher, commented: 
There is a gap between the tasks we undertake and the reality in society. You will find the 
majority of the recipients of our charity are like most people, and do not pray regularly. How 
can you expect them to understand Islam and follow other religious and ethical obligations? If 
you tell someone to pray, he might pray twice or three times a day. But to make them do it 
regularly by themselves, you need to make a meaningful contribution in their thoughts and 
lives. Some secular and Christian NGOs are doing this, but we could not. Most of our schools 
are religious, where they learn to read the Qur’an. This is good, but what they will do after 
that? How will they survive in this society with honourable income after this? Do we really 
reach effectively to the lowest classes of society? They are struggling to survive, and we are 
busy with formalities such as taking pictures, submitting reports to the foreign donors, 
publishing news and so on. Islam does not punish first [for a crime], it gives the food first and 
then comes the punishment for any crime committed. We have a channel to reach to the daily 
labourer. This channel of social welfare was established five decades ago, but we have failed 
to develop it because we did not have the foresight, and we have failed to educate them. As a 
result, you will find them receiving occasional help from us, but knowing nothing about Islam 
which is actually able to give them their rights, not the Communism as many of them believe. 
(Interviewed in his university office in Chittagong on 9th October 2012) 
 
THE RECIPIENTS’ PERSPECTIVES 
The recipients of the social welfare program of the Jama’at fall into various categories. It was 
evident throughout the participant observation phase that the party provides welfare services 
to literally anyone, irrespective of their age, race, religion or any other personal traits. 
Therefore it is very common to find a Hindu woman as a patient waiting for medical 
treatment in one of the charity medical clinics which bears an ‘Islamic name’. It is also 
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commonplace to find non-Muslim poor people partaking in other occasional welfare 
programs organized by the Jama’at. However, the case of the charity schools is different. 
These are obviously known as religious schools where the students learn how to read the 
Qur’an and other basic Islamic knowledge as part of their curricula. Therefore, there are no 
non-Muslim students attending those schools.  
Regarding gender and age, religious schools certainly provide for young pupils. The 
Jama’at’s biggest religious charity school is Madrasah Abu Huraira. It has around 600 
students studying from the primary level up to the secondary level. Among them, around 100 
are students of Tahfiz, a different curriculum of study dedicated to memorizing the whole of 
the Qur’an. There are no female students in the Tahfiz section, but the general section has 
around 200 girls, which is two-thirds of the total number of pupils. Another charity school 
has 100 students, at the primary level only, 20 of whom are girls.  
Among the patients of the charity clinics, in a normal working day, it was observed 
that more than one-third were married females. However, many of them accompanied their 
infant babies and children. The political or ideological affiliation of the patients was not 
found to have any bearing on their eligibility for this sevice.. 
Darush Shefa is the most popular of the three charity clinics run by the ISWCC in 
Chittagong. It is situated in Chawkbazar, a bustling old suburb of the city which is generally 
known as the location of some famous schools and colleges and a university, as well as being 
a middle-class residential area. In terms of locality, meeting the needs of the low-income 
areas was not considered, the emphasis being on using a section of the city office building of 
the ISWCC for this clinic, in order to save establishment costs and to maximize its usage of 
the building. However, two big slums, Joynogor and Bakalia, are situated nearby and are 
populated predominantly by poor daily labourers, rickshaw-pullers and housemaids. The 
clinic in Chawkbazar only operates in the evenings, between 5pm and 8pm; anyone can visit 
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the doctor by paying a token amount of 20 taka, whereas the usual fee to visit a general 
practitioner in Chittagong is 300 taka or more. The clinic includes a small pharmacy where 
the prescribed medications are provided free of charge.  
The average number of patients seen in Darush Shefa on a normal day ranges from 15 
to 30. On any given day, during the period of fieldwork for this study, there were one or two 
patients who looked different from the others. It was clear from talking with them that they 
were from the middle class; most were small businessmen or workers in the government 
service, who lived in this same suburb but were trying to minimize their medical expenditure. 
In an interview one of them explained:  
I have bought a flat in this suburb. This is expensive and I am going to pay that debt for a long 
time. I know that some of my neighbours look down on me as I, and all of my family 
members, visit this clinic whenever we need basic medical treatment. However, they will not 
pay my debts, which are my personal responsibility. We visit other specialists if the doctor 
here refers us to them in more serious cases. Otherwise, the treatment for common diseases 
here is quite good, sometimes better than any government medical hospital. We have been 
living in the area for the last four years, and visiting this clinic for at least three years. My leg 
was burnt accidentally and now I come here once a week to get the dressing changed. I spend 
only 20 taka here, the doctor changes the dressing and the clinic provides me with the 
necessary ointment. If I went to a general practitioner, it would cost more than 500 taka every 
week. I am a diabetic and have to regularly buy insulin and medication. Therefore, I need to 
manage my medical expenditures and I don’t mind coming here at all. (Interviewed in a 
charity Clinic of the ISWCC on 17th January 2013) 
In this society there is clearly a sense of there being a social stigma connected with receiving 
charity services, as it is generally perceived that these services are for poor people. Although 
some people from the middle class and lower middle class visited the medical centres, they 
did not seem to be comfortable being there. One of these two medical centres, Darush Shefa, 
is well known in the city for carrying out cheap but skilled circumcision operations. 
(Circumcision is considered a religious obligation for young Muslim males.) Darush Shefa 
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takes 250 taka as a token charge for this minor surgery and in most cases even this is waived 
if the parents submit an application form claiming their financial inability to pay. Although, 
officially, this circumcision procedure is free in the government hospitals, in reality one has 
to pay at least 500 taka to the nurses and other staff in order to be seen and receive medicine 
on the earliest day possible. In the private clinics, this procedure costs 3,000 to 15,000 taka, 
depending on the quality and status of the clinic.  
One evening I saw a boy, aged about eight, who was crying. At first I thought this was 
because of his fear of the upcoming circumcision, but his father told me that his son wanted 
to get it done in a specific clinic, that charges around 5,000 taka. This man is a school teacher 
and paying that amount of money is difficult for him. Having to pay only 250 taka in Darush 
Shefa was a big relief and comfort to him. However, the boy’s cousin was circumcised in that 
private clinic and now the boy feels he will be ashamed in front of others when they learn he 
was circumcised in Darush Shefa. The father promised to give him something valuable as 
compensation. It came as somewhat of a surprise to me to witness how much social stigma is 
attached to this service, even in the mind of a very young child.  
Both from the above story and through informal conversations with other middle-
class patients, the degree to which social stigma is attached to receiving this medical welfare 
service was clear. However, none of the patients participating in the focus groups expressed 
such an attitude. In these groups there were eight female patients, mostly housemaids or 
housewives, all of whom lived in a nearby slum and in very poor economic conditions. Six of 
them were Muslims and two were Hindus. Although they discussed some problems they 
faced when receiving treatment in this clinic, they expressed overall gratitude and 
satisfaction, as this clinic provides them with the opportunity to receive basic medical 
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treatment at almost no cost. Hamida Begum93, is in her late thirties. She teaches children in 
the slum how to recite the Qur’an in Arabic and her husband is a rickshaw puller. She 
explained her situation:  
I first came here 12 years ago, when my newborn baby girl’s leg suddenly swelled up. We 
tried some Kabiraji medicines [local unconventional medical treatment based on herbs and 
plants] but it got worse. Then a neighbour directed us to this clinic. I believe that this was 
help from Allah, because otherwise my daughter’s leg might have been amputated eventually. 
Since then, my whole family, including my three daughters, two sons, husband and in-laws, 
visit this clinic whenever we need medical treatment. My monthly earnings are less than 
3,000 taka and my husband also doesn’t earn much. Most of it goes on the house-rent and 
education of our children. If this medical service was not available, we would have no 
alternative except visiting free government hospitals, which is a terrible experience (Focus 
group discussion by female patients of an ISWCC charity clinic on 6th November 2012).  
Another primary medical centre run by the ISWCC is situated in the suburb of Madarbari, 
home to people of very low income, mostly labourers in the transportation sector. This clinic 
provides homoeopathic treatment to anyone, completely free of charge. This is an alternative, 
non-scientific, medicine which is cheaper than general (allopathic) medicine. A doctor, who 
is also a local Jama’at leader, sees patients in this clinic every morning from 10am to 12pm 
and at night from 8pm to 10pm. According to him, this schedule is designed to suit the 
working hours of the labourers living in adjacent areas. The room has a table, chairs and a 
wall cabinet containing the homoeopathic ingredients. The doctor sees his patients and puts 
together the free homoeopathic medicines for them. The same room in which the clinic is run 
is also used as the office of the local Jama’at unit in the daytime and evening. The number of 
patients in a normal day is between 10 and 20. During my seven months of fieldwork, none 
of the patients in this charity clinic were solvent or from the middle class. Almost all went 
there with a fever, asthma or other chronic diseases that require long-term medication. I 
discussed their jobs, families and diseases with them through informal conversations and 
                                                            
93 This name is fictitious to protect confidentiality.  
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found most of them earned a monthly wage of 5,000 taka (around 70 USD) and lived in local 
slums or makeshift huts.  
A focus group was organized in which seven respondents participated, all of whom 
had children studying at one of the charity religious schools, the Madrasah Abu Huraira, run 
by the ISWCC. Religious schools, known as madrasah in Bangladesh, are usually considered 
inferior in educational standard to the general schools. Education in the religious schools 
usually does not assure students any mainstream job in the future. Rather, most of the 
graduates work as Imam (the appointed leader for the congregational prayer in the mosques) 
or as Muazzin (who are responsible for prayer call and mosque supervision), receiving a very 
minimal wage. It is a common social scenario in Bangladeshi society that the students of such 
religious schools come from underprivileged families. The case of Madrasah Abu Huraira 
fitted this scenario. As well as the many poor students, there were also fee-paying students 
from middle-class solvent families. The principal of the school informed me that around 150 
students out of a total of 700 pay for their tuition and boarding expenses, while the others 
study and live there completely free of charge. All parents participating in the focus groups 
were from low-income classes, living in nearby slums. One of them, aged 45, described his 
situation:  
I was a labourer in a steel mill, but I am not fit for work anymore after a long illness. My wife 
works as a housemaid and she carries the costs of our daily living. Our eldest son got 
admission to this school which was a great relief for us. Religious education is also important 
at this young age and I hope he will be accepted in mainstream college after completing his 
secondary education here, so that he will get a good job in the future (Focus group discussion 
by the guardians of children studying in an ISWCC charity school on 12th December 2012).  
No parents who were solvent accepted my request to be part of the focus group discussion, 
but some of them had informal conversations with me. All were aware of the probable future 
job problem for their children, but they felt that it was important for them to receive religious 
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and moral education so as to become good Muslims. As in the case of the father mentioned 
above, they hoped their children would go to mainstream colleges in the future and continue 
their studies in the general education system.  
Apart from these people who received medical and social welfare, recipients of other 
occasional welfare services organized by the Jama’at also shared their experiences. A 55 year 
old male, working as a security guard and living in the community centre where he works for 
a monthly salary of 3,500 taka (around 50 USD), occasionally received financial assistance 
from the Jama’at office. His wife, along with their four unmarried daughters, lives in his 
village and he had not been able to visit them in the three months prior to the interview. His 
salary was not enough to cover his family expenses and he was unable to work elsewhere due 
to his age. He was an enthusiastic activist of the Jama’at and known to the city Jama’at 
leaders for his participation in political activities. He puts in an application to the social 
welfare secretary of the city office of the Jama’at whenever he needs money. This could be 
for various reasons, such as costs associated with the education of his children, medical 
treatment for one of his family members or simply to repay a debt, and the Jama’at welfare 
secretariat helps him. According to his estimation, he usually receives 2,000 to 3,000 taka 
(about 40 USD) every two or three months. When asked, he claimed that this has never 
affected his relationship with the party, but he is grateful for this assistance (Interviewed in 
Chittagong city Jama’at office on 18th January 2013). The City Welfare Secretary of the 
Jama’at previously mentioned that the party’s city office helps around 15 such people on an 
irregular but continuing basis, who have financial problems primarily due to their advanced 
age. According to him, such cases would be found in every local units working under his 
party’s Chittagong city branch as well. He was also clear that this could not be considered as 
a basis of a relationship between the party and its needy activists, as these are special cases, 
and the party does not help all of its thousands of needy activists in a similar way. Rather, it 
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encourages them to find employment or other self-employment activities by which to earn 
money (Interviewed in a school office in Chittagong on 1st January 2013).  
Some welfare events have a bigger impact on recipients’ lives than others. For 
instance, a different type of welfare program was arranged by a sister organization of the 
Jama’at, the Islamic Labourers Welfare Organization (ILWO). On 15 January 2013, ILOW 
organized a mass wedding ceremony without the demand for a dowry. In Bangladeshi 
society, a marriage imposes a huge financial burden on families, especially the 
underprivileged. According to the local custom, the father of the bride usually gives a dowry 
– a large sum of money and other material things – to the bridegroom, as part of the marriage 
contract. Every year many women are tortured or even killed in Bangladesh because the 
bridegroom’s family is not satisfied with the quality or quantity of the dowry.  
ILWO has been organizing mass marriage programs annually, with the aim of 
abolishing this dowry tradition. Any couple, or their families, can register for this event, on 
the condition that there will be no dowry given in the marriage. ILWO conducts the 
formalities of the marriage and provides food for the guests in a big community centre. At 
this particular event, 30 couples were married on the same day. The program started at noon, 
and the traditional marriage lunch was served after an hour-long religious ceremony. The 
organization allowed me to run a focus group discussion, but for the bridegrooms only, as it 
was felt that the brides would probably not be suitable participants in the discussion on the 
day of their marriage, ‘due to their emotional state’. Eight bridegrooms participated in a focus 
group discussion; all of them were poor and needy, mostly working as daily labourers and 
rickshaw-pullers. 
All the recipients at other occasional welfare events which I attended, such as for the 
distribution of assistance for Eid (yearly religious festival) celebrations, for helping the 
victims of fire in a slum, for distributing winter clothes and giving sewing machines to 
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widows and women in need, were obviously very poor and members of the low class of 
society. Almost all of them were uneducated, struggling to meet the needs of their daily lives 
and not very active politically.  
 
RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE 
The Jama’at is a religion-based political party, well known in the country as being 
fundamentally affiliated with Islam. All party leaders and activists are practising Muslims. 
However, the welfare services of the party are available for everyone in need, irrespective of 
their religious or political affiliations. It was clearly apparent during the participant 
observation phase of this study, that the charity clinics and other occasional welfare activities 
of the Jama’at benefit poor people from other religions as well. At the same time, it was 
apparent during discussions that these services have varying degrees of influence on the 
religious mindset of the recipients.  
Among all the welfare services, one in particular, educational welfare, is only offered 
to Muslims. Although there is no official restriction against non-Muslims, the religious nature 
of the charity schools naturally excludes them. Two charity religious schools, run by the 
ISWCC in Chittagong, have between them more than 800 students. The major one, Madrasah 
Abu Huraira, has 700 students, among whom 60 are orphans. The school authority also runs 
an orphanage in the same compound, where orphan students live free of charge. The other 
charity school is still a small project with around 100 students, who specialize in memorizing 
the whole of the Qur’an.94 These religious schools have adopted a government approved 
religious education curriculum, almost half of which consists of general subjects such as 
                                                            
94 The educational system in Bangladesh is divided into two categories: mainstream education and religious 
education. The religious educational institutes are known as madrasahs. The madrasah system is also divided 
into two types: the Alia Madrasah and Qawmi Madrasah. The former is recognized by the government and the 
latter is independent in its administration and syllabus and known to be the more traditional of the two. 
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languages, grammar, history and science. The rest of the syllabus covers religious subjects 
such as the Qur’an, Hadith (Prophetic Traditions) and Fiqh (Islamic Law). For this reason it 
is highly unlikely that a non-Muslim student would study in such a school, and there are 
currently none who do. However, the principal of Madrasah Abu Huraira informed me that 
there were seven students whose parents had converted to Islam.  
The Jama’at follows a specific ideological trend in Islamic politics. Although there 
are several other political and non-political Islamic groups in Bangladesh, it is seen as a party 
that strives to establish Islam through the existing democratic political system. This political 
ideology is additional to its central religious ideology, in that being associated with the 
Jama’at implicitly implies being religious. However, being religious in Bangladeshi society 
does not necessary indicate an association with the Jama’at.  
The ideological influence of the party is developed in a person through regular 
participation in party activities, and, specifically, through reading the party syllabus, which 
mostly consists of books written by Mawdudi. This essential and inherent feature of the 
Jama’at creates an obstacle for the people from the lower classes of Bangladeshi society. 
Those who live below the poverty line mostly lack any education, even basic literacy. The 
Jama’at has some programs, such as study circles or sessions where their literature is read 
aloud to an audience, but those programs are very limited in number and scope. As a result, 
the lower echelons of Bangladeshi society are not generally aware of the ideological aspects 
of the Jama’at, but rather see it as just another political party, with an Islamic leaning.  
Although there was no evidence of any ideological influence of the party’s welfare 
provision among the patients of the charity medical service, in the case of the educational 
service the situation was slightly different. One of the fathers participating in the focus group 
discussion raised an interesting issue. He was a local factory worker and unable to afford the 
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cost of education for his children. He had two daughters and three sons, all attending different 
charity religious schools. He said:  
My youngest son who is studying here [Madrasah Abu Huraira, run by the Jama’at] is 
somehow different from my other sons. All of them are studying in the madrasah system, but 
this one doesn’t want to visit other people’s houses as a Talibul Ilm95, and reads some books 
which are not part of their madrasah syllabus. After the last election, he asked me why I had 
voted for the Awami League [the major secular party in Bangladesh]. In fact, I had received 
1,000 taka for doing so. He told me that I had committed a Haram [religiously forbidden 
deed] by doing this. He is only 15 years old, can you imagine that? (Focus group discussion 
by the guardians of children studying in an ISWCC charity school on 12th December 2012). 
As he said this, the father’s approvingly smiling face showed that he was proud of the stand 
taken by his son. This stand was an indication that the students studying in those charity 
schools might become politically and ideologically aware. Reading books other than the 
regular school syllabus is also a very rare practice among poor Bangladeshi families. The 
father was not able to say what types of books these were, but there is a strong possibility that 
the abovementioned young student had adopted the habit of reading Islamic literature from 
his madrasah.  
The environment and daily activities of these schools are highly religious in nature. 
The students are visibly identifiable by their Islamic attire. The teachers and other staff 
working in these schools have religion uppermost in their minds in determining everything 
associated with the institutions. Therefore, the religious influence of these institutes is firmly 
established in the lives of their students. 
However, it is different in the case of the recipients of charity medical services and 
other occasional welfare services. During my periods of participant observation in these 
                                                            
95 This is a local religio-traditional practice where the students and teachers of the religious schools are invited 
to a person’s house on specific occasions, such as the anniversary of an elder’s death, or with the hope of 
recieving help in overcoming troubles in business. They go to the house, recite some chapters of the Qur’an, 
pray a special prayer and finally have dinner. This practice is considered unacceptable Bid’ah (ritualistic 
innovation) by many Muslims.  
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medical clinics, the presence of women wearing traditional Hindu shindur on the forehead, a 
symbol of their marital status, was a regular phenomenon. Among the eight women patients 
who participated in the focus group discussions, two were Hindus, although the 
advertisement seeking participants for these discussions mentioned no religious criteria. They 
came to the discussion groups voluntarily, after selection on a random basis, and their 
participation and opinion sharing were completely natural.  
The religious identity of these two women was immediately apparent, due to their 
appearance and names. This having been noted and a friendly atmosphere established, I asked 
them whether I could ask a question which might be of a sensitive nature. They agreed, so I 
asked them how they felt about being receiving help from an organization which bears the 
name of Islam. Everyone in the participant group smiled and one of the Hindu women 
replied:  
You don’t have to be so wary in asking about this. It is not a sensitive issue here. I have been 
a patient here for at least the last five years. Whenever it is necessary, my husband, two 
daughters and one son also come here for their treatment. My father-in-law also used to come 
here, but he died a couple of years ago. My mother-in-law is a very traditional Hindu; she 
doesn’t visit any Muslim doctor. But she never complains either when we visit this centre. 
This is because the service is almost free and they give the medicine for free as well. My 
house is located very nearby, so we can walk here. Almost all Hindu people from our slum 
come here for medical treatment, if it is not a severe illness. In case of bigger issues, we go to 
the government hospitals, and that is the same for the Muslims here (Focus group discussion 
by female patients of an ISWCC charity clinic on 6th November 2012).  
This woman is 40 years old and illiterate but clever and works as a maid in several houses. 
Her husband is a rickshaw-puller. She looked at the other Hindu woman and asked jokingly: 
“Have you ever felt that they are trying to convert us?” Then everyone laughed again. From 
the whole conversation it was perfectly clear that the question of religious identity was not a 
hindrance to receiving the benefits of this medical welfare service.  
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On another occasion, I was present at a relief distribution event for victims of a fire in 
Bakalia, a western suburb of Chittagong. This was a slum where more than 100 makeshift 
huts were burnt in one night. Most of them had housed families of rickshaw-pullers, daily 
labourers and housemaids, who lost almost all of their belongings in the accident.  
The Jama’at branch of that local area organized a relief distribution program and the 
President and General Secretary of the city committee went there to distribute aid among the 
victims. This lasted for around two hours in the afternoon. After short speeches by both 
visitors from the city committee, as well as the President of the local Jama’at unit, they 
distributed clothes, blankets, baby food, bags of rice and some other food items among the 
people. I observed that it was all very organized, in that every person had a piece of paper 
which he or she gave to a local Jama’at activist standing besides the guests, who then picked 
up the things to be given to that person, according to what was written on the paper. The 
victims of the fire then joined a queue to meet the visitors, who formally gave them the aid 
allotted to them. Of about 200 victims receiving help from the Jama’at leaders, I found at 
least 10 women identifiable as Hindus by the religious symbols they wore. An old man also 
wore dhuti, a traditional Hindu male dress, although it is rarely seen nowadays. 
During the program, the City Secretary of the Jama’at had introduced me to the local 
unit President as an external researcher. After the event ended, I asked him if he would clarify 
some things for me. He explained that the local activists of the Jama’at had prepared a list of 
potential assistance recipients before the event took place. All victims were given some help 
in accordance with the number of their family members, especially children, and their 
financial situation. The President assured me that no political or religious factors were taken 
into consideration when making up this list, as everyone had been equally affected by the 
fire. He also told me that there were other male Hindu and Buddhist recipients who could not 
be identified as non-Muslim by their appearance. He estimated that around 20 of the 200 or 
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so people were non-Muslim, and stated that religious identity is never looked at by the 
Jama’at when organizing such mass charity events.  
For the recipients of the welfare services, their relationship with the Jama’at does not 
correlate with their religious lives. Although it does not represent the best way to measure a 
person’s religiosity, regular prayer is generally considered an indication of a practising 
attachment to Islam. Among the recipients, those who are activists of the Jama’at, or who 
practise Islam from their own personal motivation, are found to pray regularly. Only two of 
the eight female patients who participated in the focus groups said that they regularly pray 
five times a day, and both were active supporters of the Jama’at. One said that she prayed 
every day, but not all five prayers. She expressed no interest in politics. The other three 
patients, who had received benefits from the Jama’at’s charity clinic for years, said that they 
prayed occasionally. During a focus group discussion with the bridegrooms, concerning the 
dowry-less marriage program, it was discovered that only one of them prayed regularly, and 
he was also active in the local Jama’at unit. None of the other seven had regular prayer 
habits, nor did they have any relationship with the Jama’at, other than receiving occasional 
welfare. One of them explained when this topic came up:  
I work on construction sites as a daily labourer. It is not easy for me to pray regularly, 
although I know that I should. I try to go to the Friday prayer, if I’m not working that day. My 
wife recites the Qur’an every day and she has memorized many chapters of it. I can’t read the 
Qur’an. I came to know about this organization through our local councilman Mr Mahbub [a 
Jama’at leader]. He runs a Qur’an recitation teaching course in our local mosque, but I just 
don’t get time to do anything after work. (Focus group discussion by the bridegrooms of a 
dowry-less mass marriage program in Chittagong on 5th December 2012) 
In summary, it is clear that family background and personal viewpoint are active elements in 
some recipients’ being more religious than others. All of them identified themselves as 
Muslims and asserted that they had the intention to pray regularly, but they presented 
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common social excuses for not being a practising Muslim, such as current difficulties in their 
lives or intending to pray, later, in old age. Similarly, among all those who received 
occasional social welfare provided by the Jama’at, there was no perceivable religious 
influence exerted by these service providers, nor did the recipients feel obliged to be religious 
in their personal lives. However, the recipients who were also actively associated with the 
party activities had a different perspective. For them, their association with the Jama’at, in its 
political and social ideology, brought certain demands of religious practice in almost every 
aspect of their lives.  
 
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS 
During this period of observation, a good trusting relationship was developed between the 
regular service recipients and the researcher. In addition, valuable information and insights 
were acquired through informal conversations with the recipients of occasional welfare 
provision. At this time, a curious fact about the recipient class came to light. It is a common 
assumption that people who receive social welfare services provided by the Jama’at are 
generally supporters of the party, or at least are favourably inclined towards it. However, this 
did not always prove to be the case. Among the recipients, there were even supporters of the 
Awami League, the party which is ideologically and politically the arch-rival of the Jama’at. 
Despite this, it appeared that as a result of those charity events, the Jama’at had gained a 
higher moral standing, in the eyes of the recipients, by providing assistance. For instance, one 
of the Awami League supporters asked for and received financial help from the Jama’at city 
office that helped him pay part of the SSC (Secondary School Certificate) exam registration 
fees for his young son. During a focus group discussion, he told me that he feels good as a 
Muslim receiving help from a religious party, but at the same time, he supports the Awami 
League politically because he sees it as better fitted to run the country.  
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While these welfare services are available for anyone, and various types of people 
were found among the recipients, some steps are taken by the party administration so that 
people associated with the party will benefit. During my interview with one of the City 
Jama’at leaders, he informed me that a large portion of the party’s welfare budget is spent on 
offering personal financial help. He explained:  
We receive a lot of applications every week. We cannot help everyone according to their 
need, due to insufficient funds. For instance, a poor person may need 80,000 taka for surgery. 
We may give him, based on his application, 5,000 or 10,000 taka. Or someone needs a lot of 
money for his or her marriage, so we try to contribute by giving 3,000 or 5,000 taka. These 
sums do not completely meet their need but contribute to it. As we have hundreds of such 
cases in any given month at the city level, we cannot satisfy someone fully and neglect others. 
Besides, the units are also helping people at the local suburb levels. Those applications come 
to us primarily with recommendations from the local Jama’at activists. However, if someone 
comes directly to our city office with an application, whether they are associated with the 
party or not, and if we later find out through investigation by the Jama’at activists in their 
local areas that the case is valid and they really need help, we never stop helping them based 
on the fact that they didn’t come through our party channel. Rather, our help is open to 
anyone who is in need of it. (Interviewed in Chittagong city Jama’at office on 16th November 
2012) 
Overall, it was clear that a large number of the people who come to the party office seeking 
direct financial help are either Jama’at activists, or sympathizers of the party. On the other 
hand, people who receive welfare services through different public outlets, such as the charity 
medical centres and schools, or the sister organizations of the Jama’at, fall into a different 
category. Their political association with or sympathy for the party, or even their religious 
identity, is not a factor.  
During the focus group discussion among the bridegrooms who participated in the 
dowry-less mass marriage organized by the ILWO, it was revealed that one of them, aged 22, 
was actively associated with the political party, the Awami League, which is the major rival 
of the Jama’at in Bangladeshi politics. Another was not politically minded, but had voted for 
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the Awami League in the previous election because he had received 1,000 taka from the local 
Awami League members. Among the remaining bridegrooms, only one was actively 
associated with the Jama’at. The other seven participants supported and voted for the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is in a coalition with the Jama’at and therefore 
the rival of the Awami League.  
With reference to his political orientation, the bridegroom associated with the Awami 
League said:  
I voted for the Boat [symbol of Awami League in the national election]. I like them as they 
are the party who brought us independence from Pakistan. They are also powerful in our area. 
When I heard about this dowry-less marriage program, it was the first time I had heard about 
this organization. They are doing good things. Some of my friends told me that it is run by the 
Jama’at. Then I consulted with Mr. Mahbub. He is our local councilman and an Awami 
League leader. He told me that there is no problem if my marriage takes place at this event. I 
work in a salvage shop and I can’t afford to conduct a huge ceremony for my marriage. It is a 
good thing that my relatives went there and had good food. The organization [ILWO] also 
gave us 10,000 taka and wedding clothes. My father is also happy because the local imam 
told him that the dowry is not part of our religion. (Focus group discussion by the 
bridegrooms of a dowry-less mass marriage program in Chittagong on 5th December 2012) 
This conversation made it clear that although this young man was aware that the program was 
organized by people associated with the Jama’at, he did not consider that receiving services 
from them would harm his political convictions. Moreover, the local Awami leader allowed 
him to do so.  
Similar stories were told by the patients of the medical services. Of the 12 female 
participants of the focus group discussion, 3 said that they had voted for the Awami League 
in the previous election, 4 had voted for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and only 1 for the 
Jama’at. The other 4 participants had not voted, claiming they were not interested in politics.  
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ECONOMIC INFLUENCE 
People need welfare assistance when they are unable to meet their minimum living 
requirements by themselves. Many industrialized countries are welfare states, providing care 
to their citizens to varying degrees. Although Bangladesh has a governmental welfare 
mechanism in place to provide for its citizens, as an underdeveloped country it is unable to 
cover the real needs of its people. In this densely populated country of 170 million people, 26 
per cent of the population lives below the national poverty line of USD 2 per day.  
Bangladeshi society is home to several types of welfare and charitable works. NGOs 
run on foreign funding can be found all over the country, in addition to a myriad of religious 
charities. However, the Jama’at is different from these others, as it is predominantly a 
political party which emphasizes welfare activities, with its religious affiliation adding a 
further dimension.  
It is evident that most of the welfare activities of the Jama’at, while making some 
contribution to the recipients’ lives, do not fully satisfy their medical or educational needs. 
Medical needs, for example, are ongoing and a person might require assistance at various 
times in his or her life. Although they have been in operation for three decades, the two 
charity clinics run by the Jama’at in Chittagong are not up to a satisfactory standard. Despite 
their history and the demand for their services, they still offer only basic healthcare. Although 
medicines are provided by the clinics, patients have to buy medicines elsewhere if they are 
expensive and not the conventional ones. In cases of any serious disease or the need for major 
treatment, the patients are forced to go elsewhere.  
The charity schools make some positive contributions to their students’ lives. Several 
people to whom I spoke had studied in those schools and are now solvent thanks to their 
various occupations. However, such cases are not commonplace, and there are other former 
students who work in low-paying jobs. This circumstance has arisen because of the socio-
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economic situation of Bangladesh, as the students of religious schools do not have many 
opportunities in the job market there. Moreover, there is an apparent negligence on the part of 
the Jama’at to maintain and develop the educational welfare activities.  
 Other occasional welfare activities, such as one-off financial donations, are mostly 
partial and temporary solutions to the problems of the recipients. The most sustainable project 
of the Jama’at is the distribution of sewing machines to needy women. This usually takes 
place once a year and from 10 to 15 sewing machines are distributed on each occasion. Apart 
from this program, the Jama’at provides partial financial help with costs of marriage 
ceremonies, business capital, house renovations, examination fees and other major needs of 
poor people. The sum provided to each person usually amounts to 10 to 30 per cent of the 
total required to meet the need. 
Some other welfare activities are conducted following major natural disasters or 
accidental events. Winter clothes distribution or relief distribution among the victims of 
floods, for example, provides temporary support to many people in severe distress. This 
assistance is not intended to improve their economic condition or to make sustainable 
contributions to their lives, but rather to help them meet their immediate needs or regain their 
normal lives.  
 
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION FOR POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 
The Jama’at is a religious-based political party based on the ideology of a transnational 
Islamic revivalist movement. The party has formal structures and policies in effect. On the 
other hand, social movements are primarily informal network or people or groups deriving 
through collective action in order to achieve specific goals or changes. Therefore, a question 
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arises. Can the Jama’at be considered as a social movement at the first place, before even an 
attempt is being made to explain its activities through social movement theories?  
The answer to that question can be found in the complex identity of the Jama’at. 
Although it is a formal political party, the Jama’at has longstanding history of confrontation 
with the establishment. In Pakistan, the party was banned in the fifties by the military ruler 
Muhammad Ayub Khan. After the independence of Bangladesh, it was banned again (Nasr, 
2005). Apart from participating in the coalition government during 2001 – 2006, it has 
always remained in the opposition and struggled for different political, religious and social 
issues. Currently, it is officially prohibited from participating in the elections96, although the 
people associated with the Jama’at have active participation in all areas of political sphere 
through various names and forms97. Moreover, social movements do not necessarily exclude 
any formal organization all the time. Staggenborg (2008) studied social movements that 
included movements with various organizational structures. He suggested that organizations 
with more formalized structure sustain more as a movement whereas informal organizations 
performs better at adopting innovative strategy. This is exactly the case with the Jama’at in 
Bangladesh as already discussed in the previous chapter and as will be elaborated more in the 
conclusion chapter.  
The definition of the social movements, as given by Greg Martin (2015, p. 1), is 
worth mentioning here. He viewed that the social movements “are collective forms of protest 
or activism that aim to affect some kind of transformation in existing structures of power that 
have created inequality, injustice, disadvantage, and so on”. It can be said that the social 
welfare activities organized by the Jama’at in Bangladesh meet the general characteristics 
                                                            
96 As mentioned previously in the Chapter 3, the High Court of Bangladesh suspended the registration of the 
Jama’at as a political party under the Election Commission of Bangladesh on 1st August 2013, and thereby the 
party is currently barred from participating in any national or local elections.  
97 For instance, two Jama’at leaders were interviewed during the fieldwork of this research who were elected as 
the Councilmen in the 2014 Chittagong City Corporation election. All Jama’at affiliated local leaders contested 
in that election as independent candidates.  
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mentioned in this definition. The party is providing welfare through an organized and 
collective activism process with an aim to bring about change in the society. The motives and 
aspirations working behind this welfare provision will be examined, based on the empirical 
data, in detail in the chapter 7. In brief, the Jama’at recognizes the poverty in the society as an 
outcome of unjust governance and attempts to alleviate it through welfare activities as an 
integral part of its political activities. Social scientists have always been trying investigating 
the reasons that motivate people to engage in collective action. For the Jama’at adherents, 
social welfare activities represent a core religious duty. Additionally, this activism has served 
the party as an avenue of mobilizing its manpower and material capitals in order to gain 
popular support as well.  
Apart from the social-change aspect, the Jama’at also represents an ideological 
movement. However, this ideological aspect of the party is strongly interconnected with its 
social aspect as it is competing in political and religious fronts with the ultimate objective of 
implementing ideology-based political and religious changes in the society. In this process, it 
has constantly been facing opposition on different grounds. Extremist religious groups 
condemn the Jama’at for compromising Islamic principles, according to their religious 
interpretations, as the Jama’at complies with the state law as ‘opposed to the Shar’iah (lit. 
Islamic Legal System) law’ (Islam, 2015). On the other hand, many in Bangladesh allege the 
Jama’at for being the umbrella organization for the extremist terrorists (Hashmi, 2015). In 
this constant struggle, the Jama’at has chosen to strengthen its ties with the society which has 
been proved to be vital for its own existence. While conversing with the leaders and members 
of the party, it was clearly understood that, especially with regards to their welfare activities, 
all of them consider their collective action as more of an ideological movement than merely a 
political party.  
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Social movement studies have recently been resorting increasingly to two closely 
related modern approaches to explain this phenomenon, they are Resource Mobilization 
Theory and Political Opportunity Theory (often named as Political Process Theory also). 
Developed by sociologists and political scientists such as Doug McAdam (1996), John 
McCarthy (1977), Mayer Zald (1996), Charles Tilly (2004b), Sydney Tarrow (2011) and so 
on, Resource Mobilization Theory recognizes the significance of resources in mobilizing a 
collective action whereas Political Opportunity Theory argues that the mobilization and 
success of a social movement largely depends of contemporary political opportunities. The 
political opportunity approach also focuses on factors such as resources, organization and the 
strategy of the movement (Cuzán, 1990).  
A combination of these two approaches are employed in this research to investigate 
the resources utilized by the Jama’at in organizing its social welfare activities as well as to 
examine the political circumstances surrounding those activities. In this study, several types 
of tangible and intangible factors such as manpower and social welfare activities themselves 
represent the resources. Moreover, motives of the welfare providers and experiences of the 
welfare receivers are analysed to understand the political realities of this phenomenon.  
Discussions in the previous chapter as well as in this chapter demonstrate that the 
Jama’at has a motive in gaining popular support and a stronghold in this economically 
underdeveloped society through various social welfare programs. Although the people 
associated with the Jama’at have their primary focus on religious humanitarian motive, they 
do not overlook their work’s implication in local and national politics, as well as in the 
elections. In his interview, a city Jama’at leader overtly attributed party’s political success to 
its social welfare activities:  
Practicing Islamic ideal can only change the society for better. Islam teaches us to serve 
helpless people, and we are actually far backward in this aspect. If the Jama’at can do proper 
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social welfare, this would be enough to win their heart and mind. Therefore, we are trying to 
inspire our people, to mix with others, to help them by whatever possible means… in the 
recent city corporation election in Chittagong, we have won 2 councils. Both of the areas are 
mostly populated with the Awami League supporters. One is the council no. 8, in 
Sholoshohor (a suburb in Chittagong city), the other is council no. 13, in Pahartoli (another 
Chittagong suburb), can you believe that Mr. Mohiuddin Chowdhury’s (the most influential 
Awami League leader in Chittagong. In Bangladesh, people usually support top leader 
especially if such a famous leader comes from their local area) home is situated in that 
council?… both areas are overpopulated with slums. They didn’t vote for the Jama’at, they 
voted for those two elected councilmen. They were the most active local Jama’at leaders 
organizing religious programs, charity schools, clinics, employment programs, cleaning 
programs, social awareness programs and so on in those slums. We even organized a Zakat 
(alms) distribution program in the home of Mr. Mohiuddin Chowdhury. It was not a Jama’at 
program, rather it was an ISWCC program. All of them know that we are the Jama’at, but 
they like us, they voted for us in local council election despite their political support for the 
Awami League (Interviewed in Chittagong city Jama’at office on 16th November 2012).  
An investigation into the social welfare activities of the Jama’at proves that socio-political 
connectivity is vital for organizing social movements as well. The Jama’at provides a socio-
political platform for people from various parts of the society to communicate and negotiate 
their demands. In this negotiation process, both moral and cultural resources play important 
roles. Interpretation of religion, socio-economic condition of the country, organizational 
structures and material resources, participation of the organizers in these welfare activities, 
varying influence of these programs on their receivers; all these factors constitute the 
construct of this social movement. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The people categorized as providers in these welfare programs of the Jama’at comprise the 
party’s leaders, intellectuals and activists and those other people who are directly involved in 
the welfare organization. The recipient category constitutes several types of people: patients 
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in the charity clinics, students receiving education in charity religious schools and their 
parents, people receiving financial and material assistance from the Jama’at and so on. 
Analysis of their participation revealed diverse facts and issues associated with social welfare 
provision by the Jama’at in Bangladesh.  
With regard to the providers’ motives, belief in a religious mandate to help the 
underprivileged is a very strong factor and religious motivation is undeniably the major 
reason behind organizing these welfare programs. However, the reality (and hence the 
practical demands) of the political context cannot be ignored. The Jama’at initiated social 
welfare activities as a means to pave the way for its return to politics, in the post-liberation 
war period, when the party was banned officially due to its war-time association with the 
Pakistani army. Moreover, in economically underdeveloped Bangladesh, the failure of the 
state to provide welfare for its citizens has resulted in fertile ground for private charity 
endeavours. Currently, the Jama’at, like many other Islamic political parties elsewhere, 
attempts to exploit this void to reach to the masses. Most Jama’at activists long for the socio-
economic development of their country and see it as going hand in hand with their 
humanitarian activities. Obviously, gaining popular support in a politically competitive 
environment is important for the future of the party.  
In providing these services, the party faces many challenges, most of which are 
associated with funding and with the political instability of the country. However, it would 
appear that the party is not focusing on improving the management of its social welfare 
provision at this time; rather, it simply wants to keep these activities going while focusing on 
other, primarily political, issues of the country. 
Recipients of these welfare services are presumed to belong to the lower income 
classes of society. Although this may be the case for most services, such as charity schools or 
activities offering occasional financial assistance, for the medical welfare service there are 
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some exceptions in this regard. Through participant observation, I found that some 
beneficiaries in those charity clinics were from the middle and lower middle classes. 
However, unlike what was found in previous studies of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, the 
recipients of the welfare organized by the Jama’at, as an Islamic political party, in 
Bangladesh are, in general, the very poor and underprivileged people.  
The welfare provided by the Jama’at is greatly appreciated by the people who benefit 
from it. Although it is not sufficient to meet all their needs, it helps them face their immediate 
problems and generally there are no complaints about the shortfalls. Nevertheless, it was 
clear that the Jama’at has failed to utilize its potential to develop a better welfare service, 
primarily due to its lack of emphasis on this area. This can be seen in its out-dated working 
strategies regarding the organization of its social welfare programs. Despite, or maybe 
because of, being in operation for more than four decades, party leaders and activists 
generally carry out welfare activities as part of their regular work and do not seek to improve 
their scope and effectiveness.  
Among the recipients, despite their gratitude for whatever they receive, this situation 
has some negative consequences for the party, the major one being the lack of religious, 
political and economic influence that it has in their lives. The party certainly has the 
opportunity to spread its religious teachings, as well as its political ideology, through these 
activities, as many of the welfare workers would like to do. Moreover, proper planning and 
strategic development would enable the party to make a more sustainable socio-economic 
contribution to people’s lives. But this has not happened in Bangladesh. The Jama’at was a 
major part of a coalition government of the country from 2000 to 2005 and the Secretary 
General of the party acted as the Social Welfare Minister at that time. But it failed to utilize 
that opportunity also, due to its emphasis on political aims instead of religious and social 
aspects of its agenda. Currently, the Jama’at is facing political annihilation by the 
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government; one of the Assistant Secretaries General was hanged in December 2013, the 
supreme leader of the Jama’at died in jail in October 2014 and all other central leaders are in 
prison, either having received a death sentence from the War Crimes Tribunal, or waiting for 
it. This political hardship is certainly a major drawback for the party’s social welfare 
provision. However, the ISWCC and other social welfare organizations of the Jama’at, 
although operating at a very minimal level and affected by the political instability, are now 
providing the party with an important means to communicate with the general population. It 
is obvious that this social welfare provision has a great potential in Bangladesh. Two 
important factors need to be considered in this regard. First, the weak economy of the state 
allows opportunities for private welfare endeavours. Second, although the state is officially 
declared secular, most Bangladeshis lean towards their religious identity. Religion has always 
been an important factor in Bangladeshi politics. In this context, a successful social welfare 
movement requires better resource mobilization and more sophisticated dealings with the 
major political elements of the society.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
This study has shown that the Bangladesh Jama’at-e-Islami, an Islamic revivalist political 
movement which embraces modern socio-religious strategies in order to attain its primary 
objective of establishing Islamic governance at a state level, focuses significantly on 
providing social welfare assistance. The primary aim of this study is to undertake an 
ethnographic exploration of the party’s social welfare activities and, in so doing, to examine 
the reasons behind this socio-religious phenomenon, which has practical political 
implications in a Muslim-majority secular state. In order to address this task, the qualitative 
inquiry method has been adopted for the research. The significant data, gathered through 
interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation, demonstrate that the social 
welfare provided by this political party serves as one of its avenues of resource mobilization 
as a social movement in Bangladesh.  
Political activities always have a close relationship with the society in which they are 
conducted. The phenomenon studied in this research has added a new dimension to that 
relationship with regard to the Islamic political parties. It also implies the future growth of 
such welfare programs in many Muslim countries, the majority of which are economically 
underdeveloped and lacking an adequate state-supported welfare system for their citizens. 
Although the Jama’at has several organizational shortcomings, the party’s provision of social 
welfare provides it with a support base in Bangladesh to some extent, despite the current 
adverse political situation there. The Jama’at’s support for the poor, who constitute the vast 
majority of Bangladeshi citizens, creates opportunities for this movement to increase its 
political power, although its inherent religious motivation to offer charity is also genuine.  
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In order to expand the arguments of this study, the first five chapters present the 
conceptual foundation of the topic, along with its historical background and a descriptive 
inquiry into the current situation of the Jama’at. As a major Islamic revivalist movement, the 
Jama’at holds a significant position in the socio-political discourse of Muslim societies. 
Particularly in the context of the current global war on terrorism and the civilizational clash, 
and like its counterparts in other Muslim countries, which are embracing a corresponding 
ideology and working to bring a religious change into socio-political governance through 
political participation, this movement plays an important role in the balance between 
secularism and religious extremism. Chapter 5, which examines the history and development 
of the Jama’at in Bangladesh, shows that after steady growth in the political arena during the 
last three decades, the Jama’at in Bangladesh is currently encountering the most difficult 
period in its history. Several top leaders of the party have been imprisoned and some have 
been given death sentences following allegations of war crimes committed during the 
liberation war in 1971. Three central Jama’at leaders, Abdul Quader Mollah, Muhammad 
Qamaruzzaman and Ali Ahsan Muhammad Muzahid were hanged between 2013 and 2015, 
the others are awaiting legal execution in prison. Although the party has now been legally 
banned from participation in elections and most of its activists are either in prison or in 
hiding, it is interesting to note that the social welfare programs of the movement are still 
actively functioning.  
One of the reasons for this is the organizational structure that the Jama’at has adopted 
to implement its social welfare agenda. This operates through a combination of internal party 
structures and a complex network of socio-religious non-political organizations run by 
Jama’at members. The party has established several non-political welfare organizations as a 
front for its social welfare program, the Islamic Social Welfare Council Chittagong (ISWCC) 
being the oldest and most active of these.  
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Chapter 6 focuses on ethnographically investigating the social welfare program of the 
Jama’at, especially the medical and educational welfare organized through the ISWCC in 
Chittagong City. It also examines in detail, through data gathered during fieldwork, the 
overall composition of the social welfare program of the party. The arguments and findings 
of this thesis are finally offered in Chapter 7.  
Although Bangladesh is constitutionally a secular country and the current government 
is run by a secular political party, religion still remains one of the most powerful factors in 
determining mass opinion regarding political issues. However, this fact has not much 
benefitted the Jama’at or any other Islamic political movements there. The development of 
religious identity in the Bangladeshi Muslim mindset has a strong relationship with local 
culture and traditions. As in many other Muslim majority countries, political revivalist 
readings of Islam have introduced a new way of looking at religion to the masses, most of 
whom are illiterate and belong to the economically underprivileged agricultural classes. In 
this context, social welfare provision should assist the Jama’at in building a functional 
relationship with them.  
The provision of social welfare is certainly atypical as a general characteristic of 
conventional political parties, but this marriage between political and social activities 
achieved by the Islamic political parties has become an emerging trend, worldwide, in recent 
decades. The Jama’at initiated this merger in the 1970s, almost at the same time as did other 
Islamic political parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle-East and Islamic 
movements in Turkey. It can therefore be assumed that the instigation of social welfare 
activities by the Jama’at was not just their own initiative, but rather part of a global trend 
adopted by several movements having a similar ideology. In Bangladesh, the adverse post 
liberation war situation of the Islamic movements and the government’s ban on the Jama’at 
gave the members of this movement more reasons to attempt such non-political means of 
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starting up their activities. However, the development and outcomes of this social welfare 
phenomenon differ from country to country, and society to society.  
It is naturally to be presumed that the utilization of social welfare as an important 
instrument of resource mobilization would help advance these movements politically, 
especially among the lower classes of society. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s social 
welfare program, predominantly in the health sector, has established a stronghold for the 
party among the general population. The Muslim Brotherhood won the first democratic 
election in Egypt’s history in 2012 – only to be ousted from power by the Egyptian military 
one year later. In Turkey, Islamic movements have achieved remarkable success through their 
participation in social welfare activities, ranging from health and education to financial 
institutions. Currently, the Justice and Development Party, officially a democratic party, but 
influenced strongly by Islamic revivalist ideology, has been ruling since 2001. These success 
stories are often cited by Jama’at members, motivating them to put more emphasis on social 
development. However, the current situation of the Jama’at in Bangladesh is very different 
from that of such Islamic movements in other countries. The party is now in opposition and 
has been strongly repressed by the government since 2008. During the several years prior to 
that, it experienced constant growth in national politics and won seats in 17 constituencies out 
of 300 in the national election in 1991. The party was part of a coalition government and the 
Jama’at President and the Secretary General held ministerial positions from 2000 until 2005. 
After three years of military government in Bangladesh, the Jama’at won only two seats in 
the national election in which it participated in 2008. The party boycotted the national 
election of 2013, along with other major opposition parties.  
Political outcomes aside, the social welfare program of the Jama’at makes 
contributions to the recipients’ lives from religious and economic perspectives, particularly in 
the education sector, through charity schools which have a strong religious influence in the 
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lives of the students who attend them. The medical and financial assistance given was mostly 
found not to have such a strong and sustainable impact, although the contribution it makes to 
the lives of the poor who are struggling merely to survive in this underdeveloped country 
should not be ignored.  
One of the major weaknesses apparent in the social welfare program of the Jama’at is 
its lack of strategic planning and its outdated approach. Its welfare activities in independent 
Bangladesh began in the 1970s, prior to its political activities. Most of the infrastructure, such 
as the buildings and material resources which are still being used for charity welfare 
purposes, was established around this period. From the condition of those buildings and items 
of furniture and their settings, it is obvious that the organization has made no attempt to 
modernize them or develop them from time to time.  
The modus operandi of the Jama’at’s social welfare provision, such as the sectors in 
which it operates and the activities through which it is carried out, has likewise hardly been 
updated. The method of fund collection also remains the same, as the organizers have not 
considered any income-generating activity or business or any other new sources of funding. 
Although the organization has long been suffering from a funding crisis, it remains solely 
dependent on occasional donations and religious alms (zakat). Almost all of the participants 
in this research who work in the Jama’at social welfare program complained of lack of funds, 
although they seemed to have no great concern about or plans to fix the problem. This 
attitude is in direct contrast to that evident in their rival NGOs, which are flourishing thanks 
to their fund-generating financial dealings, a comparatively new trend in Bangladesh, referred 
to as ‘social-business’ and introduced by Noble Prize laureate, Professor Yunus. With regard 
to the funding of the Jama’at’s social welfare program, most of the infrastructure was built 
and the activities devised in the 1970s, when charity funds from Middle-Eastern countries 
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were readily available. Currently, however, the situation is very different. In the aftermath of 
global terrorism, Middle-Eastern funding is almost impossible to obtain.  
The outdated strategic implementation of social welfare activities of the party is 
noticeable in its programs and activities. An examination of the annual welfare reports of the 
Jama’at and its secondary welfare organizations shows that almost identical programs have 
been continuing to run without any visible change for more than the last four decades. One of 
the reasons behind this could be an unchanged strong leadership over the years. The 
leadership of the party, along with its subsidiary organizations and institutions, mostly 
consists of the people who initiated or joined the party in the late seventies. They are highly 
respected inside the party environment for their lifelong and selfless contributions to the 
party. This has both positive and negative outcomes. The Jama’at is known for its strong 
inter-membership bond and undivided obedience, however, the policy and activities of the 
party are suffering from being outdated.  
The leadership of the Jama’at has very strong authority over the party programs and 
agendas, as well as the party members. Although there are some perceivable grievances and 
criticism among some of the young party members, they are very minor in influence and 
number. Improved strategic aspects such as modern methods of fundraising, need of the 
websites and information sharing, providing one-stop service through an easily accessible 
customer care centre, professional review of welfare activities, and so on were mentioned in 
some instances by some of the young party leaders during interviews. However, all of them 
expressed that such changes are hard to see in the near future due to various facts such as the 
protective nature of the party facing adverse political circumstances, and stagnant mindset of 
most of the party leadership and members as well.  
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Currently, there is a huge possibility that the Jama’at would be banned in Bangladeshi 
politics as the government has been threatening and openly planning to do this for the last 
few years. In many cases, government officials even mentioned their plan to seize all 
properties and funds owned by the Jama’at, including all of its secondary organizations like 
the ISWCC. Although some of the Jama’at leaders, adopting a pragmatic approach, view that 
the party should move forward with a new name and changed leadership in order to face this 
threat, most of them have different opinions. A common argument prevailing among them 
suggests the fact, that the party was able to re-emerge in the independent Bangladesh with all 
stigma attached to its name due to its support for Pakistani rulers and the occupying army 
during the 1971 war, proves that there is no need to adopt new name, policy, or leadership. 
Moreover, this name, the Jama’at, is considered by many as a heritage and a symbol of 
connection with the identity of a transnational Islamic movement in the Indian subcontinent. 
This also shows the protective and orthodox mindset in effect among the Jama’at people.  
It is important to remember that the Jama’at is primarily a political party which has a 
strong capacity in social welfare. Major identity of this party is religious, and it considers 
social welfare as part of its religious obligation alongside political changes to uphold Islam in 
society. Although the party do not take a more modernized approach in its activities, young 
party supporters and workers have a visible presence in the digital world. In the context of the 
oppressive political situation of Bangladesh, the Jama’at people resort to the social media in 
order to propagate their ideology as well as to continue their activities. On the other hand, 
Bangladeshi mainstream media is generally politically biased as almost all newspapers and 
TV channels are owned by secular nationalists, and the Jama’at is generally subjected to 
negative propaganda most of the time. The Jama’at people have always been complaining 
about this issue and have been unsuccessfully attempting to gain a place in the media. 
However, the only TV channel owned by pro-Jama’at people was shut down by the 
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government in 2013 at a night of a massive police and paramilitary crackdown on the 
Islamists. There are few newspapers still running by pro-Jama’at people at the national level 
but they are very insignificant, suffering from low circulation, due to outdated presentation 
that fails to appeal to most of the population. This also proves that the stagnant and 
reactionary approach towards strategic policy is a common disease that the Jama’at is facing 
on all fronts, alongside their social welfare activities.  
One may wonder how this party continues to exist in Bangladesh and gain strong 
influence in politics although it fails to update and improve its policies. The answer is 
probably hidden in the complex nature of this party. Due to being a religious-based party, 
traditional means of propagation such as meeting in the mosques during regular daily prayers 
and religious meetings provide this party with an avenue for outreach which other political 
parties and social organizations certainly lack. During the fieldwork, it became apparent that 
the Jama’at will remain one of the most significant religio-political actors in Bangladesh 
despite all government oppression and enmity from strong secular segment of the society. If 
the party policies were strategically more advanced and updated, it may have an opportunity 
to win in this confrontation. However, that is not the likely case today considering its current 
condition.   
Another aspect of the social welfare program of the Jama’at is the increasing 
commercialization of their projects, which were initially set up to provide welfare. In the 
1970s and 1980s, numerous schools and medical centres around the country were established 
by Jama’at members, primarily with the objective of spreading their religious ideology. 
Almost all of these are now run as private profit-based businesses. They are commonly 
known for their religious affiliation and cost effectiveness, but they are not affordable for the 
lower-income classes. This is now true for all educational and medical service institutions run 
by Jama’at members, that is, the schools, universities and hospitals established in the last two 
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decades. Increasingly, the Jama’at members are finding employment and hence gaining a 
stronger financial position through these service-based business endeavours, but the number 
of charity schools and medical centres has actually decreased at the same time. Non-religious 
general NGOs are now establishing more charity schools and medical centres, whereas the 
Jama’at’s biggest fully functioning charity hospital in Chittagong, the Rabita Hospital, which 
used to be funded by the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conferences) and other Middle-
Eastern charitable organizations, was shut down in 2007 due to long-term mismanagement 
and the lack of post 9/11 funding. 
Political Islam is a worldwide thriving phenomenon in the current era, especially in 
Muslim countries. Long experience of colonial rule and failure of the authoritarian rulers to 
meet people’s expectation have paved a demand for democratic good governance based on 
the rights of the people. In this context, religious-based political parties will certainly 
continue to have influential positions in those countries and in the global politics as well. 
Despite the significance of this phenomenon, the Jama’at in Bangladesh has not received 
much academic attention. There is a dearth of literature regarding this party and its position in 
Bangladeshi politics and society, and even almost none about its social welfare programs. 
This study can claim to be the first investigation into the social welfare program of the largest 
Islamic political party in Bangladesh. Through an ethnographic approach, this case study 
introduces a detailed insight into the social welfare activities of the Jama’at in Bangladesh, 
and therefore, it is expected to be a useful reference for future research in this area. 
Furthermore, while focusing on social welfare aspects, this research work also provides an 
outline of historical and contemporary significance of this religious-based political party in 
Bangladeshi politics. Both social and political studies of Bangladesh have, to date, 
overlooked this position of the Jama’at  due to various reasons, mostly attributed to the 
secretive nature of this strictly organized party as well as the political stigma attached to its 
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role during the 1971 Liberation war. However, this is an undeniable fact that the party has 
been increasingly gaining influence among the general Muslim population and in politics. 
Despite announcing all threats to ban the party, the government officials also occasionally 
mention that the ideology and though of politico-democratic Islam would not be removed 
from society. In this context, this thesis also claims to contribute in the area of studying the 
Jama’at in particular, religious-based political parties in general, and any social welfare 
activities administered by religious authorities or organizations as well.  
Before this research, no study has been carried out which investigates the social 
welfare activities of the Jama’at in Bangladesh. However, social welfare activities of Islamic 
political parties in some other Muslim countries have been studied in the recent years. Most 
of these studies focused on the Middle-Eastern countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, 
and Turkey. There is an interesting similarity between these Islamic political parties with 
regard to their social welfare activities which has been long overlooked by the academicians. 
Charitable works and social welfare activities were one of the major avenues taken by most 
of the Islamic political parties in order to initiate their political existence in all those 
countries. The AKP in Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt were vigorously 
involved in social welfare activities in their early days. (Clark, 2004b; Rabasa & Larrabee, 
2008). In Bangladesh, the Jama’at had also started education and medical services before it 
announced itself as a full-fledged political party. One can deduce from this that the Islamic 
political parties have an inherent characteristics of providing support for underprivileged 
population and making their way into politics through this social class. On the other hand, 
electoral successes of the AKP in Turkey, the Hamas in Palestine and the Hizbullah in 
Lebanon were largely attributed to their social welfare activities (Clark, 2004a; Jawad, 2009; 
Levitt, 2006). This is different in case of the Jama’at. Although it is the largest Islamic 
political party in the country, it comes after two other major political parties, secular 
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Bangladesh Awami League and liberal-nationalist Bangladesh Nationalist Party, in terms of 
general popular support. In Bangladesh, the Jama’at has not gained much success in the 
national elections except being an alliance of a coalition government for once in 2001. Less 
attention towards improving its social welfare activities might be a significant factor in this 
regard. While the studies regarding social welfare activities of the Turkish AKP and the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood indicate their attention towards service development and 
continuous strategic improvement in their charity schools and hospitals, a critical observation 
of the charity schools and medical clinics run by the Jama’at in Bangladesh demonstrates a 
contrasting situation. Most of the welfare activities of the Jama’at are administered within the 
similar formats and strategies as they were initiated with in the late Eighties. Instead of 
improving charity activities of the party, the people associated with the Jama’at developed 
their private commercial endeavours in these service sectors. As a result, charity medical 
services of the Jama’at are provided through two modest clinics in Chittagong city whereas 
there are more than six full-fledged hospitals operating in the city that are established and run 
by the Jama’at leaders, workers and supporters. Similarly, charity schools run by the Jama’at 
through the ISWCC do not hold reputation and quality as like as the general schools run by 
the Jama’at people in the city. Apart from the lack of attention towards social welfare strategy 
development of the Jama’at, as it is argued in the analysis of Chapter Eight, this situation 
clearly indicates negligence towards the social welfare services of the party.  
A critical observation of the field of study affirms that relative deprivation and 
collective behaviour theory were not pertinent to the history and development of the Jama’at 
in Bangladesh, as some scholars suggested for some Islamic movements in other countries, 
claiming that low social mobility, great income inequality and poverty contributed to the 
development of social movements. This is not the case in the phenomenon of social welfare 
services organized by the Jama’at in Bangladesh. Rather, resource mobilization and political 
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opportunity models of social movement theory were most applicable there, as the 
development of the Jama’at’s social welfare provision owes much to a synthesis of religious 
motivation, potential achievement as a political party and pragmatic consideration of the 
socio-economic reality of the country. The analysis in this thesis demonstrates that most of 
the vital components of a social movement formation are present in the existence of the 
Jama’at in Bangladesh and in its social welfare activities. Political oppression and 
confrontations have resulted in a sense of grievance or ‘insurgent consciousness’ among a 
group that has been actively trying to achieve a political goal. In the case of the Jama’at, this 
particular goal is verily religious, which makes this a very unique and new social movement 
phenomenon. This also shows the importance of looking into the role of religion in creating 
social changes in this diverse and changing modern world. The role of religion as a resource 
element is also a curious addition to the social movement discourse.     
In this phenomenon in Bangladesh, social welfare activities are considered an 
important resource by the Jama’at in an attempt to meet its political opportunities. Although 
the Jama’at’s activities suffer from a lack of development and several shortcomings, the 
important role played by its tangible resources (such as political gain and ownership of 
infrastructural properties) and its intangible resources (such as religious and ideological 
motivation) is an inevitable benefit to it as a political party. In organizing social welfare 
provision, the Jama’at certainly regarded it as an important resource for achieving its 
ideological and political objectives, and thereby strengthening probable political 
opportunities. It could be argued that in organizing social welfare provision the Jama’at is not 
as successful as its counterparts in other Muslim countries. However, the current positive 
outcomes and the future potential of these socio-political activities are impossible to deny.  
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APPENDIX  
PARTICIPANTS IN THIS STUDY 
The following is a list of the social welfare providers interviewed during the fieldwork, 
totalling 19, categorized according to their role in the social welfare provision. The first 
group included 5 interviewees who were political and intellectual leaders with roles at the 
policy-making level of the movement. In the interest of confidentiality, all names are 
fictitious in this research to protect their identity. They are:  
Aref Haidar, 59 years old, a Chittagong city Jama’at leader, former leader of Bangladesh 
Islami Chatra Shibir (the student wing of the Jama’at) and a former member of the National 
Parliament of Bangladesh. He considers social welfare as a religiously indispensable duty of 
any Islamic group. He is a full-time politician with involvement in land business to support 
his private life. He was interviewed on 24 and 25 September 2012 in a hotel in Dhaka.  
 
Shafiul Azim, 52 years old, a Chittagong city Jama’at leader, former agriculture expert by 
profession and currently a full-time politician and the person most informed about the 
Jama’at activities in the city due to his position in the city Jama’at Executive Committee. He 
is responsible for communicating with local and field-level leadership of the Jama’at and 
organizing all political events. According to him, improving socio-economic conditions is a 
prerequisite of establishing Islam in the society. He was interviewed on 16 November 2012 in 
the Chittagong City office of the Jama’at-e-Islami.  
 
Nazmuddin Maudud, 74 years old, one of the prominent intellectuals of the country, a 
retired civil servant and known widely as an Islamic intellectual figure. He was an activist of 
the Jama’at during his student life before joining the government service. According to him, 
the Jama’at should focus on welfare through education in order to sustainably contribute to 
society’s development, something which has not properly taken place until now. He was 
interviewed on 25 September 2012 in his residence in Dhaka.  
 
Abdullah Masud, 42 years old, an academician teaching at a university in Chittagong. He 
taught in ISWCC welfare schools and currently associated with training management for the 
teachers of those schools. He is of the view that the moral development of the people at the 
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root level of the society is the biggest welfare service that should be carried out by any 
Islamic group. He sees obeying Allah’s order to help the underprivileged as the only 
objective of social welfare service by the Jama’at. He was interviewed on 9 October 2012 in 
his office in the International Islamic University Chittagong.  
 
Nawshad Ahsan, in his late forties, one of the elected councilmen from the Jama’at in 
Chittagong City Corporation. He owes his electoral success and popularity in his local area to 
the social welfare services of the party. According to him, selfless service for the people, 
regardless of their political or social identities, can only ensure acceptance of Islamic 
ideology of the party in Bangladeshi society provided that the providers plan and work 
intelligently to contribute to the recipients’ lives with long-term effect, which is not common 
in the organization of social welfare by the party. He was interviewed on 17 December 2012 
in his office of Madarbari Council, Chittagong.  
 
The second group of the provider-participants comprised Jama’at leaders and activists 
who have a direct role in the party’s welfare provision, and staff working in the welfare 
providing organizations. Similarly to the previous group, all names are fictitious to protect 
their identity. Eight of them were interviewed during the fieldwork. They are:  
Abdur Rahim, 65 years old, a member of the Executive Committee of Chittagong City 
Jama’at and one of the Islamic Social Welfare Council of Chittagong (ISWCC) leaders. He 
sees social welfare as the best avenue for preaching authentic Islamic teachings to the masses, 
but concedes that inadequate funds are the major problem which the Jama’at faces in 
organizing this provision. He was interviewed on 27 December 2012 in the head office the 
ISWCC (Islamic Social Welfare Council Chittagong).  
 
Asaad Mahmud, 68 years old, one of the ISWCC leaders, a full-time welfare organizer in 
the council and responsible for field-level implementation, and a Rukon (highest cadre of the 
party) of the Jama’at. He is responsible for communicating with all project officers, doctors, 
teachers, administrators and staff. With regard to the obstacles they face in organizing social 
welfare provision, he also seconds the opinion of the president that inadequate funds are the 
major problem. He was interviewed on 1 December 2012 in the head office the ISWCC.  
 
Rafiqul Islam, 51 years old, a member of the city Jama’at Executive Committee with special 
duty in social welfare provision. He been working with the Jama’at since 1977 when he was a 
student, and working in his current welfare related position for last six years. He 
communicates with, and manages, all social welfare secretaries of all local units of the party 
in Chittagong City. He emphasizes the importance of good organization of social welfare, as 
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it helps all party activists to train themselves to serve society, although he considers that the 
party has not been able to gain any political benefit from these activities. He was interviewed 
on 1 January 2013 in the office of a private secondary school in Chittagong.  
 
Gias Uddin, early fifties, an activist of the Jama’at and professionally working as the 
Supervisor for several welfare projects in a UK-based NGO in Bangladesh. He believes that 
humanity should be put first to improve the quality of social welfare services and to make 
best use of it in socio-economic development. He was interviewed on 2 January 2013 in his 
residence in Chittagong.  
 
Yeasinul Kabir, 50 years old, a city-level Jama’at leader with special duty in welfare 
provision. He has been working with the Jama’at since 1979. He thinks that the party does 
not gain any political benefit from social welfare services, as the election system in 
Bangladesh is corrupt and the poor voters are easily bribed by other parties. He was 
interviewed on 5 January 2013 in the Chittagong City office of the Jama’at-e-Islami.  
 
Abdul Qayyum, 51 years old, working as an welfare organizer of the ISWCC for 19 years. 
He thinks that the ISWCC has much more potential, which has not been implemented due to 
a lack of strategic planning and professionalism. He was interviewed on 28 November 2012 
in the head office of the ISWCC.  
 
Nazmul Islam, 41 years old, working as an welfare organizer of the ISWCC for 22 years. He 
considers the Jama’at exceptionally successful in educational welfare. He was interviewed on 
28 November 2012 in the head office of the ISWCC. 
 
Rabiul Islam, 35 years old, working as an welfare organizer of the ISWCC for 7 years. He is 
responsible for record keeping and official procedures. He thinks that the ISWCC lacks 
proper motivation and administrative resources. He was interviewed on 5 December 2012 in 
the head office of the ISWCC. 
 
The third group of provider-participants consisted of three staff members and activists 
who were especially involved in the medical welfare sector. Their real names are replaced 
with pseudonyms in this research to protect their identity. They are:  
Dr Zaman Ahmedi, 35 years old, working as a physician in a charitable clinic run by the 
ISWCC. This clinic is open in the evenings from 6pm to 8pm. This is not a voluntary job for 
him as it is a common practice for young doctors in Bangladesh to work part-time in 
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pharmacies and private clinics, mostly in the evenings. He is neutral regarding politics and 
apparently not very serious about practising Islam in his personal life. He was interviewed on 
1 November 2012 in a charity clinic run by the ISWCC. 
 
Asadur Rahman, 38 years old, working as an administrative assistant in an ISWCC charity 
clinic for the past 16 years. He is an activist of the Jama’at and, by profession, part of the 
administrative staff in a non-government hospital in Chittagong, which is commercially run 
by people associated with the Jama’at. He was a valued informant regarding medical welfare 
services of the Jama’at, as he was found to be one of the most knowledgeable about its 
medical welfare administration. He was interviewed on 31 October 2012 in a charity clinic 
run by the ISWCC. 
 
Nazmul Islam, 42 years old, local Jama’at leader and President of a local unit of the party, 
businessman by profession, with a special interest and long-term experience in the medical 
welfare organization of the movement. Interestingly, he considers organizing social welfare 
services less important for the Jama’at, feeling it should focus on the moral development of 
the society through Islamic preaching. He was interviewed on 8 October 2012 in his 
residence in Chittagong. 
 
The fourth and final group of provider-participants consisted of three activists and 
staff with roles in the educational welfare organization of the movement. Their real names are 
replaced with pseudonyms in this research to protect their identity. They are:  
Muhammad Jamal Khan, 38 years old, an activist of the Jama’at, founder of an NGO in a 
village in Chittagong and principal of a charitable primary school. He is more concerned 
about the funding problem than about examining the motives and objectives of the party. He 
was interviewed on 27 January 2013 in his NGO office in Chittagong. 
 
Abdullah al-Hasan, 35 years old, teacher by profession and local Jama’at leader. He is of the 
view that the party should employ more resources for better social welfare services provision, 
as the management of welfare is not properly planned and lacks motivation. He thinks that 
the people of the Jama’at are doing this now as routine work, rather than with a feeling of a 
prioritized moral obligation and inspiration. He was interviewed on 28 January 2013 in his 
school office in Chittagong. 
 
Khondoker Nizam Ahmed, early 40s. He has been an activist of the Jama’at since his 
student life and is now the Corporate Social Responsibility Management Officer in a large 
commercial corporation. He has a special interest and long-term role in managing educational 
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welfare activities of the movement in various places. He considers the Jama’at has failed in 
providing any real benefit from its social welfare services, due to corruption and lack of 
proper planning by the providers. He was interviewed on 12 October 2012 in his residence in 
Dhaka. 
 
Following is a brief description of the service recipients who participated in one-to-
one interviews. Their real names are replaced with pseudonyms in this research to protect 
their identity. They are:  
Sirazul Islam Khan, 45 years old, a small businessman and supporter of another political 
party, the Awami League, a political rival of the Jama’at. He receives regular medical 
services from the ISWCC charity clinic, despite being a middle-class person with relative 
solvency. His view is that the Jama’at is a party of good people but they are unfit for the dirty 
political arena in the country. He was interviewed on 17 January 2013 in a charity clinic run 
by the ISWCC. 
 
Kabir Sardar, 55 years old. He works as a security guard in a community centre and 
receives occasional financial assistance from the city office of the Jama’at. He thinks that he 
would be a beggar and in a very miserable situation with his four unmarried daughters if there 
were no help from the party. He was interviewed on 18 January 2013 in the Chittagong City 
office of the Jama’at-e-Islami.  
 
The first focus group discussion took place on 6 November 2012, in a community 
centre near the charity clinic, Darush Shefa. Although some recipients consented to use their 
real names, their identity is protected here by the use of pseudonyms. The participants are all 
female patients who received treatment in that clinic. They are:  
Nasima Akhter, late 20s, married. She works from home as a dress-maker and supports the 
Jama’at politically because this is a religious party and she feels it is her obligation to support 
it even if there were no welfare assistance.  
 
Modhubala Debi, mid 20s, unmarried. She works as a housemaid and is not concerned about 
the political affiliation of the charity clinic that is providing her with medical assistance.  
 
Hamida Begum, late 30s. She is married and teaches children of the slum in her home. She 
is grateful to the ISWCC for the welfare assistance she receives but feels there are some 
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major drawbacks, one being that there are no female doctors available to treat female patients 
for gynaecological problems.  
 
Rahima Khanam, mid 20s, married. She is a housewife and states that the perfomance of 
and services provided by this charity clinic meet her expectations.  
 
Asmani Begum, mid 20s, unmarried. She is a garment factory worker and has mixed feelings 
regarding this medical welfare service. According to her, most of the medicines are not 
available here and she has to buy them from general pharmacies. However, she is grateful 
that the ISWCC provides great support for her and her family members. She is happy to be 
able to receive services from an Islamic organization despite the fact that she is a Hindu.  
 
Khadiza Khatun, late 20s, housewife. She sees the Jama’at as a good political party but 
incapable of administering the country. Therefore she has always voted for another rightist 
political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.  
 
Radharani Vottacharjo, mid 20s, married. She is happy with the services she receives from 
this charity clinic.  
 
Bindubala Debi, late 30s. She is married and a housewife and thinks that this charity clinic is 
a blessing for the poor people living in the nearby slum, particularly the women. She is a 
Hindu and does not see any problem in receiving support from an Islamic organization in the 
same way as other Hindu women living in the nearby slum. Her mother-in-law, although she 
does not like to visit this centre, does not prohibit the family members from going.  
 
The second focus group discussion took place on 5 December 2012, and comprised 
the beneficiaries of a particular welfare event organized by the Bangladesh Farmers Welfare 
Cooperative, a sister organization of the Jama’at. The Cooperative organized a dowryless 
marriage ceremony, where 38 couples were married. Eight of the 38 bridegrooms joined a 
focus group discussion. They are:  
Muhammad Anwar, 22 years old, daily labourer. He is not aware of any relationship 
between the organizers of the occasion and the Jama’at. However, he is inspired by this event 
to practice Islam.  
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Abdur Rahim, 23 years old, rickshaw puller. He does not support the Jama’at in politics but 
he likes the local councilman, who is a Jama’at leader, for his support and care.  
 
Muhammad Suruz Chowdhury, 23 years old, construction worker. He joined this program 
because his new father-in-law is a Jama’at supporter and inspired him to take part in this 
marriage occasion as he cannot afford to organize an expensive wedding ceremony.  
 
Abdul Hamid, 22 years old, construction worker. He does not support the Jama’at but his 
parents are strong supporters of this party.  
 
Muhammad Nasiruddin, 27 years old, salesman in a furniture shop. He is an activist of the 
Jama’at and his new wife also supports the party. He believes that this kind of dowryless 
marriage is a religiously praiseworthy act and that the party did well by organizing it.  
 
Kamal Uddin, 29 years old, factory worker. He sees the Jama’at as a proper Islamic party 
that helps poor people like him to meet the important needs of their lives.  
 
Nazrul Shah, 23 years old, rickshaw-puller. He supports the Jama’at, as does almost 
everyone in his extended family. 
 
Muhammad Hasan, 25 years old. He is learning automobile repair in a polytechnic institute 
established and run by the people associated with the Jama’at.  
 
The participants in the third and final focus group discussion were the parents of 
students studying in the religious school run as a charity by the Jama’at. The discussion took 
place on 12 December 2012 in that school. The participants are:  
Mahbubul Islam, late 40s, owner of a small grocery shop. He has six children, two of whom 
are studying in the charity-run school. He is grateful to the Jama’at for providing this 
important assistance.  
 
Rashed Ahmed, late 30s, former rickshaw-puller and currently physically disabled due to a 
road accident three years ago. He thinks that general education is better than education at a 
religious school because it ensures better employment in the future. However, he cannot 
afford that for his son, a student in an ISWCC charity religious school. 
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Bahar Uddin, early 40s, daily labourer. He has five children, two of whom study in a 
ISWCC religious charity school. The others are infants.  
 
Nazib Miya, late 40s, jobless. His wife works in a garment factory and they have two sons, 
one of whom studies in a ISWCC school while the other goes to a free government school. 
He thinks that one of their sons should be religiously educated.  
 
Morshed Alam, 45 years old, jobless. He has a son studying in a ISWCC school. He believes 
that childhood is an important time, when a child’s mindset is being formed, and therefore 
religious education at this stage is important in order for the child to become a better Muslim 
in the future.  
 
Rajibul Islam, late 30s. He has four children, including a son who goes to a ISWCC school. 
His wife nearly died while giving birth to this son, and he vowed to give him a religious 
education if both mother and son survived.  
 
Yusuf Islam, late 40s. He is a Jama’at activist who sends both his son and daughter to a 
ISWCC school. He hopes that both will be good religious scholars in the future.  
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SAMPLE: LETTER OF APPROVAL BY PARTICIPANT ORGANIZATION  
Following application was written in Bengali and was approved by the President of ISWCC:  
 
To 
The Honorable President 
Islami Shomaj Kollan Porishod Chittagong 
Chittagong, Bangladesh 
 
Sub: Seeking Permission for Academic Research Data Collection 
 
Dear Sir,  
I would like to inform you that I, Faroque Amin, am an HDR student of Religion and Society 
Research Centre in the University of Western Sydney. I am inquiring regarding religious-
based social welfare activities in Bangladesh as a part of writing my PhD thesis. For this 
purpose, I need to gain academic analytical knowledge and understanding of the medical and 
education services organized by your esteemed organization and provided to the needy and 
underprivileged people of this region. I would like to talk to social welfare organizers such as 
the doctors, teachers, staffs as well as the receivers of those welfare activities.  
Therefore, I am requesting your kind permission to interview relevant people and observe the 
activities of those welfare institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
Date, Chittagong 
14.10.2012 
(Faroque Amin) 
HDR Candidate 
University of Western Sydney 
260 
SAMPLE: INFORMATION SHEET 
 
261 
 
262 
 
263 
 
 
264 
SAMPLE: INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
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SAMPLE: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION CONSENT FORM 
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